During the late spring of 1944, the constant Soviet pressure on Ukrania and the relative passivity that prevailed on the Belarusian sector, led to the formation of two clearly separate operational areas. While the Germans and their allies had nearly been driven back to the �jump off point� for operation �Barbarossa� in the Ukraine; they nonetheless retained control over vast areas of north of the Prype� River�s wet lands. The front�s consequent appearance was both an opportunity and threat for both sides in this conflict. But the Germans viewed strategical position as essentially defensive, partly due to their numerically weaker forces. Therefore the risk of their Belarusian region being outflanked from the south increased. An effective defence of the Belarusian frontline, which measured 1,100 km from Lake Nieszczerado to the town of Werba, would have required enormous military resources which the German�s Eastern Army (Ost Heer) certainly did not possess.

At the beginning of June 1944, a lull prevailed across the entire Eastern front which gave an indication that both sides were preparing for renewed and terrible conflict. In Hitler�s opinion, the greatest threat resided in the Soviet presence in Ukrania. He feared the so called �galician manoeuvre.� According to the Third Rich�s dictator, the Soviet forces didn�t plan to attack Byelorussia, but rather to strike with all out strength against the province of Lublin and then draw north into the area between the Wisla and Bug Rivers, cross the Bug and Narew Rivers in order to set out in an approximate direction towards K�nisberg, attacking and breaking off the contacts between the German homeland and Heeresgruppe �Nord� and �Mitte.� This inaccurate assumption concerning enemy�s intentions was also shared by Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, commander of the OKW, as well as Generaloberst Jodl, chief of staff at OKH command. In reality, such an ambitious plan of action lay far outside the Soviet Army�s capabilities. The �Galician manoeuvre� would in any event have been difficult to implement given the difficult nature of the terrain, supply problems and, not least, from a purely tactical standpoint. Despite this, Hitler believed that it was a possible and ordered Heeresgruppe �Nord Ukraine� to concentrate a large potion of its available tank divisions for battle, east of the Bug River. As a result, during early summer, the commander of this Heeresgruppe, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, received under his command as many as nine tank divisions and two�� in the main, these were assembled into the 1st and 4th Panzer-Armies. Apart from these armoured forces, the Hungarian 1st Army was put under his command. In contrast, the man entrusted with ensuring that Belorussia remained in German hands, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, had only one lone tank division and three armoured self-propelled gun divisions.

However, the Soviet side had no intention of concentrating all their combat resources on only one operational objective. The plans for the new strategic offensive consisted, namely, in successively spreading out its operations to new frontlines. By employing this strategy it would prove impossible for the numerically outnumbered defenders to concentrate its reserves in any one place, and thereafter, the Germans were able to be defeated in a number of destructive battles. This masterly plan from STAVKA, (Stavka Vjerchnovo Glavnokommandujusjtjego�� the Headquarters for the Red Army�s High Command) was set into action on June 9 when the Soviet Leningrad Front carried out an offensive against the Finnish Army defending the Karelian Isthmus. This was only a supporting offensive but an extremely vital one from the standpoint of Leningrad�s and Kronstadt�s security. Barely two weeks later, on June 20, the strong Soviet partisan units in Southern Belorussia launched a broad wave of sabotage actions against Heeresgruppe �Mitte�s� rearguard units. This marked the commencement of operation �Bagration�, in which four Soviet fronts destroyed Generalfeldmarschall Busch�s Heeresgruppe.

Selected to lead the actual execution of the �Bagration� offensive were: General Ivan Bagramians�� 1st Baltic front, General Ivan Tjernjakow�� 3rd Belarusian front, General Georgij Zacharov�� 2nd Belarusian Front and General Konstantij Rokossovskij�� 1st Belorussian Front, which later would initiate the attack only from its right, which is to say, eastern flank. Heeresgruppe �Mitte� which directly faced them; was composed of the 3rd Panzer-Army, the 4th Army, the 9th Army and the 2nd Army. Of these, it was only the 2nd Army that stood directly in front of the 1st Belorussian Front�s left flank, and therefore positioned outside the reach of the Soviet�s initial offensive.

While working on the operational details, it emerged that Stalin, with regard to Belorussia, favoured launching a powerful offensive at one single strategic point. However, General Rokossovskij, the commanding officer with most responsibility for that frontline, unexpectedly opposed the dictator and expressed his opinion that a pincer manoeuvre would be a wiser way to proceed. In his view, the first thing they should do is crush the flanks of the 3rd Panzer-Army and the 9th Army, and thereafter encircle the 4th Army. Stalin finally acceded to the general�s forcefully expressed opinion, but underlined for Rokossovskij that he now, in fact, bore the entire responsibility for the operations success, or failure, on his shoulders. This was a thinly veiled threat but the commanding officer of the 1st Belorussian Front was completely sure of his opinion.

Events at the front confirmed that Rokossovskij�s plan had indeed been the wisest option. Operation �Bagration� was launched on June 22, 1944, and led to the break up of the German�s 3rd Panzar-Army and 9th Army after only seven days. The German 4th Army, which had found itself wedged between these two, was half encircled. Due to the crumbling front, Hitler sacked Busch on June 28, and turned to Generalfeldmarschall Model to save the situation. This general, who was highly regarded by the �F�hrer� and �politically reliable,� had, at the same time, command over Heeresgruppe �Nord Ukraine�. Model, a former tank division commander, now became energetically engaged in the campaign but he did not succeed in saving the troops of the 4th Army. Together with the remnants of the 9th Army, they became completely encircled east of Minsk. The Soviet troops seized the Belorussian capital city on July 3, 1944. The fighting inside the encircled area ceased eight days later. The annihilation of the three armies meant in reality, that the entire Heeresgruppe �Mitte� had been destroyed. By the middle of July, essentially all of the divisions and some of the corps� commanders within the 3rd Panzer-Army, 4th Army and 9th Army had been killed or taken prisoner. Certain of these, for example, the commander of the 18th Panzer grenadier-Division, General Zutavern, or the commander of the 134th Infanterie-Division, General Philipp, had committed suicide. Germany had lost in excess of 300,000 frontline troops. In contrast, at the same time this took place, on the other side of the front, on June 29, Rokossovskij was promoted to Marshal.

In order to save the situation, Model took troops from the western Ukraine, as required. In an effort to open up the front northeast of the wet lands around Lake Prype�, Heeresgruppe �Nord Ukraine� transferred the 4th Panzer-Corps� XXXXVI command, the 4th Panzer-Division, the 5thPanzer-Division, the 7th Panzer-Division, and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� along with five infantry divisions, to the forces fighting in Belorussia. Over and above this, OKH and OKW organised the redeployment of the �Gro�deutschland� Division and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � from Heeresgruppe �S�d Ukraine� and a further three infantry divisions from �Heeresgruppe Nord,� plus the 12th Panzer-Division. Additional reinforcements should arrive from the territory of the Third Reich and the occupied states. The command-leadership of the Reserve Army promised to send ten new grenadier divisions (later called; the people�s grenadier-divisions�) to the east, as well as the newly reorganised 6th Panzer-Division, 19th Panzer-Division, 25th Panzer-Division along with the 6th Infanterie-Division. From Italy, the transport of troops from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division �Herman G�ring� was set in motion. In addition, two infantry divisions were to arrive, one from the Balkans and another from Norway. All told, beginning at the end of June through the first half of July, orders had been issued that would bring about the transport of eleven tank divisions and twenty-five other divisions to Belorussia. The German High Command was convinced that these forces would fill-in the enormous hole in the front which had appeared after the total destruction of twenty-eight divisions of Heeresgruppe �Mitte�.

In reality, at the beginning of July, Model had only succeeded in forming a couple of new divisions with units from other nearby Heeresgruppe forces. With these troops, primarily from the 4th Panzer-Division, the 5th Panzer-Division and the 28th J�ger-Division from Ukrania, but also drawn from the 12th Panzer-Division and the 170th Infantrie-Division from Latvia, Model launched the first counter-offensive west of Minsk. The fighting spilled quickly over into Lithuanian territory and thanks to the new tactical units; the German field marshal began to throw back the Soviet advances effectively. After successes at Vilnius and Grodno, the attacks of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts were strongly limited. In order to reorganise the left and inner-centre flanks of Heeregruppe �Mitte� (the right flank occupied by the 2nd Army still remained passive at the original positions they had occupied prior to the Soviet offensive) the Germans were forced to pay for it (the reorganization itself) at the cost of seriously weakening the nearby Heeresgruppe forces, particularly along the Ukrainian front. A further negative facet of hastily sending new or insufficiently re-organised divisions was that they went into battle as weak and poorly coordinated units. An additional problem was the slow pace at which the forces along the front could be reinforced. The reason for this was the great distance that units from Romania, Italy and even Norway (196th Infanterie-Division) or Holland (19th Panzer-Division) were forced to cover. Transport problems were aggravated by air attacks, partisan attacks, and finally, by the altered situation at the front. Sometimes, only isolated regiments arrived at vulnerable locations, while the rest of the divisions were stuck at railway yards or were caught up in fighting somewhere else and found themselves in an emergency situation. As a result of this, throughout the first half of July, Model could only employ a portion of the promised reinforcements. Only fifteen divisions were in place at the appointed time in western Belorussia. When the other combat forces eventually arrived at the front; those that had been sent into battle a couple of weeks before had paid heavily in terms of their combat strength. Additional divisions drawn from the Reserve Army did not begin to participate in the fighting until the end of July and on into August.

The Germans responded exactly as the STAVKA command had expected. The plan to successively broaden the front had been successfully demonstrated. It was only north of Belorussia that the Soviet side had time to attack before Heeresgruppe �Nord� had sent the majority of its reserves to its neighbouring Heeresgrupp�s assistance. When the attacks of the Soviet�s 2nd Baltic Front, 3rd Baltic Front and Leningrad Front took place, each in turn�� precisely as planned, it forced the OKW to halt any further weakening of the Heeresgruppe fighting in the Baltic States. The course of battle on Latvian and Estonian territory was protracted, but the Soviet successes, reckoned in terms of total kilometres of occupied land, was insignificant when compared with the other line-sectors along the Eastern Front. In fact, a threat to the German troop line, and the possibility of it being split in the proximity of Riga, was already discerned by the Germans at the end of July, but that crisis they managed to overcome.

It wasn�t until three months later that the Soviet troops cut off Heeresgruppe �Nord� in Kurland.

In all four pictures we find parts of SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 depicted while on the move behind the frontline during July 1944. Note that in the picture (bottom) on page 20, that the Panther�s gun muzzle is covered for the purposes of rain protection as is the muzzle of the machine gun, hardly the case if they thought the enemy were nearby. Note the �clock� on the inside of the machine-gun shield on the half-track in the bottom picture on page 20. This assisted the gunner in orientating the direction toward the correct target to shoot at. The top picture on page 20 depicts a Panther marked 800, ditto bottom photo on page 21, this tank belonged to the commander of the 1st Company from Wiking�s �Panther� Battalion. The half-track depicted on the right side bottom page 21, is a model Sd Kfz 250/3 and is a communication vehicle from the battalion command staff. In the top photo, page 21, we see a Panther, annotated 811, on the move with a couple of Sd Kfz 250/1s, probably part of one of the �Kampfgruppe� near the frontline; note the lack of rain protection on the muzzle. (Petter Kjellander)

In the meantime, on July 13, the battle-strong 1st Ukrainian Front began its offensive. Its commander, Marshal Ivan Konev had under his command six infantry armies and three tank armies. In addition, he also had at his disposal three individual tank and cavalry corps. After a few days, the attacking troops broke through the frontline, and by July 18, these forces reached the Soviet frontline troops in the Bug River area around Dobraczyn. The weakened German 1st and 4th Panzer-Armies did not manage to halt the Soviet forces, which over the days following July 20, proceeded to cross over the upper Bug River on a broad front with an entire four armies, two of which were tank armies. In addition, prior to July 22, Soviet units encircled and annihilated a couple of enemy divisions a little farther east along the river outside Brody.

In the middle of July 1944, as a result of the 1st Ukrainian Front�s activation and the 1st Belorussian Front�s offensive, which had now been underway for a month, the last line to quiet was on the Eastern Front�s central section was an area east of the Bug River�s central flow. On the German side, the right flank was manned by the 2nd Army (East of Brest) and at the outermost reach of its left flank, by the 4th Panzer-Army (between Brest and Volodmyr Volynskj�� the VIII Armee-Korps and the LVI Panzer-Korps). As noted earlier, the 2nd Army at this point had managed to avoid any crushing Soviet onslaughts as they fortunately remained outside the scope of operation �Bagration�s� first phase. Now, with their comrades in the north having suffered such heavy losses, they slowly drew back towards the west. The situation was similar on the 4th Panzer-Army�s left flank. They also occupied positions directly across the 1st Belorussian Front�s, still resting, left flank. The remainder of this German tank army was already engaged in fighting on the Volynia Plateau against the heavy attacks of Marshal Konev�s forces. This situation was completely changed on July 18, when Marshal Rokossovskij strengthened the offensive with the remaining sections of his combat forces. This course of events was to have a decisive effect in connection with Operation Bagration�s coming attacks directed against Warsaw.

On July 17, only two weeks before the Warsaw Uprising was to break out; Warsaw was still a long way behind the Eastern front, which was some 200 kilometres distant. The Polish capital city lay to the rear of the German 2nd Army under the command of General Walther Wie�. At that point in time, troops from this Army began to leave southwest Belorussia flanked to the north by enemy forces under the command of General Rokossovskij. Directly east of General Weiߒs forces, General Pavel Bjelov�s 61st Army began to exert pressure while the following three armies drew forward in the general direction of Hajn�wka: General Romanjenko�s 48th Army, General Batov�s 65th Army, and General Lutjinskij�s 28th Army, along with two tank corps, a mechanised corps and a cavalry corps (the 1st Tank Guards Corps, 9th Tank Corps, 1st Mechanised Corps, and the 4th Cavalry Guards Corp). The Germans tried to set up a new defensive position along the Grodno�� Hajn�wka�� Brest line, but on July 17, the opposition wrecked this plan by attacking and breaking through the front in the area around the Bia�owie�a forest. The German command, which already controlled the situation between Kaunas and Brest, had planned to nullify this breach by initiating a number of counterattacks, but the offensive that was launched on the following day from the 1st Belorussian Front�s left flank, totally laid waste to these plans.

It might appear that Marshal Rokossovskij during the fighting up to this point had already made use of the greater part of his combat strength. But in actuality, this was the first time the Soviet forces had set all their reserves into action. The make up of the 1st Belorussian Front�s left flank, which was located along the Prype栗 marsh area�� Kovel line, included General Vasil Popov�s 70th Army, General Nikolaj Gusiev�s 47th Army, General Vasil Tjujkov�s 8th Army Guard, Genral Siemjon Bogdanov�s 2nd Tank Army, General Zygmunt Berling�s, 1st Polish Army, General Jusjtjuk�s 11th Tank Corps, General Krjukov�s 2nd Cavalry Guards Corps and General Konstantinov�s 7th Cavalry Guards Corps. All told, these forces mounted to a total of some 416,000 soldiers, 8,355 artillery pieces, mortar and rocket launching ramps, and 1,748 armoured vehicles, (of which 665 were tanks, and 145 tracked artillery vehicles from the 2nd Tank Army). The offensive was supported from the air by 1,465 combat planes from General Fjodor Polunin�s 6th Air Army.

On July 18, the Soviet Marshal launched the attack south of Brest with the 8th Army Guard and the 47th and 69th Armies. The assault was aimed at the VIII Army-Corps� sector within the 4th Panzer-Army. This corps was composed only of three divisions, one of which was a Hungarian reserve division. As a result, the troops of the VIII Army-Corps were quickly cut down. By July 20, the attackers had already seized two tactical bridge positions along the Bug and had soon dispatched the 11th Tank Corps and 2nd Cavalry Guards Corps to these locations; In addition, during the course of the attack, the 69th Army had defeated the LVI Panzer-Corps of the 4th Panzer-Army (the 26th, 253rd. and 342nd Infantry Divisions and the 1st Schij�ger-Division). Here, the Soviets also met with success in driving their weakened enemy back across the river. At that very moment, the entire German front with the 4th Panzer-Army began to collapse, since the 1st Ukrainian Front, whose offensive had been underway for five days, was now able to link up with the 4th Belorussian Army�s left flank which, in turn, had now also begun to be active. At the same time, which is to say, on July 20, an assassination attempt was made on Hitler which led to a state of complete chaos within the German High Command.

In the situation that now prevailed, the 2nd Army was the only German combat force with any room to manoeuvre. It had been able to retain much of its combat strength. When the Soviet forces, now in the forests surrounding Lublin, began their attack operations, so too began the 4th Panzer-Division, under the 2nd Army, and the 5th SS-Panzer-division �Wiking� supported by the 102nd Infantry-Division and the 541st Grenadier-Division, to launch intensive counter-attacks outside Czermecha.

But this concentration of strength north of Brest actually suited the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front perfectly, because his command�s main assault forces were just then crossing the Bug River between W�oda and Che�m. Marshal Rokossovskij�s plan, after broadening the bridge emplacements, was to bring the 2nd Tank Army into the fighting and order it to attack in the direction of Siedlce. In this way, his front�s left flank, with two corps from the 4th Panzer Army having been beaten down, could strike against the rear units of the 2nd Army. Then, after the planned consolidation of the attacking armies from the right flank outside Hajn�wka, a large portion of General Weiߒs army would then be encircled outside Brest. Wholly unexpected, on July 21, Stalin ordered that General Bogdanovitj�s tanks were not to roll on towards Siedlce, as per east of Warsaw. the elegant plan that had been drawn up before the summer offensive, but instead, towards Lublin. The dictator wanted, as quickly as possible, to control the largest city on ethnically Polish territory, since it was there he had thought to create the marionette-like Polish Committee for National Independence (PKWN). STAVKA therefore issued an order to Rokossovskij to capture Lublin no later than July 27, as �the political situation and the democratic independent interests of Poland acutely required this.� Given such an order, behind which was hidden a power struggle between the communists and the Polish �London-government,� the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front didn�t dare to polemise. The road to Siedlce was instead cut off by General Krjukov�s newly organised rapid-response forces (the 11th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Guard Corps). This, of course, meant a weakening of the attack against the 2nd Army.

Two soldiers from the 4th Panzer-Division�s armoured reconnaissance units observe the enemy from an appropriate distance. The vehicle they are operating from is either an Sd Kfz 250 or a 251, the man on the right is using an artillery observation scope. The picture is taken in July 1944, from an area east of Warsaw

On July 22, the most vital Soviet forces had crossed the Bug and begun aggressive operations within the defence zone of the 4th Panzer Army. In the situation that now prevailed, the Germans were not capable of creating a new frontline down in the province of Lublin, not least because large contingents of the Polish Home Army had begun to swing into action against the German rear-guard. That same day, two units from the 2nd Tank Army, together with the 7th Cavalry Guards Corps, seized the town of Che�m, which led Moscow-Radio to announce that the PKWN had now been established in the city. In reality, the committee had been established two days earlier, in Moscow. Now Stalin was able to inform the Western powers that at last he had a partner with whom he could discuss Poland�s future. On July 23, he confirmed in a dispatch to Churchill:

At the very moment the British Prime Minister was reading these words, Polish Home-Army units, along with the 2nd Tank Army�s frontline troops, commenced the storming of Lublin. The battle for the city began in the morning of July 23 and was already decided only two days later, on July 25, as a complete success for the attacking troops. And despite the establishment of a provincial delegation in Lublin for the Polish government, this seemingly legal government administration could not survive within the PKWN �s sphere of power. On July 26, this political body undersigned an agreement with representatives of the Soviet Army where it was stipulated that: �all decision-making powers and complete responsibility for all questions related to the prosecution of the war within Polish territory where armed conflict is taking place as a result of the invasion of Soviet troops [�] shall reside with the Soviet Forces� highest commander.� The same pattern of events soon unfolded in Lublin province as had taken place in Volynien and in the Vilnius area. Partisan units were cleverly disarmed by the NKVD (the forerunner of the KGB) or were forced at gun point to lay down their weapons. Officers and political delegates were arrested, while non-commissioned officers and common soldiers in the Home Army were incorporated into General Berling�s army. Some of the representatives of this underground government went back to their secret operations.

At the same time, events at the front became increasingly intense. The 2nd Tank Army had reached Lublin even sooner than the headquarters� directive had planned. But during the fighting outside of Bystrzyca on the night spanning July 23-24, General Bogdanov was seriously wounded. His command was taken over by the tank army�s chief of staff, General Aleksiej Radzjijevskij. On July 24, the 1st Belorussia Front�s left flank, together with 3rd Guards Army from the 1st Ukrainian Front, crushed the German 4th Panzer-Army. The defeated divisions from the VIII Army-Corps retreated in chaos to the outskirts of Bia�a Podlaska to the rearguard area of the 2nd Army. The decimated LVI Panzer-Corps, on the other hand, escaped by fleeing across the Wis�a opposite Lublin. In this way, a 70 kilometre wide gap was opened up in the German lines between Pu�away and �uk�w. This gap was filled by the 2nd Tank Army, the 8th Guards Army, the 47th Army and the 7th Cavalry Guards Corps. When Radzjijevskij took over command, there were no enemy forces worthy of mention standing between his armoured corps and Warsaw.

However, the situation outside of Siedlce was more complicated. On July 24, General Krjukov�s rapid response forces approached the city. Seizing Siedlce and cutting off the road between Warsaw and Brest was a vital component of the plan to encircle the German 2nd Army. The defeated VI11 Army-Corps� retreat in an easterly direction towards Bia�a Podlaska, suited Soviet plans �hand in glove.� Soon, however, the 11 th Tank Corps� frontline troops were subjected to heavy attack from the Luftwaffe. Aircraft from the German 6th Luftflotte carried out concentrated carpet and dive-bombing attacks on the stretched-out mechanised columns. General Wei� made the decision to try and hold Siedlce at any price. He gave the order to call in the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking,� which until then had been fighting north of Brest, in preparation for the battle. Transporting the whole of both divisions at such short notice was an impossibility (as late as July 17 the forces of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� had been defending the isolated Grodno area), and therefore an improvised Kamfgruppe was sent south. The 5th SS-Panzer-division �Wiking��� for example�� was split up with support from the grenadier regiment. And while Kamfgruppe �Westland� (SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 �Westland�, the 1st Battalion from SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 and elements of the SS-Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 5) remained at the north front in the vicinity of the Bug River, other units began to slowly wend their way south. Holding the overland road toward Siedlce was a key concern for the 2nd Army�s right flank, because on July 22 the Soviet 65th and 28th Armies had reached the Bug River close by Siemiatycze. This meant that now the defenders of Brest�� the XX Army-Corps and the VIII Arm-Corps, who had also been transported there�� could only retreat to the west through Siedlce and the nearby Soko�ow Podlaski.

Now that troops from Heeresgruppe �Mitte� and those from �Nord Ukraine� had been isolated from one another, OKH made the decision to redraw the operational boundaries for the armies fighting at the front. The 4th Panzer-Army received orders to hold the line along the Wis�a south of Radom, while operational responsibility for the terrain north of this town fell on the shoulders of Heeresgruppe �Mitte.� In this way the VIII Army-Corps came to be incorporated into the 2nd Army. However, this army did not have sufficient troops to man the Warsaw defence line. The army command, with a great deal of difficulty, managed to organise the defence of Siedlce with its rearguard troops, but any chance of sending troops 70 km west towards Warsaw was out of the question! For this reason OKH handed over responsibility for the defence of the Wis�a River�s central portion and of Warsaw to the reorganized 9th Army. General Nicolaus von Vormann, who had command of this army, received orders to hold the front from Pulawy to Minsk Mazowiecki, where his left flank would establish contact with General Weiߒs forces.

General von Vormann was an experienced commander, but it seemed that the mission he had been handed was impossible to carry out. On July 25, when he reported to Heeresgruppe �Mitte� that his staff had taken up their duties, there was not a single German division between Pu�awy and Siedlce. The road to Warsaw, as with the frontline along the Wis�a north of D�blin, was not manned by even a single German soldier. To plug this enormous gap, OKH earmarked the 9th Army Parachute-Panzer-Division �Hermann G�ring� which was still on route via rail from Italy, plus the 17th and the 73rd Infantry-Divisions as well as the 174th Ersatz-Division. The Ersatz-Division had, up to this point, been engaged with carrying out missions in the occupied General-government, so that it could, in principle, be directly sent into battle between D�blin and Pu�awy. Immediately following which, it could then be supported by the 17th Infantry-Division. Meanwhile, the 73rd Infantry-Division together with Parachute-Panzer-Division �Herman G�ring� were despatched to Warsaw�s outskirts. The 60 kilometres that separated these two forces stood, for all practical purposes, completely undefended.

The following four pictures show Panther tanks from the 1st Panzer-Regiment 35, 4th Panzer-Division, July 1944 east of Warsaw in the war zone.

On July 25, the 2nd Tank Army�s frontline troops reached the Wis�a having taken D�blin and Pu�awy. An attempt to cross the river failed due to the determined resistance of the 174th Ersatz-Division. While awaiting the arrival of larger infantry units, General Radzjijevskij had held a part of the 16th Armoured Corps there, but gave the 3rd Armoured Corps and the 8th Armoured Guards Corps the mission of continuing attacks along the Wis�a in a northerly direction. On July 26, Soviet tanks set off at speed towards Garwolin. Following with them was the 8th Army�s Infantry Guards Corps. This was the 1st Polish Army�� renamed on July 27, the 1st Polish Volunteer Army�� which had the mission of manning the frontline outside D�blin.

At the same time that the two armoured corps from 2nd Tank Army pressed on, without pause, towards Garwolin, the battle for Brest in the east was being decided. The Germans, making use of components out of the 102nd Infantry-Division and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf,� succeeded in manning Siedlce in time and General Krjukov�s rapid response force�s first attack on the city on July 24 was thrown back in bloody fighting. In short, the 11th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade Corps got tied down in intense fighting and were not able to defeat the enemy by themselves, who had rather unexpectedly and in significant force made use of air attacks. As a result, the attackers were forced to await the arrival of the 47th Army. General Wei� had been successful in holding on to Siedlce, but the situation outside Brest by the Bug River had become critical. With the Soviet 28th Army having reached the Bug River near Siemiatycze, the city�s garrison�� the XX and the VIII Army Corps�� was now under threat of encirclement. Sometime on or about July 23, the commander of the 2nd Army ordered both corps to leave the city, and in all haste make towards Siedlce and Soko��w (at this time, the VIII Army-Corps was about to be split up: both units were actually already under the command of the XX Army-Corps� staff). A consequence of this sizable German retreat towards the west was that it worked to enhance the German troop strength protecting the Siedlce road. Brest itself was defended by the weakened Tactical Group �E� under the command of General Felzmann. This group had been built up from the bones of 203rd Sicherungs-Division.

The Commandant for the installation was General Scheller.

On July 25, immediately following the XX Army-Corps� retreat, the 20th Rifle Corps, from the 28th Army under General Sjvarjev, attacked Brest from the north, while the 9th Rifle Guards Corps under General Khaluzin from the 61st Army attacked from the east, and the 114th Rifle Corps under General Rjabysjev from the 70th Army attacked from the south. Prior to July 27, the German defenders of the city were surrounded and cut off from the rest of the 2nd Army. During the night of July 27, General Felzmann gave the order to breakthrough towards the west. As a result, the Soviet units on the following morning were able occupy the abandoned city of Brest and, at the same time, encircle the fleeing Tactical Unit �E�� yet again, about ten kilometres east of Jan�w Podlaski. Given the prospect of General Felzmann�s entire force being annihilated, a rescue operation was carried out and an improvised Kampfgruppe from the 102nd Infantry-Division was sent in, strengthened by a number of companies from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking.� Despite this, the Germans came to suffer considerable losses during the retreat and lose nearly all of their heavy battlefield equipment. General Scheller, among others, was captured.

At the same time, on July 28, after the battle for Brest had ebbed out and while intensive fighting for Siedlce raged on; STAVKA issued new orders to Marshal Rokossowski. Order nr. 220162 read as follows:

Given the situation which had arisen at the front during the last days of July, this was not an especially precise and/or logical order. Rokossovskij wanted to annihilate the 2nd Army sooner, namely, east of the Wis�a�s central area, and the order to attack Warsaw with the right flank (the 28th Army) and, at the same time, seize the bridge emplacements along the Narew (the 48th and 65th Armies) sapped his enthusiasm. But as though this were not enough, in a couple of additional coded telegrams from Headquarters, he was ordered to withdraw from the front, and to send the 61st and 62nd Armies north. The headquarter staff of the 1st Belorussian Front sharply objected, not only to the suggested direction the attack would be launched in, but also from the perspective of having just these two particular Armies designated to carry out this order. Marshal Rokossovskij�s reasoning held that if two entire infantry armies were taken from him, his front would be dangerously weakened. In addition, the 2nd Tank Army�s left flank could not cross over the Wicca south of Warsaw as there was a shortage of transport possibilities for the tanks.

In this situation, Marshal Zjukov, who was responsible for co-ordinating operations between the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Ukrainian Front, carried out a number of medium-scale changes in the original order while still retaining its main intent. Firstly, the 70th Army would remain under the existing command structure. To the north, with respect to the planned new offensive against Latvia, only the 61st Army was sent. Secondly, the 2nd Tank Army was to continue on towards Warsaw, particularly looking to send its armoured corps against the rearguard of the German 2nd Army. On having reached the join of the Bug and Narew rivers, they would then operate as the western jaw of a pincer movement. Praga would be stormed, providing it was clear that the enemy�s defences were sufficiently weak. If the Germans managed to reinforce that part of the capital city with a larger numbers of troops, Radzjijevskij should await infantry reinforcements from the 47th Army. The most vital import of the directive from July 28 thus remained unchanged. The primary mission of the 1st Belorussian Front was to seize the two operational bridges north and south of Poland�s capital. It was exactly from this location that the coming offensives should be launched; offensives that would ultimately destroy the German defence along the Wis�a and Narew rivers.

Zjukov knew that the Soviet summer offensive along the central sector of the eastern front would soon have to be slowed down. This was quite simply a requirement for implementing the masterly plan to launch the assault on not one, but rather several fronts, along with the incredible losses sustained in the fighting thus far. By the end of July, the Germans had already strengthened their positions in western Lithuania and across the Podlaski lowlands, and no reinforcements had subsequently arrived in the Baltic republics. Stalin demanded results on the front�s flanks�� but, for the moment, was primarily concerned with the situation to the south, where the large-scale offensive against Rumania was to begin in about three weeks time. Not even the powerful Soviet Army could handle two such broadly pursued and geographically divided strategic offensives simultaneously (the problem was not rooted in the number of soldiers available but in the system which controlled how the soldiers were deployed and how provisions and equipment were distributed.) It was with these circumstances in mind that Zjukov ordered Rokossovskij to first seize the well-defended bridge emplacements on the banks of the Wis�a and Narew Rivers. Konev also received a similar order. If the defenders resistance proved to be weak, both Marshals could press the attack further towards the Krak�w�� ��d��� Toru� line. But STAVKA, in fact, didn�t really expect all that much. It was typical of headquarters to issue orders that were somewhat overstated. In February 1943 for example, an order was issued to the effect that the enemy was to be driven across the Dnieper (in reality, the Germans crossed the river for the first time in October), and in the Autumn of 1943, headquarters ordered that Riga should be occupied before the end of the year (Latvia�s capital city was, in fact, taken in October� 1944).

Zjukov and the other officers at headquarters had another plan. For them, it was the bridge emplacements that were vital. After the success in the Balkans, it was around these strategic locations that they wanted to assemble the main Soviet combat strength and focus on a decisive offensive against Berlin. This concept originated in the summer of 1944 and became a reality by the winter of 1945. As it turned out, Warsaw played a subordinate role in the Soviet military plans. Gaining control of the city�s Praga sector was viewed as a high priority objective that should be accomplished as soon as possible, which is to say, during the first week of August. It was quite obvious that the chances of gaining control over the bridge emplacements were nearly non-existent. The Germans had mined them, and the approach roads to the bridges were covered by 88 mm guns and machine-guns hidden in concrete bunkers. The Soviets had gotten this intelligence toward the end of July from its agents and air-reconnaissance. Storming city sectors west of the river with frontline troops using Praga as a jump-off location was completely dismissed for tactical reasons. All of those cities built around rivers, like Kiev and Budapest, were seized through outflanking manoeuvres this also proved to be the case at Warsaw when it finally fell in January of 1945. Zjukov intimated to Rokossovskij that the city would be captured from the bridge abutments south of the Polish capital. In which case, the 8th Guards Army would be able to carry it out.

The political question remained however, and it presented a particularly sticky problem. Stalin was concerned about the Home Army�s troops in Warsaw, not from a military perspective but for propaganda reasons. Any attempt to disarm the Polish resistance movement in the capital city naturally threatened to awaken violent conflict to life. It appears�� with respect to this matter, no documentation has been saved�� as if the Soviet dictator awaited the outcome of the assault and was counting on a rapid seizure of Warsaw. The radio station �Ko�ciuszko� which was controlled by the communists, encouraged the Uprising. This kind of appeal was standard Soviet operating procedure when a need was seen to dilute the ferment of concern in the resistance movement�s backers. Fighting in the city would work to facilitate Soviet troop operations. In Warsaw, not only had the home-army remained combat ready, along with the organizations that co-operated with it, but also the so-called �People�s-Army.� Much depended on the precise time point the Uprising took place.

Stalin must have known, with a fair degree of certainty, that the 2nd Tank Army which was due to attack Praga with only one tank corps (the other two were designated to cut off the German 2nd Army) would not be strong enough to seize Warsaw�s central sectors west of the river. The regular infantry armies could carry this out. But these forces wouldn�t arrive at the city until a couple of days later, and unless there was a state of total chaos on the German side or an uprising, nothing could guarantee a successful crossing of the Wis�a in an urban setting. What the Soviet dictator actually planned, we�ll never know. Perhaps he had counted on the fighting breaking out in the city prematurely. His perception was that the Germans would pacify the city within a couple of days and destroy the Home Army, after which the 8th Guards Army could enter the Polish capital from the south. It�s also possible, as has already been mentioned, that Stalin shelved decisions concerning Warsaw until later and, in effect, let them be decided based on what resulted from the frontline attacks east of Poland�s capital.

Towards the end of July, military operations began to directly take in Praga�s south-eastern suburbs. On July 27, brigades with frontline troops from the 2nd Tank Army began a series of debilitating battles over a 40km stretch and took possession of the Garowlin-area. At that moment, the German 9th Army�s command of the approaches into Warsaw rested solely on General Fritz Frank�s 73rd Infantry-Division (the 70th, 170th and 186th Infantry-Regiments, and Artillery-Regiment 173) along with smaller units drawn from General Wilhem Schmalz�s division �Herman G�ring� (Aufkl�rungs-Abteilung and a portion of Flak-Regiment). General von Vormann deployed, rashly enough, these weakened forces (Gruppe �Frank�) to the south with the mission of impeding the pace of the Soviet advance. In fighting with two Soviet tank corps over July 27-28, the 73rd Infantry-Division suffered heavy losses and was driven back to the Otwock�� Minsk Mazowiecki line. General Frank was taken prisoner and a portion of the units from his division escaped in tatters to the other side of the Wis�a.

In this situation, the status of the 9th Army became critical. On July 27, Hitler appointed General Reiner Stahel as commander of the entire Warsaw military district. He was regarded as an expert in urban warfare. Actually, Stahel was an officer in the Luftwaffe, but had already been posted as commandant over Rome and Vilnius in 1944. Hitler ordered Stahel to defend the city �at any price.� The Germans knew about the plans for an uprising and therefore prepared their troops for fighting on two fronts. The troop strength at the city�s outposts was reinforced and soldiers from Pionier-Bataillon 654 awaited orders to blow up the bridges. Model wanted to stop the 2nd Tank Army with a sudden counter-attack east of the Praga district, and at the same time, protect Warsaw with division �Herman G�ring � and the 73rd Infantry-Division. He also got the all-clear to redeploy 19th Tank-Division from the north to the Warsaw region and placed it on combat-ready status.

On the other side of the front, General Radzjijevskij�s two tank corps approached Praga on July 28. The third, the 16th Tank Corps, remained a little in the background, but quickly tried to link up with the rest of the army by attacking directly along the Wis�a�s eastern shore�� behind them, trailed rifle divisions from the 8th Guards Army. General Vasilij Tjujkov received orders to cross the river south of the capital (the order was formally issued on July 29, 1944). At the same time, in the area around Kazimierz Dolny, the 69th Army had already begun to cross the river and the 1st Polish Volunteer Army stood outside D�blin. At Siedlce, the rapid response force and the 47th Army, which had just arrived in the area, were engaged in heavy fighting. After taking Brest, the 70th Army relentlessly drove a fortification garrison westwards, while the 61st Army had just begun to withdraw from the 1st Belorussian Front.

The table displayed above was compiled by General Radzjijevskij�s staff on August 28, 1944 and may not be entirely accurate.

It is not clear if the report overlooks certain independent units who operated under the direction of the army commander. In addition, there is some question as to whether any of the tanks were otherwise occupied or undergoing repair. The list includes a total of 568 tanks and tracked assault guns (among them 19 SU-57s). According to other sources, which are also based on Soviet records (T.�Sawicki, W.�Wo�oszyn), the 2nd Tank Army on July 17, 1944 was composed of a total of 810 armoured vehicles; (665 tanks, 145 tracked assault-guns) while on July 27, 1944, reports indicated they still possessed some 680 armoured vehicles.

On the morning of July 29, tanks from the 3rd Tank Corps under the command of General Nikolaj Vjedjenjejev resumed their northward offensive. From the east, they had gone around elements of the 73rd Infantry-Division, which were retreating towards Warsaw, and cut off the main roadway towards Siedlce between Mi�sk Mazowiecki and Ka�uszyn. This accomplished, the corps� tank brigades once again headed west and reached the Stanis�aw�w-region. General Vjedjenjejev then sent out reconnaissance patrols in the direction of T�uszcz. That evening, the 3rd Tank Corps� advance troops cut off the railway line between Warsaw and Bia�ystok.

East of the 3rd Tank Corps along the Wis�a, units from General Ivan Dubovoj�s 16th Tank Corps went on the offensive. These were probably the same tank troops from the corps who had, on or about this time, destroyed the German armoured train nr. 74 along the stretch between Otwock and Pogorzel Warsaw (It may also have been tanks from the 109th Tank Brigade). But following immediately behind the 3rd Tank Corps, General Aleksiej Popov�s 8th Tank Guards Corps also rolled northwards and, at the same time, secured the tank army�s right flank. On July 29, this corps reached Mi�sk Mazowiecki.

The Germans tried to assemble their combat forces as quickly as possible for Generalfeldmarschall Model�s counter-attack. That day, responsibility for the defence of Praga was placed on Lt. General Dietrich von Saucken�s XXXIX Panzer-Corps, which had been deployed there from the 4th Army, which at that time was being reconstructed in Lithuania. Under Von Saucken�s command were the 19th Panzer-Division and the Parachute-Panzer-Division �Herman G�ring.� His greatest problem was the all too real shortage of combat forces. General Hans K�llner�s 19th Panzer-Division had just begun to move in the direction of Warsaw, starting out from the northeast near Wysk�w. Moreover, this force didn�t mount to a full formation since the transport of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 and the division�s artillery from Holland had not yet been completed. By July 29, only one of these Kamfgruppe had actually arrived in the area around Praga, almost certainly strengthened by a couple of tanks from Panzergrenadier-Battalion �Panther.� The rest of the formation was expected to arrive over the coming days.

The situation for division �Herman G�ring� was far from ideal. They were forced to transport General Schmalz�s force in, all told, 72 railway coaches As a result of Soviet bombing raids on the capital city�s railway stations, large sections of the division, tanks included, were off-loaded outside the city in Pruszk�w and Piast�w�� after which, these units were reassembled in Warsaw�s western suburbs, from where they then made their way to Praga. The outcome of this, given the limited capacity of the suburbs� railway stations; was that off-loading became an excessively drawn-out process. The first units from Division �Herman Gorimg� to turn up in Warsaw arrived on July 25, and on the following day they began to demonstratively drive through the city. An intention of this, of course, was to make a psychological impression on the city�s citizens. To a certain extent, this also appears to have been the case.

On July 30, the units of the Fallschirm-Flak-Regiment �Herman G�ring�, arrived in Praga, along with elements of the Fallschirm-Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment �Herman G�ring�, Pionier-Bataillon and Panzer-Aufkl�rungs-Abteilung. The march through Warsaw of the most vital force, that is to say�� the Fallschirm-Panzer-Regiment �Herman G�ring� and two parachute panzer-grenadier regiments, (Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 1&2), was, on the other hand, decidedly disoriented. The panzer regiment had arrived in a weakened state because as late as July 3, on special orders from Hitler, a portion of I Battalion�s personnel had been sent to Holland to equip the forces sent there with the new �Panther� tanks. The result of this was that the first vehicles to roll into battle were the Tiger tanks of the III Battalion, whose 10th Company received support from infantry troops out of the 73rd Infantry-Division, which was retreating from the area around Siennica. The following day, the company covered the infantry�s withdrawal south of Sulej�wek, and a portion of the III Battalion became involved in fighting near Pogorzela. At the same time, the Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment I, supported by artillery, consolidated with units from the II Panzer-Abteilung outside of Marki prior to the planned counter-attack, while Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 2 was still in route to the front.

General von Vormann was still counting on support from the 6th Luftflotte and two grenadier brigades. The Luftwaffe had at its disposal a vast number of anti-aircraft batteries from the 80th Regiment in the Warsaw region�� everything ranging from units armed with light 20mm calibre weapons, to heavy 88mm artillery guns. All told, this mounted to 19 heavy batteries, 3 medium-heavy batteries and 11 light batteries. In addition to these resources, based at nearby airfields were Ju 87D bombers from 1 Gruppe in 1 Staffel out of the SG 1 (Schlachtgeschwader 1) and the 4th Flieger-Division in the 77th StG (Sturzkampfgeschwader), along with Bf 109G fighter planes from the 1 Gruppe from JG 51 (Jagdgeschwader 51). These were not especially impressive combat planes, but�� thanks to the extensive distance separating Soviet airfields from the field of battle�� the German planes had a local advantage in the air over the battle area outside Warsaw. Now and then, the 6th Luftflotte also took advantage of its greater strength in air battles, but they continued to concentrate most of their air power and superiority on supporting the 2nd Army. This, for the Germans, favourable balance of air power over the Warsaw area was not to change radically until the second week of August.

The 9th Army also received reinforcement from the newly formed 1131st and 1132nd Grenadier-Brigades, plus a couple of defensive battalions. The Army Chief of Staff reported on their potential: �These units have far too few, or no heavy weapons whatsoever at their disposal, no artillery whatsoever and they are in no condition to withstand a heavy enemy attack both because of poor armament but also because of poor training.�

With this in mind, von Vormann put anti-aircraft guns at their disposal and thereby increased the firepower of both brigades. The Grenadier-Brigades remained in position south of Warsaw�s central sectors west of the river. If an uprising was to break out they were to be used to bring the city under control.

On July 29, Generalfeldmarschall Model, after receiving alarming reports from the commander of the 9th Army concerning the possibilities of defending Praga and about the sudden offensive with regard to enemy attacks outside Mi�sk Mazowiecki, ordered the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� to disengage the enemy at the Bug�s lower section and march towards Warsaw. He also despatched a portion of the 4th Panzer-Division there. This Kampfgruppe would arrive in Praga immediately behind the 19th Panzer-Division through Wyszk�w. At this point and time, the Germans apparently had difficulty in identifying the Soviet forces which were attacking Poland�s capital city, since they had initially taken the 3rd Tank Corps to be a cavalry corps. On the other hand, they correctly identified the 16th Tank Corps and the 8th Tanks Corps.

The order to march westwards reached the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and SS-Oberf�hrer Hellmuth Becker at Siedlce�� where, for the last two days, he had been engaged in hitting back at General Krjukov�s rapid response force. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� and SS-Gruppenf�hrer Herbert Gille had not, on the other hand, completely finished their transport across the Bug where Kampfgruppe �Westland� carried out a counter-offensive against the 65th and 68th Armies. But by July 29, the majority of the divisions had nonetheless assembled outside of W�gr�w, northwest of Siedlce. In some literature, information indicates that II SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking� (which was part of Kampfgruppe �M�hlenkamp��� HQ staff of the SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking�, II SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking� and a part of SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania�), had fought outside Siedlce on July 28�29, destroying 107 Soviet tanks while only losing 6 of their own. It must be observed, however, that it�s very doubtful this battalion could have been present at that location on July 29. At Siedlce, soldiers from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � did fight and they actually did destroy an impressive number of the 11th Tank Corps� tanks. But in Heeresgruppe �Mittes� situation report of July 30, it states that the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� was located in W�gr�w. And inasmuch as the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� retreat from Siedlce resulted in the city being seized by Soviet forces that very day, the possibility of SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking�s� tanks engaging in the fighting at Siedlce is hardly realistic. They did, however, participate in battle east of the city, since that portion of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� which battled in the south retreated across �osice and Mordy to Soko�ow Podlaski, and from there, on towards W�gr�w.

On July 30, the situation was complicated even more on the stretch towards Warsaw. Early that morning, the 3rd Tank Corps� reconnaissance units tried to seize Zielonka. The Germans beat off the assault. At the same time, the corps� main force struck at Wo�omin and after they had taken it, they set their sights on Radzymin. After a couple of hours, both towns were in General Vjedjenjev�s hands. Frontline troops within the 103rd Tank Brigade had encircled Radzymin�� the 50th Tank Brigade had occupied positions west of Wo�omin in the area by the road towards Marki, while the 51st Tank Brigade had secured the corps� right flank, east of Stanis�aw�w. Additional forces, in the form of the 57th Mechanised Brigade, were also on their way to this area, although they had for a short period of time lost connection with their tank units during an attack against German corps� second echelon. Here, it�s appropriate to point out that in carrying out this well-executed armoured raid into unknown territory, the Soviet tank crews were indebted to local units of the Home Army and the local population, who had gladly volunteered their expert knowledge of the area.

The seizure of Radzymin by the 103rd Tank Brigade meant that the 3rd Tank Corps � commander had, in effect, executed the order to cut off the German 9th Army from the 2nd Army. Meanwhile, the 8th Tank Guards Corps, which found itself in back of the 3rd Tank Corps, went round Mi�sk Mazowiecki in a westerly direction. The corps� frontline troops had reached the area east of Okuniew. The 16th Tank Corps, which attacked from the Otwock area, having identified the enemy�s defensive status, continued the offensive towards Praga. On July 30, under increased resistance from the 73rd Infantry-Division, the Soviets seized �wider, J�zef�w and Wi�zowna. The main road to Warsaw from the south passed through Wi�zowna. From here, Soviet units carried out a raid outside the Zakr�t district where the main roads from Siedlce and Lublin met. The capture of this village created a threat that the combating German units would be outflanked outside of Falencia.

Assessing the situation that had arisen, the command staff of the 9th Army decided to immediately launch a counter-attack, but the XXXIX Panzer-Corps at this juncture commanded only the incomplete Division �Herman G�ring� plus a weak Kampfgruppe drawn from the 19th Panzer-Division. But the Germans had a bit of luck�� part of which lay in the fact that on July 30 the greater part of the tanks belonging to the Fallscirm-Panzer-Regiment �Herman G�ring� had already been off-loaded from the transporting freight trains�� and partly in that there had been enough time to complete the consolidation of reinforcements with the 1st Grenadier Regiment, outside of Marki. At the same time, tanks from Panzer-Regiment 27 and the 19th Panzer-Division were en route from the direction of Wyszk�w. Moreover, PzKpfw IVs from the II Fallschirm-Panzer-Regiment �Herman G�ring� sped through Warsaw, and thereafter were able to reinforce the Kampfgruppe from its own �mother� unit.

On July 30, the XXXIX Panzer-Corps launched a counter-offensive. Augmented with tanks and artillery, a Kampfgruppe from Fallschirm-Pz.Gren. Rgt. 1 �Herman G�ring� attacked in the direction of Wo�omin from the area around Marki. Another unit from the 19th Panzer-Division (II Pz.Gren. Rgt. 74, a Tank company from the II Pz.Rgt. 27 and the II Battery in the 19th Panzer-Artillery-Regiment), together with infantry from the 73rd Infantry-Division, conducted an attack on the village of Zakr�t. Northeast of Radzymin, fighting also broke out when the 103rd Tank Brigade and advance forces from the 19th Panzer-Division clashed. The German attack was by no means overwhelming because it was carried out by fairly reduced forces: Both the 19th Panzer-Division and the �Herman G�ring,� neither of which had yet completed their respective consolidations, engaged only solitary regiments in battle. An additional two Waffen-SS tank divisions were unable to participate in the fighting during the course of the day. Columns out of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � were just leaving Siedlce and didn�t reach Chojeczno, halfway between Siedlce and Ka�uszyn, until that evening. Soldiers in the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� were also on their way toward Ka�uszyn.

The German attack from the direction of Praga, made General Radzjijevskij abundantly aware that the enemy still had the means to execute telling combat operations on his army�s left flank. Units from the 16th Tank Corps were transported from the area around Zakr�t and withdrew to Wi�zowna. Thereafter, the 3rd Tank Corps threw back the attack against Wo�omin, as well as the attack against Radzymin, but was then forced to defend itself. General Vjedjenjejev reacted very quickly to the changed situation. He gave orders to, among other things, set about organizing an indirect defence; firing trenches must be dug for a number of tanks, anti-tank ambushes must be prepared making use of anti-tank guns, the corps� artillery must be called in and reserve units created. With over 150 tanks and tracked artillery vehicles, the 3rd Tank Corps hardly represented an insignificant force. According to Soviet combat calculations, the 2nd Tank Army�s first echelon-corps would remain in a defensive posture until it established broad contact with 8th Tank Guards Corps and the 16th Tank Corps. At the same time, General Radzjijevskij reported to General Rokossovskij informing him about the increasingly strong German resistance in Praga�s outlying towns and requested additional heavy artillery units to break it down. Rokossovskij responded that he, General Radzjijevskij, should concentrate on cutting off the German 9th Army from its 2nd Army, and hand over the mission of seizing the city to the 47th Army which was en route as part of the second echelon. In theory, Radzjijevskij had command of forces capable of carrying out this order. However, between July 18 and July 30, 1944, the 2nd Tank Army suffered a total loss of 582 soldiers killed in action, 1,581 wounded and an additional 52 soldiers unaccounted for, along with the loss of approximately 130 tanks and tracked artillery guns. Still, given such a large fighting force, these losses were not all that serious�� and the army had potential access to a further 560 to 680 armoured vehicles.

On July 31, just as additional units arrived from Division �Herman Goring,� the Germans increased their pressure on the 3rd Tank Army�s left flank. From the direction of Praga, attacks were mounted along the Marki�� Radzymin motorway, as well as along the Zielonka�� Wo�omin railway line. The 19th Panzer-Division�s main combat force, in the meantime, approached Radzymin from the northeast. Despite the German XXXIX Panzer-Corps (now called: Gruppe �von Saucken�) having taken over the initiative, it was still numerically significantly weaker than the Soviet 2nd Tank Army and, in terms of frontline troops, it was even weaker than the 3rd Tank Corps. During the day, the last Pzkpfw IV from the II Fallschirm-Panzer-Regiment �Herman G�ring� finally linked up with the troops already engaged in combat (the off-loading of the whole division was completed on August 4). Thanks to the above-cited unequal numerical strength and the competent defence put up by the Soviets, all German counter-attacks were beaten back with bloody results. General von Saucken was thus very impatiently awaiting the arrival of the two promised Waffen-SS-Divisions and the 4th Panzer-Division (which he had earlier commanded) to spearhead his attack. During the last day of July, the reinforced SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania� arrived, along with a portion of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� in the area around Stanis�aw�w�� but Kampfgruppe �Westland� from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� was still engaged in crossing over the Bug north of W�gr�w. Nor was SS-Oberf�hrer Becker�s unit in a position to engage in battle at full strength, since the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � was still fighting in the Siedlce region. Despite this, after having received a report that a Kampfgruppe drawn from both forces would possibly begin to participate in the fighting the following day, he contacted the commander of the XXXIX Panzer-Corps, SS Gruppenf�hrer Gille, for the purpose of coordinating all the divisions� operations. General von Saucken also received a report to the effect that the 4th Panzer-Division forces were en route in the direction of Wyszl�w. However, because of rain and the length of the division�s transport, they could not join the fighting for an additional 48 hours.

On July 31, south of Wo�omin, the Soviet side continued to carry out attacks with tanks from the 60th and the 58th Tank Guards Brigades. The 8th Tank Guards Corps attacked Okuniew, which was captured during the evening hours. Their next objective was to capture the village of Oss�w which was under siege on the outskirts of Wo�omin. But this manoeuvre was checked by the stubborn defence mounted there by the grenadiers of the division �Herman G�ring�. The terrain favoured the Germans. Despite the 3rd Tank Corps holding Wo�omin, and the 60th Tank Brigade from the 8th Tank Guards Corps holding itself in wait the nearby village of Okuniew; the two areas remained separated due to the wet lands, forests and two streams, the D�uga Struga and the Czarna Struga, between them. The 3rd Tank Corps, which was the first unit to attack, got around these natural obstacles by travelling in a wide arc towards the east near Stanis�w�w. Now, with the nearest connection with Vjedjenjev�s corps having been blocked, General Popov decided to imitate this tactic. With the aim of broadening the wedge which the 8th Tank Guards Corps had created; he attacked Mi�sk Mazowiecki together with Colonel Vasilj Bjelgakov�s, 260th Rifle Division which was en route from the south. After a short engagement, in which the 3rd Battalion out of the Home Army�s 22nd Regiment, also actively participated; the town fell into Soviet hands. The 16th Tank Corps also pressed on with their assault operations, driving the German 73rd Infantry-Division into the area around Rado��.

At the same time this was taking place, the battle for Siedlce, east of Warsaw, neared its end: The city was captured by General Krjukov�s soldiers on July 30. Marshal Rokossovskij�s new orders, which were issued the very next day, meant that the crippled 11th Tank Corps was to move south to Pu�away. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, in accord with the wishes of HQ, intended to support the 69th Army�s frontline troops at Wis�a with this tank force. Other offensives towards the north, that is to say, on a direct line towards Poland�s capital city, were to be carried out by the 2nd Cavalry Guards Corps. This meant that the rapid response force was dissolved. New support for Krujkov�s cavalry troops would now be provided by the 70th Army. Following the seizure of Brest and the 2nd Army�s redeployment towards the west; General Vasilij Popov�s army, which included two rifle corps, lost contact with the enemy. At this time, Marshal Rokossovskij gave the order that after the regrouping had been carried out, they were to march in the direction of Ka�uszyn and, from there, begin to participate in the storming of Praga together with the 47th Army. In addition, adjacent to the Bugs lower flow near Siemiatycz; the 28th Army, along with support troops from 1st Mechanised Corps and the 9th Tank Corps, began to prepare for an assault. These formations were to attack positioned on the right side of the 2nd Cavalry Guards Corps in the direction of Soko�ow Podlaski and onward toward Wyszk�w.

The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� withdrawal clearly sealed the loss of Siedlce, however, only some 10km west of the city; the Germans built a new defensive line with the intent of retaining the area between W�gr�w and Soko��w Podlaski. Model gave General Wei� a special order forbidding him from retreating any further from Warsaw. The German�s 2nd Army had also received orders to cease all attacks against the 1st Belorussian Front�s right flank along the Nur�� Sura� line where the Bug and Narew Rivers joined. Set in to oppose the Soviet 48th and 65th Armies, which were attacking north of the Bug, was the newly formed LV Army-Corps (the 11th Panzer-Division, the 28th J�ger-Division, the 367th Infantry-Division, the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507, the Calvary-Corps �Harteneck,� with their commander General Gustaw Harteneck�� the 4th Panzer-Division ,the 12th. Infantry-Division and the 4th Calvary Brigade) as well as parts of the XXIII Army-Corps that along with the XX Army-Corps also defended the terrain between Nur and Soko��w Podlaski. The XXIII Army-Corps had command of the 35th Infantry-Division, the 292nd Infantry-Division, and the 541st Grenadier-Division, while General Rudolf von Roman�s XX Army-Corps had at its disposal, the 7th Infantry-Division, the 102nd Infantry-Division, the 3rd Cavalry-Brigade plus the remnants of the Brest garrison. On July 31, the 2nd Army still had command over both of the Waffen-SS armoured divisions, but these were subsequently redeployed to the 9th Army sector, consisting of the decimated VIII Army-Corps (5th J�ger-Division, 211th.Infantry-Division) under the command of the XX Army-Corps staff and that portion of the II Ersatz-Corps which had remained with the Hungarian Front�s rearguard. Within this corps were the 5th, 12th and 23rd Ersatz-Corps, as well as the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division. The fighting capacity of the Hungarian units was not especially high, however, due to their weak armament and the low morale.

On the first day of August 1944, three significant events took place at the Warsaw-front. South of the Polish capital near the join of the Pilica and Radomka Rivers, the substantial forces of General Vasil Tjujkov�s 8th Guards Army crossed over the Wis�a to its western bank. During the course of a single day, Tjujkov transported no less than nine rifle-guard regiments, 341 light guns and mortars, along with 19 tracked artillery vehicles across the river. Once the Soviet forces had crossed the river, they immediately set to work constructing pontoon bridges. By the evening of August 1, the frontline troops stretching between Mniszew and Magnuszew were already 15 km wide and 5 km deep.

In the face of this new threat, General von Vormann now directed all available reserve troops in the direction the Pilica�s discharge. However, with his weak army devoting all its combat strength to the battles raging outside Praga, these reserves were not particularly impressive. Those who left the Warsaw sector were, first and foremost, the 1132nd Grenadier-Brigade and the Ersatz-Sturmgesch�tz-Brigade that it worked in co-operation with. Two artillery units, equipped with heavy 8.8cm anti-aircraft guns, also left the country�s capital. Infantry-Regiment 95 from the 17th Infantry-Division and a few additional reserve troop battalions ended up outside Deblin. Airplanes from the 6th Luftflotte attacked the pontoon bridges and ferries. The Germans lacked the combat strength needed to carryout a bigger counter-offensive.

This day�s second significant event was the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising. As it happened, luck fell on the side of the uprising�s supporters: It didn�t break out until the afternoon, which is to say, until a couple of hours after the city had been deserted by the most vital German forces, which coincidently included the very units that had earlier been earmarked for pacifying an eventual uprising. The commander for the Warsaw region, General Stahel, was forced to go on the defensive and, as late as August 4, the Home Army still retained the initiative. The fighting that burst out in Warsaw also made it more difficult for the division �Hermann G�ring� to reach the front. This was particularly the case for Fallschirm-Pz. Gren. Rgt. 2 �Hermann G�ring� which had not been involved in the fighting in Praga. However, it should be pointed out that the two, model PzKpfw V �Panther� tanks, which were captured on August 2 by insurgents in the city quarter of Wo�a, had not hailed from �Hermann G�ring� but, instead, came from the 1st Company, I Panzer-Regiment 27. On August 2, this �Herman G�ring� unit fought with all the strength at its disposal in Praga�s environs and, as earlier noted, had no access to tanks of this model. The Uprising also obstructed the 19th Panzer-Division from carrying out a complete troop consolidation. Namely, it was isolated from its main force which was en route from Holland. The resulting outcome was that the artillery reinforced II Panzer-grenadier-Regiment 73 had to make a detour south around the whole of Warsaw and, on August 1, found themselves in the Wilan�w district.

Finally, in the fields outside of Praga, the tank battle reached its culmination. On August 1, a part of the 19th Panzer-Division (Gruppe �Baler�) circled around the Soviet positions outside of Radzymin, and then detoured north through Wysk�w, Serock and Zegrze along the Bug and Narew Rivers. After having joined together part of the II Panzer-Regiment 27, the I Panzer-grenadier Regiment 74, and the I Battery plus some smaller divisional formations in the forest adjacent to Niepor�t, the resulting force then went on the attack against Aleksandr�w via W�lka Radzymi�ska. At the same time, the Fallschirm-Pz. Gren. Rgt. 1 �Hermann G�ring� made use of the powerful support provided by the division�s artillery and tanks (the II Battalion and commandeered Tiger-tanks from the III Battalion arriving from the south) and fought their way from Marki towards Struga. Despite the heavy opposition put up by soldiers from the 50th Tank Brigade, destroying at least ten German tanks, both attacks succeeded. The 19th Panzer-Division seized Aleksandr�w and the Luftwaffe grenadiers took Struga. Soviet troops were also forced to abandon the village of S�upno, retreating with heavy casualties toward the inner defensive line surrounding Radzymin. The southern Kampfgruppe, the 19th Panzer-Division (Pz. Gren. Rgt.�� I 73rd, II 174th, II Artillery-Regiment), regrouped in the morning at Weso�a, west of the capital, and from there launched an attack against the troop forces defending Okuniew, drawn from the 60th Tank Guards Brigade and the 8th Tank Guards Corps. This counter attack was also crowned with success. Having captured Okuniew; the Germans switched to a defensive war posture while awaiting the arrival of tanks from the Waffen-SS scheduled to arrive from the east.

On August 1, both Waffen-SS divisions drove round Stanis�aw�w, while simultaneously covering the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� forces� southern flank from the Mi�sk Mazowiecki direction. The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf �received orders to attack Wo�omin, and 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� was ordered to move out quickly in the direction of Okuniew with the objective of linking up with the XXXIX Panzer-Corps. The success of this offensive operation meant that the 3rd Tank Corps was sheared off from the rest of the 2nd Tank Army. Immediately after the attack began, however, some tens of Soviet tanks from the 59th Tank Guards Brigade cropped up on SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gilles division�s left flank. They were about to carry out the 8th Tank Guards Corps� manoeuvre against Stanis�aw�w on orders they had received the previous day. Confronted with this situation the SS-forces were forced to intensively defend themselves instead of attacking. Both sides suffered heavy equipment losses and both sides broke off further attacks. At this juncture, General Popov took advantage of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�s� aborted attack against Okuniew and re-deployed his troops precisely in that direction. In the evening, the 8th Tank Guards Corps struck back against Okuniew and drove the Kampfgruppe from the 19th Panzer-Division out from there and to some extent restored contact with the 3rd Tank Corps. Here it should be pointed out that during this time both the 3rd and the 5th SS-Panzer-Divisions �Wiking� only succeeded in setting isolated units into battle. SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 �Westland� had not yet completed the transport of its entire complement across the Bug, and the most vital troops in the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� were still fighting east of Siedlce. In short, the contribution of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� to the fighting at Praga was at this time decidedly modest.

The intensity of tank battles increased. Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model ordered General von Vormann to set about annihilating the frontline troops in the enemy�s panzer corps as fast as possible, and, moreover, see to it that the Soviet bridge-defence emplacements at Magnuszew were likewise destroyed. The commander of the 9th Army reported that, due to the prevailing shortage of equipment, it was impossible to carry out both missions simultaneously. Model informed him that the VIII Army-Corps� command had been transferred to the 9th Army. This force would organise the defence of the Wis�a south of Warsaw (as a result of the Uprising in Warsaw, the Army-Corps� staff, with General H�hne at its head, finally reached the new battlefield after a delay of four days). In addition, at Wyszk�w a Kampfgruppe �Felzmann� was formed drawn from units of the German 2nd Army. Incorporated into it was a Kampfgruppe from the 4thPanzer-Division that had been promised to von Vormann a couple of days earlier, along with the remainder of the troops from Brest and two heavy artillery units. General Betzel�s 4th Panzer-Division provided Panzer-Regiment 35, Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12, Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 103, Panzer-Pioneer-Battalion 79, two companies from the Panzer-Flak-Artillerie-Abteilung 290, along with a communications unit. Model despatched these troops to Radzymin with the mission of supporting the 19th Panzer-Division. In order to further better the German command, the field marshal gave orders directing that the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and he 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� should also be incorporated into Gruppe �von Saucken.� This meant that both divisions would, in effect, be transferred to the 9th Army.

2nd Tank Army

Commanding Officer: General Aleksiej Ivanovitjv Radzjijevskij

Army forces:

41st Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade

5th Independent motorcycle regiment

87th Independent Motorcycle Battalion

9th or 79th Independent Liaison Regiment

86th Guards Mortar Regiment

10th Flame-thrower Battalion

729th Independent Mortar Battalion

3rd Tank Corps

Commanding Officer: General Nikolaj Vjedjenejev

50th Tank Brigade 51st

Tank Brigade 103rd

Tank Brigade

57th Mechanised Brigade

8th Tank Guards Corps

Commanding Officer: General Aleksiej Popov

58th Tank Guards Brigade

58th Tank Guards Brigade

58th Tank Guards Brigade

60th Tank Guards Brigade

28th Mechanised Brigade

62nd Guards Regiment (heavy tanks)

16th Tank Corps

Commander: General Ivan Dubovoj

107th Tank Brigade 109th

Tank Brigade 164th

Tank Brigade 15th

Mechanised Brigade 6th

Guards Regiment (heavy tanks)

The 2nd Tank Army, in fact, ceased to exist on August 6, 1944, following the crushing of the 3rd Tank Corps and the retreat of the 16th Tank Corps back to Magnuszew. From this point on, each corps operated independently under the aegis of the regular army. The 2nd Tank Army (as of November 20, 1944, called the 2nd Tank Guards Army) never re-established the corps structure that existed in July 1944. The above chart contains all the large unit formations within the 2nd Tank Army but does not include certain smaller formations, subordinate to corps or army commands. Theoretically, each tank corps had a subordinated mortar regiment, an armoured artillery regiment (the regiments� self-propelled guns are presented in tables together with the equipment; the 8th Tank Guards Corps had the 301st and the 1817th Anti-tank Guards Regiments; the 16th Tank Corps had the 1239th and the 1441st Anti-tank Regiments), a motorcycle battalion, an engineer battalion (in the 3rd Tank Corps, the 220th Battalion; in the 16th Tank Corps, the 201st Battalion), and an anti-aircraft Tank Corps, the 201st Battalion), anti-aircraft regiment. Likewise, on the tank �army� level apart from the corps structure, there were, among other units, a motorcycle regiment, an artillery regiment, a rocket artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, a communications regiment, an air-support liaison regiment (20 Po-2), an engineer battalion, a repair battalion or a transportation regiment. But in 1944, every Soviet tank army had a somewhat different make up, depending on the mission it was then carrying out. Sometimes, a special army unit was attached which cannot be found in the formal register, and certain units were simply never actual.

On August 2, the 3rd Tank Corps� situation further deteriorated. The entire area controlled by General Vjedjenjejev�s soldiers came under heavy enemy artillery fire. The Germans attacked Radzymin from the northeast with a Kampfgruppe from the 4th Panzer-Division, and from the north and west with the 19th Panzer-Division. Along the Radzymin-Wyszk�w roadway, an attack was launched by Kampfgrupp �Christern� (under the command of Colonel Christern, commander of Panzer-Regiment 35), with 28 model PzKpfw IV tanks from the II Panzer-Regiment 35, along with the 12th Regiment out of the I Panzergrenadier-Battalion. This offensive developed into fiercely contested battles fought over the bridges crossing the Rz�dza River in the vicinity of Dybowo, a village the Germans had succeeded in taking. Due to the concentric attack, the Soviet 103rd Tank Brigade�s units were forced to turn back toward Wo�omin, and in doing so, simultaneously abandoned a considerable amount of war materials on the battlefield. In the evening, Colonel Christern�s kampfgrupp, having split into two separate assault units, attacked Ciemne and Dobczyn. (The first unit was made up of the II Panzer-Regiment 35 together with the Panzergrenadier- Regiment 12 from the I Panzergrenadier-Battalion�� the second unit consisted of the I Panzer-Regiment 35 and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12 from the II Panzergrenadier-Battalion.) The re-taking of Radzymin meant that the vital road between Warsaw and Wyszk�w could be re-opened and that contact between the 9th and 2nd Armies could also be re-established.

^{A PzKpfw �Panther� tank Sd Kfz 267 from the 3rd Panzer-Regiment 35. The photo is probably taken during the course of fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days of August 1944. (MWP)}

Further south, enemy positions outside Wo�omin were attacked by Division �Hermann G�ring� from Zielonka, and by the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� from the area around T�uszcz. This time, the Soviet tank troops from the 51st Tank Brigade and the infantry from the 57th Mechanised Brigade proved to be the more skilled combatants. They inflicted heavy casualties on their attackers and forced them to quickly retire. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� (II SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking� and the grenadier battalions from SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania�) also participated in the attack and tried to break through the 3rd Tank Division�s positions around the village of Po�wi�tne. This effort was only partially successful. Clearly, the Soviet forces withdrew from Mi�dzyle�, W�lka D�brownicka and Po�w�tne, but they succeeded in setting up another defence line. SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gille could not commit his entire division to battle because he was also responsible for the defense of the battlefield outside Warsaw between Mi�sk Mazowiecki and Ka�uszyn (SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 Westland,� which had also been reinforced, completed its transport across the Bug that same day and only just now was able to join up with the rest of the formation). On August 2, components within the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking,� together with soldiers from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf,� were positioned along this stretch to repel attacks from the 8thTank Guards Corps supported by the Soviet 47th Army�s frontline units. By reason of the above-described situation, the Germans were not in a position to launch a new attack against Okuniew.

^{A PanzerbefehlsWagen III ausf M has fallen through a bridge. The crew had a huge job in front of them, either to lift it up and transport it back to their unit, or destroy it so that it did not fall into the hands of the Russians. Eastern Poland, August 1944. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive).Soviet units crossing the Wis�a at Pu�away in August 1944. In the foreground is an amphibious vehicle, model Ford GPA (WAF)A command vehicle, PzBfWg V Sd Kfz 267 �Panther� (tactical number �R 02�), from the command company, SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking�, August 1944. On the right, a KIPzBfWg Sd Kfz 265 from Panzer-Regiment 35. (MWP)}

At the same time, the Soviet the 16th Tank Corps, which fought side by side with the 73rd Infantry Division, slowly began to approach Praga. Once in the vicinity of the city, Soviet units were fiercely attacked by the German infantry supported by a small number of armoured vehicles. The commander of the corps, General Dubovoj, however, did not regard these troops as being particularly threatening. Despite this, he complied with General Radzjijevskij�s three-day-old order, making it clear that the tank corps alone did not have permission to storm the buildings inside the city. Thus the 16th Tank Corps waited in Mi�dzyle� and Zbytki for the arrival of the 125th Rifle Corps out of the 47th Army. To better the 2ndTank Army�s situation, General Dubovoj renewed the attack on the area of Zakr�t�� and after it was seized, he dispatched the 73rd Infantry Division to the Zastowski-Forest which lay between Anin and Stara Mi�osna. Outside Zakr�t, the 16th Tank Corps linked up with the 8th Tank Guards Corps� left flank. Despite the 3rd Tank Corps� difficult situation, the 109th Tank Brigade from the 16th Tank Corps withdrew to the army reserve at the rear of the front.

^{Two Panther tanks from the 4th Panzer-Division east of Warsaw at the beginning of August 1944. Note the extra camouflage which is draped on both vehicles. Apparently, the Luftwaffe wasn�t totally to be relied on! (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)}

On August 3, Gruppe �von Saucken� placed even more pressure on General Vjedjenjejev�s increasingly weakened 3rd Tank Corps. After the tank attacks, came aerial assaults with SG 1s and SG 77s, along with intensive artillery bombardment. However, the Soviet troops were not completely chanceless. What they plainly lacked were fuel and ammunition, but around Wo�omin they organised a defence by making use of close to 100 tanks. The terrain was favourable to making anti-tank ambushes, but the fighting was hindered by hilly terrain and marshy wet lands. General von Saucken attacked from the north with a Kampfgruppe from the 4th Panzer-Division; from the west with the 19th Panzer-Division and a portion of the �Herman G�ring�; and from the east with units from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf.� The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� attacked the 8th Tank Guards Corps east of Okuniew. General Popov�s forces also launched offensives. The Soviet forces tried to improve their situation along the Micha��w-Okuniew-Sulej�wek line. Controlling this line would ensure contact with those units fighting at Wo�omin.

For the entire day, the 3rd Tank Corps held their positions outside Wo�omin at the cost of some tens of tanks, but they also caused significant losses to the German forces. Reports from Gruppe �von Saucken� tell of heavy fighting having taken place. In Gruppe �Herman G�ring�s� daily report, special mention is made of the III Panzer-Abteilung �Herman G�ring� 10th Company, under Captain Bellinger�s command, which apparently had destroyed as many as 36 enemy tanks. Panzer-Regiment 35 from the 4th Panzer-Division reported the elimination of 14 Soviet tanks. However, in the commander of the 2nd Panzer-Army�s report made some four weeks later it states that, on the day of the engagement at Wo�omin, 47 tanks were lost as well as six 7.62 cm guns, two 5.7 cm guns, a 12 cm mortar, two motorcycles (footnoted as having been crushed), seven 8.2 cm mortars, along with 12 vehicles. By that evening, it was apparent to General Vjedjenjejev that it would be impossible to hold the town any longer. He ordered his troops to withdraw south through Le�niakowizna. During the night of August 3, the Soviet troops left Wo�omin and after having marched through the woods along the D�uga Brook, they reached the 8th Tank Guards corps� position. A part of the heavy war-equipment was evacuated, among other things, some tens of tanks. These were probably driven away on a forest road via �ysa G�ra.

^{Command tank, PzBfWg V �Panther� Sd Kfz 267, from the company staff�s Panzer-Regiment 35. The photo is probably taken during fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days in August 1944. (MWP)A command vehicle PzBfWg V �Panther� Sd Kfz 267 from the Company Staff�s Panzer-Regiment 35. The picture is probably taken during fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days of August 1944. (MWP)}

On the morning of August 4, General von Vormann informed General Field Marshal Model that the 3rd Tank Corps had been destroyed, although it actually had not been completely neutralised. The commander of Heeresgruppe �Mitte� made a mistake here caused by the successive and, for every passing day, increasingly serious crisis emerging outside Magnuszew. At this point in time, the most vital concern for Model was the 8th Guards Army�s attack on his frontline troops. On August 3, the enemy had namely concentrated nearly nine rifle divisions, a tank brigade, plus two �assault-gun and tracked-artillery� regiments on the German forces. He then gave the order that the combat forces in Gruppe �von Saucken� be divided into two independent combat forces. A portion of the 19th Panzer-Division, together with �Hermann G�ring,� would cross over the Wis�a at Pilica while two Waffen-SS panser divisions would guarantee that stability was maintained in moving towards Praga. The 4thPanzer-Division was also to be withdrawn.

^{A tank, model PzKpfw V Sd Kfz 171 �Panther� Ausf. G, from the I Panzer-Regiment 35, August 1944. (MWP)A tank, model PzKpfw V Sd Kfz 171 �Panther� (�800�), belonging to the commander of the 8th SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking,� SS-Obersturmf�hrer Karl Nicolussi Leck, Radzymin region August 1944. (ADM)A Soviet 8.2 cm calibre mortar, model 1938, in the vicinity of Warsaw, August 1944. (WAF)A Tiger tank under repair, serial nr. �912� from the 9th SS-Panzer-Regiment 3 �Totenkopf�, the Slupno region, August 1944. (Bundes-Archive)}

This order began to be implemented almost immediately after it had been given. Fallschirm-Pz. Gren. Rgt. 2 �Hermann G�ring��� which had only just now completed its consolidation and had not participated in the fighting in Praga�� was sent towards the frontline troops. A panzer grenadier battalion from the Panzer-grenadier-Regiment 74, supported by a column of PzKpfw IV tanks, left on the same day through a Warsaw in violent revolt. The Germans� objective was to makes their way into the city, in which they were only partly successful and only at a heavy cost of lives.

The rest of General K�llner�s division and the �Hermann G�ring� left the battlefield a short while later. General von Vormann decided to continue pursuing the battle outside Praga until at least August 5. In this way, he could capitalize on the successes he had thus far achieved, thanks to the formidable consolidation of combat strength. On August 4, an attack was launched from the Wo�omin area in a southerly direction against a Kampfgruppe from the 19th Panzer-Division and �Hermann G�ring.� The Germans attacked the 8th Tank Guards Corps� position (60th Tank Guards Brigade, 59th Tank Guards Brigade, and the 28th Mechanised Guards Brigade) outside of Okuniew along both banks of the D�ugas River. In carrying out this attack they sought to drive yet another Soviet tank corps away from the suburbs of Praga. The difficult terrain and the strong defences hindered the attack. The I Panzer-Regiment 35 and the II Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12, for example, could not force a break in the 59th Tank Guards Brigade�s position in the area around Zabraniec, though they spent an entire day in the attempt. At this same time-point, troops from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� began an offensive against Okuniew from the east through Pustelnik and Micha��w. This attack, despite some initial success outside Micha��w, was also bloodily thrown back. The battles conducted by Becker�s division received no support from units of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� for the reason that, on August 4, this force had been drawn into the fighting outside Stani�aw�w by the 77th Rifle corps from the Soviet 47th Army. Despite a dearth of successes on this the 4th day of August, that very day the Wehrmacht reported 76 Soviet tanks as having been destroyed (this figure probably reflects the total number of wrecks recorded outside Wo��min).

^{Three captured Sd Kfz Panther ausf A�s in working condition east of Warsaw in August are ordered into action around Praga under the command of Lieutenant Sotnikov. (Leandoer & Ekholm archive)A well camouflaged tank, model PzKpfw IV Sd Kfz 161/2 Ausf. H, from the II Panzer-Regiment 35. The photo is probably taken during fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days of August 1944. (MWP)A destroyed tank, model PzKpfw IV Ausf. H, from the SS-Panzer-Regiment 3 �Totenkopf�, Radzymin region, August 1944. (Janusz Ledwoch)}

On August 5, the 19th Panzer-Division�s began a westward march across the bridges of Warsaw and Modlin. The Soviet 47th Army�s (less the 125th Rifle Corps) sudden attack against the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking,� which had begun along the road towards Siedlce, forced the German side to withdraw both Waffen-SS Panzer Divisions that same day from the battles directed against the 8th Tank Guards Corps. They now made battle-ready and manned defensive positions between Stanis�aw�w and the Liwiec River. Left to oppose the 8th Tank Guards Corps in this tank battle, there now remained only sections out of Division �Hermann G�ring� plus the Kampfgruppe from the 4th Panzer-Division. Together, they launched an attack to the north and northeast against the 8th Tank Guards Corps� positions outside of Okuniew. The 4th Panzer-Division noted only insignificant territorial gains, while the Luftwaffe�s grenadiers were wiped out under intense fire from positions manned by the Soviets at the start of battle. General Popov, who still had considerable combat resources at his disposal, organized a counter-attack with the aim of retaking their original positions. Thanks to his successes (the 4th Panzer-Division lost 11 tanks), by evening, the front was back to the situation as it had been on August 4. And since at the same time this was taking place, General von Saucken received orders to immediately re-deploy Division �Hermann G�ring� to Magnuszew, he had also lost any opportunity of carrying out further attacks on the enemy.

^{The commander of the 4th Panzer-Division, General Betzel, in an armoured transport vehicle, Sd Kfz 251/6. The photo is probably taken during fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days of August 1944. (MWP)A Soviet artillery, tracked tractor, model JA-12, tows a 12 cm howitzer 1907/30 toward the front, summer of 1944. (WAF)}

On August 6, the remaining German units withdrew from the area around Okuniew and were replaced by the 73rd Infantry-Division and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade. Still positioned outside Zabraniec was the artillery-reinforced Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12, which the 4th Panzer-division I Panzergrenadier-Regiment 33 attached themselves to. Tanks from the 35th Army, on the other hand, were sent back to Wo�omin for repairs. The 8th Tank Guards Corps held its positions and the tank battle was about to end. General Radzjijevskij did not restart hostilities but instead ordered that the 3rd Tank Corps be reorganised, and that the positions occupied by the 8th Tank Guards Corps be defended�� nor could he commit the 16th Tank Corps: As late as August 4, General Dubovoj�s corps, acting on orders from Rokossovskij, had started a withdrawal from Warsaw�s suburbs�� and instead�� he redeployed them to the bridge emplacement outside Magnuszew. The area outside Praga was transformed into an enormous battlefield, littered with the wrecks of close to 300 tanks and tracked artillery.

Paradoxically enough, when the battle was over, i.e. on the morning of August 6, the Soviet side still held an advantage in terms of armoured combat vehicles versus the enemy on the frontline at Warsaw. General Popov�s 8th Tank Guards Corps still possessed 126 tanks, and the beaten 3rd Tank Corps had 50, (the figure, 44 tanks and 12 tracked assault guns is also supplied). In addition, the independent units from 2nd Tank Army could also despatch a further 24 (19) vehicles into battle. Between Okuniew and Mi�sk Mazowiecki the Soviet forces had, all told, over 200 tanks and tracked artillery at their disposal. On August 6, the 2nd Tank Army still had between 334 to 373 armoured vehicles at their disposal, including the withdrawn 16th Tank Corps (134-166 vehicles). But the Soviet soldiers were completely exhausted and their tanks in urgent need of repair. Heavy losses had been suffered. Between July 29 and August 6, it�s not unlikely that as many as 340 tanks and tracked artillery vehicles were put out of action. Calculated beginning from July 18, this mounted to a total loss of close to 470 armoured vehicles (destroyed, damaged, or otherwise non-functional). Over August 2 and 3, when the most intense battles were raging, the Soviet Army lost several score of tanks each day as a result of artillery fire, air attack, and direct battle.

^{Assault-guns of model Stug 40 Sd Kfz 142/1 Ausf. G from an undetermined unit on the eastern front, summer of 1944. (CAW)}

Precisely determining Soviet tank losses, however, is difficult. In the Wehrmacht�s official report of August 6, it states that during the battle for Radzymin and W��omin 192 enemy tanks and 45 guns were destroyed. In another report from the 4th Panzer-Division dealing with the fighting that took place between August 2 and August 9, there appear�� under the heading �divisional successes��� notations listing enemy losses mounting to 108 tanks, 2 tracked gun vehicles, 65 artillery and anti-aircraft guns, and a great deal of other war material, as having been destroyed. The information contained in General Radzjijevskij�s report of August 28 reports only 116 tanks as having been irreparably destroyed during the first week in August. It primarily concerned tanks from the 50th and 51st Tank Brigades which had been abandoned in German controlled terrain. Both brigades, in fact, were split up and their wounded commanders (Major Fundovnoj and Colonel Mirvoda, respectively) were captured.

^{One of the PzKpfw V Sd Kfz 171 �Panther� tanks Ausf. G from the I Panzer-Regiment 35, during fighting in August 1944. (MWP)Soviet soldiers test-drive a captured NSU HK 101 �Kettenkrad�, a tracked motorcycle. The photo was taken in August in the woods outside Warsaw. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)A VW Kfz 82 �K�belwagen� with �new� owners. The picture was taken in Lublin, July 1944. Leandoer & Ekholm Archive).An Opel Bliz 3.6-36s under new ownership, July, 1944, Eastern Poland. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)}

The majority of the 8th Tank Guards Corps� �destroyed� tanks, on the other hand, were rather quickly repaired and, after the assignment of new crews, sent back into action. Human loss of life (only tank personnel?) in the 2nd Tank Army mounted to 409 men, killed by either guns or fire, 127 wounded and 589 �missing without a trace.� Some of the wounded Soviet soldiers, thanks to help furnished by the local population, were able to make their way back to their units. To what extent the commander of the 2nd Tank Army�s report is reliable remains an open question.

The Germans also suffered significant losses. On August 6, within the 19th Panzer-Division there remained only 28 battle-worthy tanks, while the 4th Panzer-Division had only 40. The Waffen-SS divisions, which had fought at the front for almost a month, had at their disposal 56 tanks within the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and 45 tanks in the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�. The elite division �Hermann G�ring� which had been sent into battle a week earlier, reported only 51 combat-ready tanks (although these statistics are based on the original German reports, they do not include tracked gun vehicles; nor is it known if the 19th Panzer-Division�s complement refers to the whole division or only to the II Panzer-Regiment 27). Given this, it�s possible to calculate that Gruppe �von Sauckens � divisions could have lost as many as 100 to 150 of their own tanks during the course of battle, but this is only a hypothetical number. It is simply not possible to confirm how many vehicles fell victim to the 2nd Tank Army and how many were disabled due to motor failure. The 4th Panzer-Division�s complement, for example, is a case in point. At the start of August, the divison had 45 PzKpfw IV tanks, 40 PzKpfw V �Panther� tanks, 12 Jagdpanzer IVs, 10 Marder IIIs, as well as 237 other transport and armoured vehicles. In addition to these combat-ready vehicles, 38 PzKpfw IV tanks, 18 Panthers, and 74 transport vehicles were undergoing repairs. On August 6, only 20 Pzkpfw IVs, 20 �Panthers,� 10 Panzerj�ger IVs and 6 �Marders� were reported as operational. This indicates that over the course of six days of fighting and marches, Panzer-Regiment 35, consisting of two tank battalions, lost at least 45 vehicles�� which is to say, over 50% of their entire complement. Undoubtedly, the regiment�s combat strength increased when the damaged military equipment had been repaired. According to General Radzjijevskij the Germans should have lost 273 tanks, 100 armoured transport vehicles and 8,000 troops killed in action. These figures are widely over-exaggerated, especially when compared with the number of German POW�s taken�� only 138, in total!

^{Model PzKpfw IV tanks and vehicles from Panzer-Regiment 27, 19th Panzer-Division, Eastern Front, August 1944. (CAW)}

After the departure of the two divisions towards Magnuszew, the German 9th Army, together with the 2nd Army, succeeded for a period of time in holding the entire Warsaw isthmus with a mobile combat force numbering approximately 200 armoured vehicles (the 3rd SS-Panzer-division �Totenkopf�, the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�, and the 4th Panzer-Division). Even though the repair and recovery crews towed away the disabled tanks from Radzymin and Wo�omin and were subsequently able to return a portion of them back into battle, the total number of German armoured vehicles in Praga�s suburbs was very low at the beginning of the second week in August. After the withdrawal of the 4th Panzer-Division on August 8-10 to the vicinity of Modlin and Nasielko, opposition to General Popov�s 150 tanks along the Okuniew-Stanis�aw�w line consisted of only a very few score tanks belonging to the enemy�s 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� (the 4th Panzer Division had been despatched to Kurland).

^{A PzKpfw V �Panther� tank camouflaged with bushes from the I Panzer-Regiment 35, at a �jump off� point prior to an assault, August 1944. (MWP)A battery of �Hummel� tracked artillery from the SS-Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 5 �Wiking� in combat, Poland, summer of 1944. (CAW)Three Panthers drive through a village on their way to the front. Air superiority has probably been established or, alternatively, the crew feels over-confident, given their relaxed posture on the deck of the last tank. The vehicles hail from the 2nd SS-Panzer-Regiment 3 �Totenkpf�. The location is east of Praga, August 1944. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)A tracked artillery gun, 15 cm sFH 18/1 Fgst auf Gschw III/IV �Hummel� from an unknown unit, Eastern Front, Summer 1944. (CAW).}

To a great extent, the development of combat operations outside Warsaw depended on Stalin�s wishes. No later than August 2, he received verified intelligence from Poland�s capital that reported the Uprising had begun. On August 3, this event was directly confirmed by Polish Prime Minister Stanis�aw Miko�ajczyk who had flown to Moscow from London for talks concerning the future of his country. There was no doubt about it being the Home Army that stood behind the Uprising, and there was equally little doubt about the in-country representatives of the Polish Government having swung into action.

Simultaneous with these political developments, on August 2, or August 3 at the latest, Marshal Rokossovskij informed headquarters about the 2nd Tank Army�s troublesome situation. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front emphasized the fiasco with the original intention of cutting away the rearguard troops for 2nd Army, and he also pointed out the enemy�s increasingly troublesome opposition between the Bug and the Narew. On the positive side, the sector of the front under his command had experienced fantastic success along the western flank where two bridge emplacements on the Wisla had been captured. At Magnuszew, it was now possible to transport large sections of the 8th Guards Army across the river to its western bank.

Stalin decided to exploit the operational situation which had arisen. The Soviet dictator ordered that only defensive warfare should be conducted on the outskirts of Warsaw, particularly with respect to the direct approaches to Pragda. In his view, the Germans�� just as Hitler and other highly placed Nazis believed�� should be able to crush the opposition of the insurgents over the next few days. He anticipated that when this happened and the Home Army had been eliminated, Soviet troops would then attack and seize Praga. In Stalin�s view, an attack against the city sectors east of the river should not begin until after the Uprising in Warsaw had been quashed, since a premature attack would work to needlessly prolong the time, or even make it impossible for the Germans to pacify the Polish capital.

And while it is true that this order, with its ruthless import, was never committed to paper, it was nevertheless, on August 4, set into motion: First and foremost, a halt was called to the planned storming of southern Praga by the 125th Rifle Corps from the 47th Army over the coming days. On August 4, General Kuzmin�s corps had just reached the area around Rado��, thereby making contact with the 16th Tank Corps� left flank. Following this, the Soviet fighters were forbidden from flying over Warsaw�s airspace where German Ju 87D bombers carried out several terror attacks. Prior to August 10, the NKVD finally staked out its �defensive line� behind the front. These orders, and their underlying objective, made it impossible for help to reach the battling Home Army units from the Lublin area.

Initially, Stalin hid his hostile attitude toward the Uprising especially during talks held on August 9 with Prime Minister Miko�ajczyk. However, he soon cast aside this mask and openly expressed his intention to passively await the fall of free Warsaw. On August the 13, the Soviet news agency, TASS, reported this strategy in a matter-of-fact, and to all intents and purposes, reasonable tone, but three days later in response to Churchill�s request for assistance for the Home Army, Stalin replied that:

On August 22 he wrote:

The Soviet dictator would not even agree to granting allied aircraft carrying provisions for the Polish fighters landing rights on Soviet air fields. Stalin�s openly hostile attitude didn�t change until the beginning of September, when the issue of the Warsaw Uprising began to enflame relations with Great Britain.

This list was complied by General Radzjijevskij�s staff on August the 28, 1944. How reliable it may be is debatable, especially when it comes to the lost anti-tank guns, mortars and machine guns. The report does not list any cars or motorcycles. Note the considerable discrepancy between the number of tanks totally lost (T-34s); in comparison with other models of armoured vehicles. Of the 35 vehicles destroyed in battle, model: M4A2 �Sherman� tanks, only six burned up completely, exploded or were captured by the Germans; like-wise with the anti-tank SU-85 vehicles. The rest of the vehicles of this type were later repaired and used again (although the new attacks on August 10 lengthened the list of losses). According to this list, the 3rd Tank Corps� 50th and 51st Guards Tank Brigades and the 8th Guards Tank Corps� 60th Guards Tank Brigade took the most serious losses.

Meanwhile, fighting was taking place outside Warsaw. Although Stalin had already halted the storming of Praga as early as August 4, this by no means meant that hostilities had ceased completely. Marshal Rokossovskij had only received orders to halt operations in the city�s suburbs. On the other front lines he commanded; he therefore continued to conduct offensives which at the appropriate time would also come to encompass Warsaw. For these reasons, on August 5, STAVKA requested detailed reports about 2nd Tank Army�s defeat, about the situation of the Soviet frontline forces along the Wis�a, and lastly, information about the possibility of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts launching an immediate offensive. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front replied that due to their extensive losses, and the unusually large geographical area over which the 47th Army was stretched, and the re-organization of the 70th Army, along with supply delivery problems; he would not be in a position to resume the offensive for another five days, i.e. August 10. In addition, on his own initiative Rokossovskij further weakened the front outside Praga by sending the 16th Tank Corps to Magnuszew in support of General Tjujkov. He did this partly for the reason he did not have permission to storm the city, and partly because the most important objective for the left flank of his front was to maintain and broaden the frontline positions.

In response to these reports, Stalin ordered that a new battle plan for the central Wis�a area be worked up which would take account of the successes and reverses which had been experienced, as well as the �Warsaw fuss.� On August 8, Marshal Zjukov presented just such a plan to him. In his considered view, the most important objective for the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belorussian Front was to seize the two large bridge emplacements along the Wis�a. After which, seizure of similar emplacements along the Narew�s banks should be carried out. Simultaneous with this, the central sector of Marshal Rokossovskij�s front (the 8th Guards Tank Army, the 47th Army, the 70th Army, the 28th Army) should, without delay, begin attacking the enemy in Warsaw, with the exception of Praga, and this, together with an attack launched on the area around the join of the Bug and Narew Rivers (the 48th Army, the 65th Army) should lead to Heeresgruppe �Mitte� being split. Zjukov wrote, far too early, something about Soviet troops in the frontline units along the Wisla and the Narew achieving the preparedness necessary to carry out new attacks towards the west around August 25, 1944. On the other hand, he adopted a more sceptical view when it came to the possibilities of successfully carrying out further offensives in that direction, especially in light of the necessity for concentrating reserve troops as well as supplies for the large offensive planned for the Balkans which was shortly about to begin.

On August 10, the fighting east of Warsaw flared up with renewed force. Marshal Rokossovskij set about destroying the German �balcony� in the frontline that stretched from Stanis�aw�w through W�gr�w all the way to Nur by the Bug River. This was not an easy mission, despite the Soviet side�s numerical superiority. At the beginning of August, immediately after the tank battle was decided and done, the following forces were positioned along the section of the frontline referred to here: the 47th Army, certain units from the 2nd Tank Army (essentially, now only the 8th Guards Tank Corps), the 70th Army, the 28th Army, the 9th Tank Corps, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. Of these, the 47th Army�s, 125th Rifle Corps stood directly outside Warsaw, and between Okuniew and the river Liwiec stood the rest of the 47th Army, the 70th Army, plus the 8th Guards Tank Corps and both cavalry corps, while the 28th Army and the 9th Tank Corps were located to the east around Soko��w Podlaski. Two days before the offensive was resumed, the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps from this formation was re-deployed and positioned on a passive section of the front by the Wis�a River between Karczew and Wilga.

Initially, the Germans organized their defence with Gruppe �von Saucken� (the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkop,� the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�, the 4th Panzer-Division, the 73rd Infantry-Division, and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade), the XX Army-Corps and the XXIII Army-Corps� right flank. With thought to the continuous Soviet pressure north of the Bug in mind, Generalfeldmarschall Model ordered, just before the enemy�s next offensive commenced, that a portion of the forces defending Praga were to regroup in that direction (i.e. north of the Bug) which served to weaken the Warsaw based forces even more. On August 9, Gruppe �von Saucken� was broken up. General von Saucken, himself, together with the XXXIX Panzer-Corps HQ staff, was sent to the 3rd Panzer-Army which was defending western Lithuania and the border with East Prussia. With him, also disappeared the 4th Panzer-Division, as well as the 12th Panzer-Division from 2nd Army (re-deployed to the 4th Army). In Praga, there only remained the 73rd Infantry-Division and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade�� in short, a very modest force. On August 11, a new corps was formed as a replacement for von Saucken�s unit. This was the IV SS-Panzer-Corps with SS-Gruppenf�hrer Herbert Otto Gille, commander of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� appointed as the corps� commander. Initially, his former Division �Wiking� command was taken over by SS-Oberf�hrer Eduard Deisenhofer and later by SS-Standartenf�hrer Johannes M�hlenkamp who, in turn, was replaced on October 9 by SS-Standartenf�hrer Karl Ullrich. As we now see, it wasn�t until after the tank battle that the IV SS-Panzer-Corps was established. In addition to two Waffen-SS armoured divisions, its make up included the 73rd Infantry-Division and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade.

On August 10, the new Soviet offensive began. Before that day ended, the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� reported no less than fifteen enemy attacks on Stanis�aw�w. These attacks were launched by General Popov�s 47th Army and the 8th Guards Tank Corps. On this occasion it was Soviet fighter planes that dominated the airspace and attacks carried out by the Il-2 air attack wing covered the German positions with a rain of undirected rocket projectiles and gun fire. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� could not hold out on the battlefield and retreated back north, but, thanks to intense counterattacks conducted by SS-Panzer-Regiment 5, the situation stabilised during the evening. The next day, the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and the XX Army Corps� positions were attacked by units from the three infantry armies and three tank corps. The 47th Army, the 8th Guards Tank Corps and the 70thArmy�s 3rd Tank Corps set off towards the new Waffen-SS Corps. The 28th Army attacked the XX Army-Corps in the area around Soko��w Podlaski supported by tanks from the 9th Tank Corps, with the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps held back in reserve.

The Germans withdrew, but the territory won cost the Soviet side heavy casualties. At the same time, the commander of the German 9th Army sent alarming reports concerning the critical supply-delivery situation facing his forces. The shortages primarily had to do with ammunition and fuel�� shortages that were especially felt by the frontline entities (�Herman G�ring�, 19th Panzer-Division and the new 4th Grenadier-Division) that had attacked the bridge emplacements at Magnuszew beginning on August 7, but the situation of the IV SS-Panzer- Corps wasn�t much better. Model believed that the greatest threat to his plans lay at Magnuszew and therefore continued to send all available reserves there, which consequently led to the German fighting strength outside Praga being yet further weakened. The new German tanks were sent primarily to the bridge emplacements and it was Gille�s corps that suffered as a result. For example, the 19th Panzer-Division improved its tank complement during the course of two weeks from 28 to 76 vehicles, despite being continuously engaged in combat. On top of this, on August 10 von Vormann took over command of Heeresgruppe �Nord Ukraine� XXXVI Panzer-Corps from General Smilo von L�ttwitz , but without being allotted any new troops. L�ttwitz took over command of the frontline extending from Radom to the discharge of the Pilica, and the VIII Army-Corps had the mission of defending the west bank of the Wisla from Pilica to Warsaw. General H�hne had only the resources of the 1132nd Grenadier-Brigade and the 23rd Luftwaffe-FLAK-Regiment to deploy along this stretch, but defended a 40 km. long frontline.

On August 12, Soviet troops launched yet another assault on the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and the XX Army-Corps. Having thoroughly prepared with artillery bombardment and an intense, almost compact, aerial attack; the infantry launched their assault with the support of tanks. The 47th Army which attacked from Stanis�aw�w toward T�uszcz came under heavy fire.The Soviets brought the 8th Guards Tank Corps into battle. Between August 12-15, General Gusiev, commander of the 47thArmy, ordered repeated waves of attacks in an attempt to destroy the IV SS-Panzer-Corps� positions along the Okuniew-Wo�omin-T�uszcz line. If successful, he would also effectively sever contact between the 9th and 2nd Armies as well as both corps defending the routes entering Warsaw. On August 15, after repeated bombardment in connection with air attacks by the I�-2 assault wing, the Soviet infantry entered Wo�omin and T�usczc. The German and the west-European volunteers from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� responded with a series of heavy counter-attacks in which all of the tanks and assault-guns (StuG�s) from both of the SS armoured regiments participated. Throughout the entire day, bloody close-quarter combat took place�� including actual hand-to-hand use of the bayonet�� and the 47th Army�s two rifle corps retreated to their start-out positions. Troops from the IV SS-Panzer-Corps together with the XX Army-Corps managed to avoid being totally crushed. Nonetheless, between August 10 and 15; they were pressed back almost as far as the Bug. The front now ran precisely along the railway line between Warsaw and Bia�ystok. On the evening of August 15, they inflicted such heavy losses on the Soviet side that it ceased its assault, but this pause lasted only 48 hours. It was only along the stretch between Sulej�wek and Rad�c, on the direct approaches to Praga, that calm continued to reign.

In the middle of August, vital changes were made in the command positions of the German side. Hitler was impressed by Model�s effectiveness when it came to �taping� gaps in the front and was also highly aware of his dedication. For these two commendable reasons, he was awarded the prestigious post of Oberbefehlhaber �West��� commander in chief over all military forces in the west. Model would go on to organise the retreat of the defeated troops in Normandy over the Seine, simultaneously resolving sensitive political questions in the Wehrmacht staff related to lingering suspicions regarding his contacts with the July 20 conspirators. On August 16, General Georg Hans Reinhardt was appointed as the commander of Heeresgruppe �Mitte��� and General Josef Harpe was selected commander of Heeresgruppe �Nord Ukraine.� The Germans were very conscious of the weaknesses along their front, especially in the Warsaw region, therefore they decided to again send the Hungarian unit from the II Reserve Corps into combat. General von Vormann regarded this type of support as highly dubious, not just because their number was low and their weaponry light. His main objection was grounded in signs indicating they �fraternise with the Poles�, as he wrote of in his reports. Despite this, the Hungarian 12th Reserve Division took up combat positions between the Warsaw section of �oliborz and the Kampinos-reservation (to battle against the partisans), while the 5th Reserve Division reinforced the VIII Army-Corps outside Warsaw. These units began to regroup on August 19.

A day earlier in Warsaw (with the exception of the stretch of area passing through Praga), the 47th Army, the 70th Army, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, and the 28th Army resumed the assault directed against the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and the XX Army-Corps. The opposing German troop forces were as follows: along the Rado��-Solej�wek line�� the 73rd Infantry-Division; the Sulej�wek-Oss�w line�� the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade; the Wo�omin-T�uszcz line�� the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�; in the T�uszcz region�� the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�; and along the �och�w-Ma�kinia line, in the following order�� the 5th J�ger-Division, the 211th Infantry-Division and the 102nd Infantry-Division. Once again, the Soviet offensive was preceded by massive bombing runs and hurricanes of artillery fire. The main assault was carried out by the 70th and the 28th Armies between T�uszcz and �och�w. The Soviet infantry with the support of tanks and assault guns overran the German positions at Jad�w, just where the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� and the 5th J�ger-Division connected. Without pause, the infantry continued their assault-march reaching the suburbs of T�uszcz in hard fighting, with at least 400 armoured vehicles participating on the Soviet side alone.

SS-Gruppenf�hrer Herbert Gille received orders instructing him to conduct counter-attacks in the direction of �och�w. This was an impossible mission to execute since all the units in his corps were already engaged in battle. On that same day, August 18, SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 incurred heavy losses at Jad�w, and the tanks which had been spared were sent speedily away in the direction of T�usczc. Their presence made it possible for the soldiers from SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania��� exhausting the last of their strength�� to hold back the enemy�s attacks.

On August 19, the German front began to collapse. Attacking Soviet columns along the Liwiec River split both German corps and advanced to the Bug River. The 5th J�ger-Division had been destroyed. General Wei� ordered a rapid evacuation of the XX Army-Corps to the other side of the Bug River, where he would take up new positions north of Wyszk�w. In other words, 2nd Army had withdrawn from Warsaw, and consequently, the entire burden of its defence was turned over to the 9th Army and the IV SS-Panzer-Corps.

The west- European volunteers in the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking,� who were defending T�uszcz at this time, found themselves under deadly bombardment from �Katjusha� rockets�� the Soviet air force controlled the air, virtually unopposed. Wave after wave of infantry units and tanks washed over the unyielding defenders. The 47th Army stormed Wo�omin; and the 70th Army, T�usczc. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� which fought on the left flank was forced to shorten its front to the T�usczc and Wysz�w line, and take up positions along the railway line there. That day, they successfully withstood the violent attacks against Wyszk�w by the 28th Army�s frontline troops, solely thanks to a timely intervention carried out by all the panzer division�s regiments. Tank crews reported enemy losses mounting to 20 destroyed tanks�� on the other hand, SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 also lost two vehicles to the marsh-terrain near the village of Skuszew by the Bug. This sort of incident, where the Germans themselves blew-up their tanks after having become hopelessly trapped in the muddy banks of a river, would be repeated on further occasions,

The situation for both SS-panzer divisions now became critical. Opposing them were three armies (more concretely: six rifle corps, as the 70th Army had only two; one corps from the 28th Army fought against the XX Army-Corps, while the 47th Army�s 125th Rifle Corps stood inactive across from the 73rd Infanterie-Division) and two armoured corps, plus countless artillery and combat aircraft. The losses were enormous and only some tens of tanks per-regiment were battle-worthy. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� had been driven out of T�uszcz and organised a new defence line along the main road to Bia�ystok between Trojany and Zabrodzie. With the aim of reinforcing Gille�s ever weaker corps, General Reinhart ordered that the Hungarian reserve, the 1st Cavalry Division, be re-deployed to Praga. Also ordered to arrive in Praga was the 1145th Grenadier-Regiment from Warsaw, which up until that time been part of von dem Bach�s corps and had helped to crush the Uprising. SS-Obergruppenf�hrer and polizeigeneralen Erich von dem Bach opposed this decision with the argument that his pacification troop was already weak. The order, however, continued in force. In addition, the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade was put under the operational command of the severely mauled 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� in the defence of Wo�omin.

^{A tracked assault-gun StuG 40 Ausf. G from SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� or the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� waiting in ambush in the vicinity of Warsaw, in August 1944.}

At this time, new operational plans were meanwhile being drawn up in Moscow dealing with, among other things, the fighting in central Poland. It was a cheerless satisfaction Zjukov felt when, as he had foreseen, the weakened force of Soviet attacks now began to be clearly evident. Soviet forces continued to fight hard, but the officers at Soviet headquarters knew that a breakthrough in the German frontline along the Wisla was not going to be achieved in the immediate future. To all appearances, Stalin was not concerned about this. The Soviet dictator was now completely focused on the Balkans where the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian Fronts were poised to launch a new strategic offensive. He also wanted to strike against East Prussia and decide the battle for control of the Baltic States. Zjiukov informed him that it was necessary to carry out a reorganization of several armies and to give them new objectives. Moreover, it was necessary to concentrate large amounts of supplies and reinforcements to the Balkans and this would primarily be at the expense of Konev and Rokossovskij�s armies. Stalin did not debate the viewpoints of his �representatives.� And on August 20, the 1st Belorussian Front and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were already on their way south. This had, to some significant degree, an impact on the battles for Warsaw since, on that sector of the front which these forces had up until then occupied; there now remained only the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. Clearly, this weakened the combat strength of the forces storming the Warsaw region.

The issue of the Warsaw Uprising was dealt with separately. Stalin was surprised that the insurgent opposition had lasted so long. For the Germans, who had primarily regular troops along the front, it was increasingly apparent that they did not have enough combat strength to quickly regain control of the city. According to Stalin, Marshal Rokossovskij should not, as yet, attack Praga itself, but instead concentrate his focus on liquidating the enemy in the Wo�omin-Wyszk�w region. Obviously, the most important objective of his frontline for the immediate future was to continue to maintain and even expand the troop positions along the Wisla. Likewise, the 2nd Army should be smashed and the Narew crossed.

The final days of August constituted a period of seldom-seen, brutally intensive fighting. Soviet pressure on the IV SS-Panzer-Corps let up on August 20, which immediately resulted in German counterattacks. The local counteroffensives which the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� conducted were aimed to �even out� the frontline between Radzymin and Wyszk�w: This, because the 70th Army in earlier fighting had managed to carve troublesome pockets between various districts of defence. On August 21, the tank grenadiers (from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�) led counter-attacks to regain control of the main road to Bia�ystok, which temporarily removed the risk that both Waffen-SS tank divisions would be separated from one other. Although the SS-soldiers� tanks and anti-tank guns caused incredible losses in terms of combat equipment for the Soviet attackers; the disproportionate combat strength favouring the 70th Army on August 24 enabled them to once again cut off the road to Bia�ystok near the village of Trojany. Volunteers from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� fought frenetically and managed to beat back repeated attacks by the Soviet infantry, which had the support of tanks from the 8th Guards Tank Corps. The Germans had the Bug River at their backs, and were the division�s positions to give way, it would cease to exist. The commander of the 70th Army, General Popov (the army was led by Vasil Popov while Alexei Popov had command of the 8th Guards Tank Corps), strove to cross the Bug from the village of Trojany to Marian�w on the other side. It did not succeed, however, until August 25, despite one of the 28th Army�s rifle corps engaging half the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�s� combat strength due south of Wyszk�w.

The 47th Army�s 77th and 129th Rifle Corps simultaneously attacked Wo�omin from the east, and the village of Zabraniec which lay south of it. Defence of the village, which lay in ruins, was the responsibility of a combined unit composed of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade, while the stretch of area to the south was manned by the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division. The Germans took a pause from the fighting but, due to lack of modern weaponry, the Hungarians were beaten down and withdrew towards Zielonka and Rembert�w. In an effort to save the situation, SS-Gruppenf�hrer Herbert Gille supported the cavalry division with units from the 73rd Infantry-Division, effectively halting further Soviet successes. In the end, the front along the Wo�omin�� Dluga River�� Okuniew line was temporarily stabilised.

The fighting that had taken place was extremely bloody. According to a report from the �War-diary of the 9th Army,� the IV SS-Panzer-Corps�� taking into account only the days between August 18 and August 22�� destroyed 249 Soviet tanks and tracked artillery. Balancing this, however, was the fact that for all practical purposes the Soviet air force had liquidated this German corps� artillery. Many troops had fallen, forcing the combining of combat entities, as for example: the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade. Holding the main Radzymin-Wyszk�w road became impossible. North of the Bug, the German 2nd Army, under pressure from the 48th and the 65th Armies, withdrew to the other side of the Narew. Gille now began to withdraw the rest of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� towards the west, where together with the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� it would form the new �l�any-Zawady-Rz�da Brook defence line, east of Serock. With this objective in mind, von Vormann ordered General von L�ttwitz to immediately re-deploy the 19th Panzer-Division, with the exception of Panzer-Regiment 27, to the IV SS-Panzer-Corps. Eighty tanks would halt outside of Magnuszew, while the 73rd and 74th Panzer-Grenadier-Regiments, as well as Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 19, would support the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� in its fight to retain control of the river�s outflow.

On August 26, the Soviet troops commenced the next assault with the support of massive artillery fire. Along the southern bank of the Bug, units from the 28th Army clashed with the Germans as they attempted to cross the river and strike at the XX Army-Corps� rearguard. The Germans quickly eliminated these bridgeheads but despite this momentary success, the 2nd Army�s main fighting force was soon cut down and driven back during the first week of September across to the other side of the Narew. Prior to this, the biggest apparent problem at the location where the zones of the 9th and the 2nd Armies met involved the frontline fighting being conducted by the combined combat strength of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� and the 2nd Army. Rifle divisions of the 28th Army with support from a mass of T-34s and �Shermans� seized �l�any on August 27, and during the fighting that followed, the villages of Czarn�w and Kulig�w were also seized. The commander of Heeresgruppe �Mitte,� General Reinhart, interpreted the enemy manoeuvre as a preparatory action for intensifying pressure in the area of the Bug�s discharge, with the goal of attacking the isolated rearguard of the 2nd Army which was engaged in the fighting outside Wyszk�w. Thinking along the same lines, von Vormann gave Gille the order to launch an immediate counter-attack. Tanks from SS-Panzer-Regimen 5 together with the panzer-grenadiers from the 19th Panzer-Division attacked Kulig�w and Czarn�w. Initially, the German fire power forced the Soviet infantry to give ground and two of their tanks were knocked out. But then a number of attacking tanks drove into a swampy marsh which they had not noticed bordering the banks of the Bug: The counter-offensive fell apart. During their withdrawal the Germans were forced to blow up twelve of their own tanks and assault guns. An unexpected order from the commander of the 9th Army instructing the 19th Panzer-Division, at the combat ready, to return to Magnuszew, further weakened the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking.� The only unit left to provide it support was Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73.

On the same day, further south, the 70th Army carried out an offensive in the area surrounding the village of Zawady�� at the same location where the zone of the 5th SS-Panzer Division �Wiking� and that of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� had met. Though sustaining heavy losses, the attackers managed to take control of the villages of Zawady and �osie, but they didn�t succeed in crushing the SS-soldiers defences at Rz�dza Brook and on the approaches to Radzymin. The rifle divisions from the 47th Army had great tactical success when they yet again drove out the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division from its positions outside Wo�omin and were able to seize Oss�w. Consequently, the Hungarian-German positions in Wo�omin itself were outflanked from the south. On August 28, the 129th Rifle Corps continued to attack in that direction, and advancing from the south and the east reached the former built up sector of Wo�omin which lay in ruins�

On August 29, nine rifle divisions from the 28th and the 70th Armies carried out the next violent storming of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� positions between Radzymin and the mouth of the Bug. Gille reported to the army staff on a massive infantry attack, in numbers never before witnessed, accompanied by waves of air attacks carried out by the I�-2 air assault wing, and heavy artillery fire. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�s� right flank (SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 �Westland�), after several days of bloody fighting, was forced to retreat back to the village of Ruda. SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania� and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73, however, had succeeded for the time being in maintaining control of the area around the outflow of the Bug River. To meet this situation, the Soviet 28th Army on August 30 increased its pressure on that area by launching periodic assaults against the exhausted enemy. On August 31, the 28th Army�s troops controlled the entire southern bank of the Bug River and thus its troops could now press on towards the Narew, in the vicinity of Serock. The Germans retired to a line which stretched along Rynia-Bia�obrzegi-W�lka Radzymi�ska. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�s� withdrawal toward Rynia and Bia�obrzegi created a gap between the IV SS-Panzer-Corps� positions and the area controlled by the 2nd Army; a gap which encompassed the west bank of the Narew between Zegrze and Serock. General Reinhart gave the commander of the 9th Army the order to occupy the area with Gille�s corps. With the aim of ensuring the success of this mission�� to begin with, a part of the SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania� was re-deployed.

The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� found itself under a sustained enemy attack that showed no signs of letting up. On August 30, 1944, the 96th and the114th Rifle Corps from the 70th Army attacked Radzymin simultaneously from both the north and the east. As on the previous day, the attack was accompanied by relentless waves of Soviet air attacks. The Germans were forced to withdraw from the villages of Mokre and Dybowo. The retreating SS-soldiers set up a new defensive line taking advantage of the destroyed buildings in Radzymin. But not even the devastating fire-power of their machine guns and mortars could hinder the Soviet infantry from entering the city. By that evening, when it had become evident that heavy counter-attacks supported by tanks had not improved the situation; the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� was finally forced out of Radzymin.

The day after; both corps from the 70th Army and one corps from 47th Army launched attacks along the Radzymin-Marki road and in the direction of W�lka Radzymi�ska. After the loss of Radzymin; Gille set the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� in positions to defend attacks from the north, and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf � from southerly attack, including the road towards Marki. Despite both merged Waffen-SS divisions (together with parts of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade) being exhausted, they nonetheless continued to fight stubbornly and carried out almost daily counter-attacks with combat units drawn from the companies and battalions and with the support of armoured weapons. The Soviet soldiers also displayed great bravery and apparent unconcern with death. The fighting was therefore both hard and drawn out. The rate of advance for the 28th, the 70th, and the 47th Armies, as well as the 8th Guards Tank Corps, never exceeded more than 1 to 2 kilometres per day. On August 31, the 70th Army Corps together with the 47th Army�s 129th Rifle Corps only exerted the energy needed to clean up Radzymin�s southern suburbs and occupy the village of Cegielnia.

On September 1, however, the pressing Soviet forces resumed the fighting in earnest. The terrain favoured the defenders because, in village after village, building structures rested on both sides of the main road to Marki, and between W�lka Radzymi�ska and Struga spread a forest (which before the war had belonged to the village of Nieporet), small marshes, and a number of hills (heights numbered 104, 100 and 97 in the vicinity of S�upno village). Early in the morning, after a heavy pre-assault artillery bombardment and air attack, the Soviet infantry commenced an offensive supported by tanks. After an entire day of heavy fighting, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 �Westland� halted the enemy amidst the ruins of W�lka Radzymi�ska and on the muddy roads within the aforementioned forest, while units from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� did the same thing along the line stretching between the villages of Struga and Nadma. The fact that the SS-soldiers reported�� just in the area surrounding the village of S�upno�� a total of 24 destroyed enemy tanks can serve as proof of just how hard these battles were fought.

The pressure exerted by the Soviet troops against the IV SS-Panzer-Corps� left flank began to slowly taper off. Yet, on the 2nd and 3rd days of September, the 70th Army, and the 47th Army�s 129th Rifle Corps renewed their attempts to attack and breakthrough the German positions between W�lka Radzymi�ska and Nadma, albeit without success.

In August, the Russians sought to broaden the front by circling around Warsaw south of the city and building a bridgehead at the town of Magnuzew. The �Hermann-G�ring� Division, together with other units, was pulled out of the fighting in Praga and re-deployed to meet this new threat. Here they were confronted by the 1st Free Polish Tank Brigade. The result of this battle was a �draw� and the Russians succeeded in holding onto this location throughout the autumn of 1944.

All attempts to pierce the defence were immediately met with counterattacks by improvised Kampfgruppe from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf �. Tanks wound up in long-distance artillery duels in which the Soviet side proved to be without chance. This was the case because the warring Soviet infantry�s main support came from outdated, model �Valentine� tanks, while their modern tanks had been placed in other armoured entities, as for example, in Guards units. In addition, the relatively few German tanks and tracked assault-guns, fought from ambush positions in the forest where they were at least camouflaged from the ever present threat of the I�-2�s bombers.

A more difficult situation for the IV SS-Panzer-Corps had developed, instead, around Wo�omin itself. After the enemy had reached the nearby village, Nadma, the German troops occupying Wololmin were fighting half-encircled and only had contact with the corps along the railway line to Zielonka. Finally, subsequent to the 129th Rifle Corps ending its assault of Wo�omin; the situation became temporarily stabilised. Despite this, and with the aim of improving his troops� situation, Gille received permission to shorten the defender�s line. On September 6, the German and Hungarian troops left Wo�omin and withdrew to the suburbs of Zielonka. This was the final clever feint in the new Soviet offensive phase of the war which had begun on August 10. Beginning on September 3, SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gille�s frontline troops experienced a welcome period of relative calm.

However, the intense fighting having let up against the frontline at Warsaw did not mean that the crisis in Heeresgruppe �Mitte�s� sector was over. The German forces defending Praga�s suburbs were extremely weak. General von Vormann had quite correctly foreseen that the Soviets side�s aim was to renew carrying out its assault strategy as soon as possible, particularly in the direction of Warsaw. Therefore he sent reminders to von dem Bach and General Hans Schirmer, (Schirmer had replaced General Stahel as commandant of urban warfare on August 25, who was dispatched in all haste to Bucharest) concerning the quashing of the Uprising and protecting the bridges across the Wis�a and along Warsaw�s left river bank. He then presented these concerns in very striking terms to the 9th Army�s chief of staff, General St�dke�� and in a telephone conversation to von dem Bach, he stated that: �Not a single tank shall be allowed to pass!�

At the same time, the 9th Army, which had been burdened with the responsibility of defending the middle section of the Wisla, was suddenly weakened�� because now it was General Weiߒs 2nd Army, fighting in the northern zone, that began the final retreat over the Narew and, among other locations, withdrew from Wyszk�w. Wei� reported: �During that day the situation became so grave that the order was given directing the XX and XXIII Army-Corps to withdraw to the other side of the Narew and the EastPrussian defence line.� But the 48th Army, the 65th Army, and the 1st Guards Tank Corps, all components of the 1st Belorussian Front�s right flank, succeeded in reaching the Narew at several points parallel to the retreat of the Germans and set up strong bridgeheads on its western bank. The 28th Army, positioned on the Bug�s southern bank where it ran out close to Wyszk�w, was also active here. The 128th Rifle Corps from this army pursued the XX Army-Corps and crossed over the Narew by Wierzbica, two kilometres north of Serock. The Soviet troops also seized the important bridgehead at R�an (the 48th Army) and at Pu�tusk (the 65th Army with the 1st Guards Tank Corps).

This course of events caused General Reinhardt, as soon as the temporarily stabilised situation outside of Praga was made known to him by von Vormann , to decide in favour of strengthening the 2nd Army at the expense of the 9th Army. He rescinded the order he had given two days earlier concerning the redeployment of the new 542nd Grenadier-Division to Warsaw, and despatched it instead to the area around Pu�tusk, where it was to operate together with the 35th Infantry-Division and the Panzer-Abteilung 104.

Thereafter, he further strengthened this formation with the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade that had been pulled away from its co-operation with the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 which had been assigned to the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking.� Over the course of two days, he even decided to commit the rest of the SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 to the stretch between Serock and Pu�tusk. Meanwhile, in accord with decisions made by the OKW and OKH, the commander of Heeresgruppe �Mitte� was, at the same time, expecting that the 24th Panzer-Division, along with a Kampfgruppe from the 25th Panzer-Division, to arrive at the bridge emplacement from southern Poland (the Dukla-Pass). It was Reinhardt�s contention that a powerful Kampfgruppe should be assembled as soon as possible outside Pu�tusk, because according to reconnaissance�� by September 8, four days after the bridge area had been seized�� the enemy had already found time to mass two rifle corps and a tank corps there. Confronted with the prospect of such a drastic reduction in his own force strength, General von Vormann naturally opposed these orders, though to no avail. On the other hand, the German command�s quick decision did make it possible for the 2nd Army to check the expansion of the Soviet bridgeheads. What particularly contributed to this success were the few model PxKpfw V �Panther� tanks from SS-Panzer Regiment 5 which provided support to the 35th Infantry-Division and the 542nd Grenadier-Division. Between September 6 and 9, they eliminated scores of tanks belonging to the 1st Guards Tank Corps.

The commander of the 9th Army had no illusions that the cessation of attacks against Praga on September 3 was anything other than for the purpose of regrouping Soviet combat forces in preparation for new assaults. His immediate superior shared this view and reported the following to the OKH on September 6:

Despite this, on September 8 General Reinhardt gave orders to von Vormann to transfer command of the XXXXVI Panzer-Corps, together with the rest of the 19th Panzer-Division at Magnuszew, to the 2nd Army. General L�ttwitz�s staff would coordinate the counter-attack against the bridgehead at Pu�tusk and the time-point was set for September 13. When the panzer corps� officers set off on September 9, the 8th Army-Corps again overtook command of the forces blockading the mouth of the Pilica, while the area between Warsaw and G�ra Kalwaria was taken over by the improvised Gruppe �Sickenius� (General Sickenius� staff from the 391st Sicherungs-Division z.b.V and the Hungarian 5th Reserve Division). The 19th Panzer-Division�s columns also set off towards the north during the evening of September 9. General K�llner�s subordinates still had no idea that instead of marching towards Pultusk, they would wind up in the middle of the battle for Praga.

Throughout the month of August, Stalin, as has already been mentioned, deliberately held back the storming of Praga since it clearly risked hindering the Germans from pacifying Warsaw, despite the unspeakable brutality of their methods. Nor did he, notably enough, make a secret of this reasoning which he wrote of in his letters to the leaders of the western powers. The dictator�s wording concerning �the public distancing from the Warsaw-disturbance��� together with his order concerning the denial of allied landing rights�� was an openly hostile policy towards the Uprising. However, such a clearly spelled out perspective, which also served as clear evidence of his capacity for grim and mercilessly cold calculation, came to provoke strong exception in the western press. Political relations with Great Britain became extremely strained and the USA�s ambassador in Moscow talked about his �serious concerns regarding the Soviet government�s position.�

In this sensitive atmosphere, Stalin consulted with the officers at headquarters toward the end of August about near-term operational plans. STAVKA at this time had its attention primarily focused on the Romanian front and the planned new offensive in the Baltic States which was to be carried out in the very near future. Zjukov asserted that the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belorussian Front had already exhausted their resources with respect to offensive warfare, which was also reflected in the order dated August 29, directing a tactical shift to defensive warfare and consolidation. This order, in practice, merely sanctioned the prevailing situation. Zjukov�s order encompassed not only the right flank in Marshal Rokossovskij�s front, which should make every strain necessary to reach the Narew and take the well defended bridgeheads on its west bank (this was the purpose of the fighting between Wyszk�w and Radzymin). According to the commander�s representative, one of the considerations behind this operation was the necessity of also storming Praga itself, primarily to even out the front and improve the tactical connection between the flanks of Marshal Rokossovsk�s forces. STAVKA already possessed information concerning the stubborn defence mounted by the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and consequently wanted to eliminate any possible threat from the enemy panzer corps. And lastly, the prospect of success for the fighting along the Narew was partly dependent on the continued presence of the German�s 9th Army along the Wis�a�� a factor that materially hindered it from being used as a support force to the 2nd Army,

Stalin approved Zjukov�s plans. Marshal Rokosovskij, after regrouping his troops, would storm Praga, clear the area surrounding the Narew�s entry into the Wis�a, from this join to Modlin, and then shift from attack to defence of the river�s eastern bank. Help to the crumbling uprising was not a consideration in the planning. The attack, scheduled to commence September 10, was to be carried out by the 70th and 47th Armies, along with the 8th Guards Tank Corps. With regard to the 28th Army, the decision was made that it would no longer be a part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Instead, it would be moved north to join the planned fighting in East Prussia. The 28th Army was finally relieved on September 8, and left the outskirts of Warsaw as late as the evening prior to the storming of Praga.

On September 4, the British War Cabinet communicated its special decision to Stalin, where, among other items, it read:

In diplomatic terms this was a serious warning, a threat of sanctions. Stalin was, of course, dependent on military aid from the west, particularly with regard to modern industrial equipment. He had also approved the original concept of storming Praga and, at first, had ordered the reinforcement of the 1st Infantry Division�s 47th Polish Army (according to the operational order issued on September 5) and then, on September 11, the withdrawal of the entire 1st Polish Volunteer Army from Magnuszew and its re-deployment, in the 47th Army�s wake, towards Warsaw. The dictator sought in this way to show his goodwill towards the Uprising, and by having engaged the use of Polish troops even indicate that the capital should indeed be freed by the Poles themselves. On September 10, he also withdrew his order not to grant allied planes landing rights on Soviet airfields, and ordered the Soviet Air Force to take complete control over Warsaw�s airspace. On September 13 1944, the first airborne weapon delivery was parachute-dropped to the resistance men.

On September 9, Marshal Rokossovskij received reports from Generals Popov and Gusiev that their armies were ready to conduct further attacks on Warsaw. On the same day, the Soviet bomber wing launched heavy raids on positions held by the 73rd Infantry-Division and the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division. Intensive reconnaissance of German positions in the IV SS-Panzer-Corps area was carried out, with the intent of disorientating the opposition with regard to the main direction of attack. This succeeded because, even as late as September 7, von Vormann reported that ��an attack is expected from the 70th and 28th Armies against the 9th Army�s left flank, as well as from the 47th Army against Praga.� The German High Command thus perceived the greatest threat to be in the north, although the 8th Guards Tank Army on September 6 was re-deployed from the 70th to the 47th Army. It wasn�t until September 9 that German reconnaissance flights observed this Soviet troop movement and then noted it in reports. The following day the offensive was launched.

Early September 10, the two sides were deployed as follows. On the German side along the Zbytki�� Mi�dzylesie�� Stara Mi�osna�� Weso�a line stood the 73rd Infantry-Division: Between Weso�a and Zielonka stood the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division: In the forests between Zielonka and S�upno, the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� was stationed, and in the terrain stretching from the village of Sierak�w to Rynia, the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking��� less SS-Panzer-Regiment �Wiking.�

The list of all the units comprising the IV SS-Panzer-Corps included:

��Eisenbahn Panzerzug Regiment 1

��The II and IV Batteries from the 102nd Werfer-Regiment (from the 300th Festung-Werfer-Brigade),

��Kommando 9th Army Sturm-Battalion (except the 1st Company)

��The 9th and 421st Festung-Pionier-Battalions

��The 2nd and 4th Companies, 737th Festung-Pionier-Bataillon

��The 2nd Company, 5th Festung-Pionier-Ausbildungs-Bataillon

��The 500th SS-J�ger-Battalion

��The 5 II, 1 VI, 2 VI and 4 II Flak-Festungs-Companies

��The 23rd Festungs-MG-Battalion

��The 73rd Infanterie-Division (except the 73rd Machinegun Battalion and parts of the 1886th Infantry Regiment) along with the subordinate 745th Panzer-J�ger-Abteilung, 2./475 Panzer-J�ger-Artillerie-Abteilung

��The 1st The Royal Hungarian Cavalry Division and the unit subordinated to them, schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 154

��The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and

��The 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� along with its subordinated units: the 1145th Grenadier-Regiment, the 560th Infanterie-Abteilung z.b.V as well as the 1405th Infanterie-Festungs-Bataillon.

Their opposition included: the 47th Army, the 70th Army, the 8th Guards Tank Corps (the 58th Guards Tank Brigade, the 59th Guards Tank Brigade, the 60th Guards Tank Brigade, the 28th Guards Mechanised Brigade). The complement and operational positioning of the 47th Army was as follows: the remnants of the 105th Reserve Brigade, as well as the 175th Rifle Division, the 1st Tadeusz Ko�ciuszko-Infantry Division, the 76th Rifle Division, a Rifle Regiment from the 60th Rifle Division (from the 125th Rifle Corps) in the area of Mi�dzylesie-Stara Mi�osna. As a reserve for the 125th Rifle Corps, in the vicinity of Michalin stood the remnants of the 60th Rifle Division and the 143rd Rifle Division. The 234th Rifle Division and the 185th Rifle Division were located between Stara Mi�osna and Oss�w

The Wo�omin region was manned by the 129th Rifle Corps which encompassed the 260th, the 132nd and the 328th Rifle Divisions. In the area from S�upno to the Narew we find the 70th Army, with combat forces from the 114th Rifle Corps in the area of Radzymin (160th, 165th and 413th Rifle Divisions) and the 96th Rifle Corps (the 1st Rifle Division, the 38th Guards Rifle Division & the 76th Rifle Corps).

The above summary shows the concentration of Soviet forces in the two most important compass points from which to launch attacks. The first is the southern location around Anin where the following forces were assembled: five infantry divisions, a tank corps, a reserve brigade, and a reinforced artillery. The other was between W�lka Radzymi�ska and S�upno. Concentrated there, within very small bounds, was the 70th Army�s 114th Rifle Corps. The Soviet command also planned during the course of following days to send the 1st Polish Volunteer Army to fight in the southern sector.

At that time the Polish forces were attached to General Kuzmin�s 125th Rifle Corps. On September 9, 1944, the 1st Tadeusz Ko�ciszko-Infantry Division counted a total of 8,893 soldiers and had at its disposal 102 8.2 to 12 cm, mortars, 37 4.5 cm. anti-tank guns, 36 7.62 cm. guns, 12 12.2 cm. howitzers and 13 assault-guns, model SU-76M, plus 244 vehicles and 1,193 horses. Direct support was provided by the Soviet 13th Light Artillery Brigade, the 23rd Rocket Artillery Brigade, the 30th Heavy Artillery Brigade, the 100th Howitzer Brigade, the 139th Engineer Battalion, the 58th Guards Tank Brigade�s 2nd Battalion (support provided by the Soviet units). Initially, the division only sent selected infantry battalions into combat. As it happened, the Poles opposition in the Anin-area was an infantry battalion from the 73rd Infantry Division�s Infantry-Regiment 70 supported by a battery of 12 cm mortars (incidentally, it can be noted that the German 12 cm mortars, model sGrWr 42, were an identical copy of the mortars used by the Red Army). Longer out on 1st Infantry Division�s attacking shoulder, Artillery-Regiment 173 from the 73rd Infantry-Division was also deployed on the front.

At 10:00 AM, September 10, after a one-and-a-half hour artillery barrage, the 114th Rifle Corps had the honour of being the first unit to open the attack. Once again, intensive fighting broke out at S�upno and at the entry points to the Nieporet-Forest. Troops from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� threw back all enemy infantry attacks, inflicting heavy losses in the process. The vicinity of height no. 104 marked the first incident that took place with consequences that would have dramatic repercussions on both sides: One of the 160th Rifle Division�s regiments, supported by a tank company, fought through the deadly fields of fire and passed the German lines and, when they reached the forest�s main road, set off towards nearby Stanis�aw�w. But when the next wave of Soviet infantry and tanks began to attack the defending force from the direction of S�upno, StuG 40 assault-guns from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� suddenly cropped up near height no.104 and forced the enemy to retreat under massive bombardment. In this way, the lead regiment, which toward evening had been decimated to 150 soldiers and 6 tanks, were separated by the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� detached rearguard. They fought relentlessly outside Stanis�aw�w�� but before dark, the SS- troops had brought them to their knees. At the same time, the main infantry forces from the 114th Rifle Corps had become bogged down in the ruins of the villages of Sierak�w and S�upnos.

Events worked out much better for the main forces of the 47th Army. Their attack commenced at 1300 hours along the Wis�a, opening with only the 175th Rifle Division. The German, 73rd Infantry-Division met this first attack with violent counterattacks. Soon, however, the entire 125th Rifle Corps joined in the fighting. Thanks to their numerical superiority, which also applied to artillery an anti-aircraft gun support, they eventually were able to crush the enemy�s resistance. The German infantry began to withdraw towards the north. The commander of the 73rd Infantry-Division, Colonel Kurt H�hlig, was wounded and lost command of his unit. And though individual battalions attempted to carry out counterattacks�� for example, the 76th Rifle Division had, in fact, been beaten back from Stara Mi�osna - nevertheless, before the clock reached 1600 hours, the Germans were forced to retire from Anin (godsen Zast�w and Sadul). Towards evening, Polish and Soviet infantry began to approach the buildings of Praga�s suburb, Wawer, by fighting their way through on the right-hand side of the railway tracks.

The knowledge that the attack on Praga had now begun forced the commands of the 9th and 2nd Armies to alter their operational plans. The decision to begin attacking the bridgehead at Pu�tusk was now conditioned on how the attack outside Warsaw went. General von Vormann halted the march of the 19th Panzer-Division towards Modlin and turned it, instead, directly towards Praga. Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 and SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking�, which were also part of the panzer division�s complement and had thus far been fighting outside Pu�tusk, were also commandeered in preparation for battle against Warsaw.

On September 11, tanks from the 19th Panzer-Division rolled into Praga. General K�llner, who commanded the division, had been assigned the split 73rd Infantry-Division and gave them the order to halt the enemy attacks. The Germans organised a series of counterattacks. Since the panzer divisions had begun to participate in the fighting successively, the commander had only succeeded in stopping the 125th Rifle Corps� advance, which as of September 11 had been supported by tanks from the 8th Guards Tank Corps� tank brigades. That same day, the Soviet formation occupied the city sectors of Wawer, Rembert�w and the village of Zielonka. Only during the attack against Groch�w, a typical built-up urban area, were they driven back. In addition, the 77th Rifle Division�s infantry was activated and applied hard pressure against the 1st Calvary�s Hungarian positions in the woods north of Rembert�w.

In the 3rd SS. Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� area, the 114th Rifle Corps�� with support from the 129th Rifle Corps� 328th Rifle Division�� continued fighting. On September 11, the infantry, supported by tanks, again sped towards the Ni�poret-Forest. The Soviet units fought their way into the woods taking significant losses under close-combat conditions. The panzer-grenadiers and the Soviet infantry continued to fight on with determination but at the end of the day neither side had succeeded in forcing the other from the wooded area.

On September 12, the 73rd Infantry-Division�s line of defence was broken despite tank support from Panzer-Regiment 27. The German infantry troops fled in panic towards the town. On the road between Anin and Wawer (along the Otwock line) the Polish 1st Infantry Division destroyed the German Artillery-Regiment 173. The only troops left at the German defensive positions were panzer-grenadiers from the 19th Panzer-Division, but due to their meagre number (in the combat companies of both regiments� four battalions at that time, there were barely 900 soldiers�� but Polish records report that only Panzergrenadier-Regiment 74 participated in the fighting), the Poles were able to hold a broad front. An irritated von Vormann wrote that �the opposition�s attack has completely broken through the 73rd Infantry Division�s front [�] during the course of two days fighting the division has not shown any fighting spirit whatsoever, and therefore cannot be said to possess any combat value worthy of mention.� The Hungarian soldiers also withdrew from Rembert�w in the direction of Zielonka. The 77th Rifle Corps, which followed in their tracks, received support from tanks of the 8th Guards Tank Corps. General Gusiev, however, had no intention of letting his tank corps get bogged down in street fighting�� he only intended them to be used in attacking the city�s suburbs from the flanks. Despite this, individual tank battalions remained in order to support the 125th Rifle Corps.

Towards evening, the 175th Rifle Division moved over towards Goc�aw, while the 1st Infantry Division and the 76th Rifle Division made a northerly detour around the effective defences at Groch�w, taking Kaw�czyn and closed in on the built up communities of Utrata, Elsner�w and Z�bki. On or about the same time this was taking place, 1640 hours to be precise, Captain Kapu�ci�ski from the 1st Infantry Regiment entered Praga�s centre. General K�llner carried out several counter-attacks, with the support of tanks, near the city sector Saska K�pa in Targ�wek: On September 12, in the Polish sector alone, eight such attacks were carried out. But these were thrown back by the 175th Rifle Division�s artillery and the Polish 1st Infantry Division (for defensive purposes, using the 1st Light Artillery Regiment�s direct-target guns). Now the Germans, together with the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division, tried to organise a new defensive line along the Zielonka�� Z�bki�� Elsner�w railway. The 19th Panzer-Division carried out a defensive manoeuvre. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division reported that the enemy operated in formations of 8�14 tanks supported by one or two infantry companies. What was particularly amazing was that they had identified the �Elephants� company, but naturally the whole business turned out to be a misunderstanding. On the German side, the only success experienced on September 12 was the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf�s� effective counterattack, which had taken place in the forest near S�upno. Following on a violent grenadier assault supported by tank artillery, the 144th Rifle Corps was driven out of the Ni�poret-Forest.

On September 13, at 1000 hours, the Soviet and Polish forces resumed the assault. It began with street battles in Praga. General Wojciech Bewziuk now despatched tanks from the 1st Tank Brigade �The Wester-Plains heroes� to the 1st Infantry Division�s assistance. (the order issued by the commander of the 1st Tank Brigade at 1100 hours indicates that the 2nd Tank Battalion and the 1st and 2nd Batteries equipped with SU-85 assault-guns from the 13th Artillery Regiment were sent into battle). After an entire day of hard fighting against a Kampfgruppe drawn from the 19th Panzer-Division. the 175th Rifle Division succeeded in taking control over the southern part of the city�s sectors of Saska K�pa, Goc�awek in Groch�w, which prompted the Germans to blow up the Poniatowski Bridge and also to destroy, somewhat prematurely, a railway-bridge. The Polish troops fought in Targ�wek and reached the area around the East and the Wilno rail stations, and continued the offensive in the direction of the Kierbed� Bridge. Meanwhile, as this was unfolding, the 76th Rifle Division became engaged in intensive fighting with the main force of the 19th Panzer-Division, between Targ�wek and Zacisze. The German division launched several counterattacks in the Zacisze area attempting to outflank the 125th Rifle Corps storming the buildings of Praga. But in the end, the Germans were forced to give way to Soviet pressure, particularly as during the course of that afternoon the 77th Rifle Corps� infantry, and tanks from the 8th Guards Tank Corps, had positioned themselves in the neighbouring Zabki-Zeilonka zone.

Defending the city with only one panzer division was, for all practical purposes, an impossibility. The Germans were short infantry sufficient to man all their positions; even though the German Field Police placed the newly trained 73rd Infantry Division�s small units into battle, while the command of the 9thArmy sent what remained of the Panzer-J�ger-Bataillon 475, plus a number of security and training battalions. Clearly, these measures were of doubtful significance when compared with the massive combat forces storming Praga. General von Vormann informed the staff of Heeresgruppe �Mitte� about the situation at Praga, and on September 13, he received permission to withdraw from the centre toward the northern suburbs. The 19th Panzer-Division, remnants of the 73rd Infantry-Division and the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division were now to form a new defence line from Brudno to Marki. Immediately after this had been organized, the IV SS-Panzer-Corps was instructed to send the Hungarian division to the reserve forces. This order was dictated by the plan to send all in-country Hungarian troops to Hungary. Instead of retaining the weak (Hungarian) cavalry, the plan was to send a Kampfgruppe from the 25th Panzer-Division under the command of Colonel Oskar Aud�rsch; a formation which had been previously earmarked for combat operations outside Pu�tusk. In an effort to neutralise possible Soviet or Polish landing-forces from crossing to the Wis�a�s western shore; the German command decided to deploy an elite unit, Fallschirm-Pz. Gren.Rgt.2 �Hermann G�ring� (from Magnuszew) to Warsaw.

On September 14, large sections of Praga had been liberated. During the night, the retreating Germans had blown up the Kierbed�-Bridge and the railway bridge at Cytadela. At 0500 hours, the 1st Infantry Division�s 2nd Infantry Regiment had control of the Wilno rail station. Intense fighting developed around the bridgeheads, especially in the zoological garden and in the field in front of the railway bridge where the fighting continued to rage throughout most of the following day. In the evening, the IV SS-Panzer-Corps units, which up until then had been defending the city, took up positions along the Br�dno�� Stare Br�dno�� Marki line. In the vicinity of Marki, the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� had already taken command of the front. The situation for Gille�s corps became critical since all the corps within the 47th and 70thArmies had joined in the combat operations. In an effort to save the situation outside Praga, combat battalions from the Waffen-SS panzer divisions were dispatched there with the thought they would reinforce the Hungarian units or the 19th Panzer-Division. On the morning of September 15, with the support of heavy artillery and massive air assaults by planes from the 2nd and 11th Air- assault Divisions; the Soviet 70th Army, and the 96th Rifle Corps beat the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� back from Bia�obrzegi to Niepor�t, which at the same time allowed these attacking forces to reach as far as the village of Aleksandr�w. With the position at S�upno having been outflanked, SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gille was forced to also order the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� to withdraw. The troops from this division, who had been in continuous combat with the 114th Rifle Corps, relinquished Niepor�t-Forest and retired across the Kr�lewski Canal in the vicinity of Stanis�aw�w (which in 1963, after having been deepened and broadened became part of the �era�ski Canal). Soldiers from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� were also fighting against the 129th Rifle Corps from the 47th Army. And on September 15, three rifle divisions from this corps managed to gain control of the Czarna Struga and Struga Rivers, and at Marki made contact with the 77th Rifle Corps� 185th Rifle Division. The Germans withdrew towards the north with the intent of shortening their frontline. By evening, the 125th Rifle Corps and the 77th Rifle Corps along with the 8th Guards Tank Corps had occupied the districts of Br�dno, Stare Br�dno, Annopol, �era�, Bia�o��ka and Marki. It wasn�t until darkness began to fall that their assault was finally neutralized by counterattacks launched by Kampfgruppe from the 19th Panzer-Division and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf.�

By September the 15, Praga was already cleared of German forces. Between the days of September 10 and 15, the Polish 1st Infantry Division, which had participated in the liberation of the city, suffered the following losses: 353 dead, 1,406 wounded and 109 missing in action (MIA). The official operational report for September 16 lists enemy losses caused by the Polish 1st Infantry Division and its support troops, i.e. the 1st Polish Volunteer Army, as 8 dead officers, 41 non-commissioned officers and 564 soldiers. One officer, 25 NCO�s and 59 soldiers had been taken prisoner�� 33 rifles, 2 sub-machine guns, 16 light machineguns, 18 machineguns, 7 mortars, 16 artillery guns, 19 tanks, 4 armoured vehicles, and 16 other vehicles had been destroyed. Captured war material included: over 200 rifles, 15 sub-machineguns, 5 light machineguns, 1 mortar, 25 guns, (mainly 10.5 howitzers from the decimated Artillery-Regiment 173 from the 73rd Infantery-Division), plus 1 motorcycle, and 1 radio transmitter. The division�s successes were reflected in order No. 25 formulated by the Polish army�s chief commander, General Micha� Rola-�ymerski, on September 15, in which he wrote among other things:

General Rola-�ymierski, well-aware of how many soldiers from the Home Army were now serving in the 1st Polish Volunteer Army, was forced to weigh his words carefully when he formulated this order. For this reason he added the following:

At the same time, following the regrouping and consolidation of the artillery, the 47th Army together with the 70th Army resumed their collective assault in the direction of Legionowo, at 1500 hours on September 16. But on this occasion their assault was met by a well ordered defence mounted by the IV SS-Panzer-Corps. Supported by tanks, the 114th Rifle Corps� infantry occupied the narrow Kr�lewski Canal near Rembelszczyzna. This location, however, lies in a clearing between two wooded areas which before the war had been called the Jab�onna Forest (the woods south of Niepor�t and the woods north of Choszcz�wka). When the Soviet troops approached the village from the south, they found themselves exposed to deadly machinegun fire�� and from both woods, the SS-division�s hidden guns and tanks suddenly opened fire. Under this heavy bombardment, the soldiers of the 114th Rifle Corps became pinned down and throughout the entire day they were unable to improve their situation.

Further south around Bia�o��ka, three divisions from the 47th Army began an assault with one of the tank brigades from the 8th Guards Tank Corps. Initially, the operation went well, they took the village of Tomasz�w and, indeed, the Soviet tanks almost reached the town of P�udy. There, however, they ran into the 19th Panzer-Division�s positions equipped with anti-aircraft guns and these destroyed a couple of tanks and stopped any further attack. Just outside Choszcz�wka, the German tanks started a counterattack supported by a mixed Kampfgruppe composed of panzer-grenadiers and rapid-response Hungarian cavalry troops. The surprised Soviet units offered strong resistance but were unable to organise an effective defence of the newly-won ground. Towards evening, the 19th Panzer-Division had managed to throw back the opposition to their start-out positions. The commander of the division reported 26 destroyed Soviet tanks of the 40 said to have taken part in the battle. In this way, on September 16, the IV SS-Panzer-Corps was able to stabilise the situation.

On September 17 and 18, two rifle divisions from the 70th and the 47th Armies resumed attacks in the vicinity of Niepor�t, Rembelszczyzna and Wi�niewo, without, however, committing a combat force bigger than a regiment. Both Soviet armies at this point were thoroughly exhausted by the fighting which had taken place, and the entirely too little pause in operations before the storming of Praga. The condition of the soldiers among the independent rifle divisions had worsened in an alarming way. The 8th Guards Tank Corps was impaired by heavy losses in armoured equipment. SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gille took advantage of the weakening offensive against his corps� position and on September 17, with support from the 19th Panzer-Division, started new counterattacks in motion along the banks of the Wis�a. During these battles, which raged on for two days, and was a mixture of localized clashes and counterattacks from both sides, the Germans once again succeeded in retaking Tarchomin, occupying Wi�niewo and even advanced as far as �era�. On September19, the front along the �era� Piekie�ko�� Tomasz�w�� Rembelszczyzna�� Niepor�t line was finally secured. Fatigue was now spreading among the troops on both sides: On the Soviet side, Marshal Rokossovskij sanctioned this exhaustion by issuing, on September 20, an order to the effect that, for the time being, a defensive war posture should be adopted at the positions already taken. One day later, an order arrived from the front that directed the exhausted 8th Guards Tank Corps to withdraw, in order to reorganise and consolidate anew. It became clear that the 47th Army, the 70th army and the 8th Guards Tank corps as a result of the strong opposition mounted by the IV SS-Panzer-Corps were not capable of implementing Zjukov�s or Rokossovskij�s order with respect to eliminating all enemy forces in the area of the Wis�a and Narew�s join. Although the entire area east of the river had been brought under Soviet control (until 1951 the administrative boundary went through Annopol), the same could not be said of Legionowo or Nowy Dw�r Mazowiecki. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, on the other hand, had not abandoned his goal of seizing them. He simply pushed this objective forward until his armies had recovered their fighting capabilities. The resumption of operations was planned to take place on October 10.

For the while then, the Polish 2nd Infantry Division remained at the front near Annopol; the 175th Rifle Division close by Bia�o�eka; the 143rd Rifle Division outside Szamocin; and the 328th Rifle Division, south of Rembelszczyzna. The rest of the 47th Army, including the 77th Rifle Corps with the 8th Guards Tank Corps, occupied positions in the vicinity of Zielonka and Z�bki. The zone that separated the 47th Army from the 70thArmy now ran through Rembelszczyzna. From the latter, three rifle divisions were transferred to the reserve troops at the end of September. The 160th Rifle Division from the 114th Rifle Corps remained positioned at Rembelszczyzna, while the 1st Rifle Division as well as the 38th Guards Rifle Division from the 96th Rifle Corps remained outside Aleksandr�w and Niepor�t.

The loss of Praga provoked strong reactions in the German ranks. By September 15 or 16, Colonel Hans von Necker�s (as of September 24, commander over the entire Fallschirm-Panzer-Division �Hermann G�ring�) Fallschirm-Pz.Gren. Rgt.2 from �Hermann G�ring� had already been sent to Warsaw via rail. The disembarkation took place in the western suburb of W�ochy, and on September 18, once the reserve troops had been relieved, they made their way to the other side of the Wis�a with the mission of preventing contact between the insurgents and the regular Polish army, which had been identified in Praga. Although Panzer-Aufkl�rungs-Abteilung 25 and Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 87, a part of a Kampfgruppe from the 25th Panzer-Division, had already arrived from the north on September 14, they were not sent into the fighting in Praga but to Zoliborz on the other side of the river and immediately began operations against the insurgents.

The new German forces that disembarked in western Warsaw were formally under SS-Obergruppenf�hrer von dem Bach�s command. But he lacked the competency to lead frontline troops and Heeresgruppe �Mitte�s� staff therefore made the decision that General von L�ttwitz and his XXXXVI Panzer-Corps would take over the defence of the Wis�a line in this sector. In the vicinity of Pultisk, confused officers in the panzer-corps learned that the Kampfgruppe they had been called in to lead at this time was not even to be formed. L�ttwitz returned to the 9th Army and, on September 18, took over command of the area between M�ociny and G�ra Kalwaria. Von dem Bach�s group-corps would now, as quickly as possible, set down the Uprising while the XXXXVI Panzer-Corps would defend Wis�a�s western bank against Soviet and Polish forces. Under his command were the 25th Panzer-Division, Fallschirm-Pz.Gren. Rgt. 2 �Hermann G�ring,� Sickenius� Hungarian units, and in addition General Rohr�s and Colonel Schmidt�s Kampfgruppe (isolated detached sub-units with engineer soldiers, police, and volunteer units from the east, almost all of whom were of low combat value and carried with them the �rumour� of having murdered civilian residents of Warsaw).

Simultaneous with von L�ttwitz taking over command, von Vormann sent an alarming message to Heeresgruppe �Mittes� staff about the situation facing his army, stressing how adverse the conditions had become for all divisions under his command. He wrote: �Only Division �Hermann G�ring� can be said to be fully adequate with regard to combat strength and battle-competence. The hard tested SS-divisions �Totenkopf� and �Wiking��� as well as the 9th Army�� have, during the past several weeks of combat, become so decimated that at this present juncture they are only equivalent to a very mediocre fighting force.� The entire 9th Army just then had in its three infantries, two grenadier, one cavalry and four armoured divisions; only 30,335 combat soldiers at the frontline, supported by 341 functioning tanks or assault-guns, and 148 artillery batteries equipped with 602 guns. Of these, there were 10,078 soldiers, 268 tanks and 327 guns positioned along the front between G�ra Kalwaria and Serock (with the exception of the troops which were in use against the insurgents fighting in Warsaw). The opposition�s fighting strength in the same sector, as calculated by the commander of the 9th Army, stood at 66,600 soldiers, 360 armoured vehicles and 920 guns. General Reinhardt was sympathetic to these troublesome observations, but after having read at the end of the report about how �the uprising had so quickly taken hold in Warsaw,� and about the ��hopeless situation of the army,� he deemed von Vormann as incapable of fulfilling his duties as a commander. Reinhardt was strengthened in his judgement of the general�s unstable character during a subsequent telephone conversation with him. That very day he asked Hitler to sack von Vormann. On September 20, an astonished L�ttwitz was informed that he was to hand over command of the XXXXVI Panzer-Corps to General Walter Fries, as he had now been ordered to take over command of the entire 9th Army. From a personal perspective, the new commander took over this post at a fortuitous point in time: The Soviet offensive had weakened considerably and the Warsaw Uprising held on by only a frail thread.

Parallel with the 47th and 70th Armies� final combat engagements north of Praga between September 16 and 23, a number of dramatic landings were made by regular Polish troops on Warsaw�s western bank. Directly after the front passed through Praga, the Wis�a-sector made ready to greet Major General Zygmunt Berling�s 1st Polish Army which was en route to the city. On the evening of September 15, Berling occupied the river bank opposite the city quarters of Marymont and �oliborz located west of the river, with the 2nd Infantry Division �Henryk D�browski�; the area around Warsaw�s Zoo on the east side opposite the ruins of the Old Town and the New Town, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade; and lastly, in Saska K�pa on the east side, with the 3rd Infantry Division �Romuald Traugutt.� When the remaining German positions by the ruins of the railway bridge in Praga near Cytadela (Gol�dzin�w) had been eliminated, the exhausted Polish 1st Infantry Division, with the exception of an artillery regiment, returned to the army�s reserve forces.

On the morning of September 16, under orders from the commander of the 1st Polish Army, preparations were already underway for the 3rd Infantry Division�s 9th Infantry Regiment to cross the river to Czerniak�w. Unfortunately, this became a fairly chaotic operation. Only the first battalion managed to get across the river as planned�� the other two, due to enemy fire, had to make use of the cover of dark and didn�t reach Czerniak�w until sometime during the nights of September 16 and 17. Despite the soldiers linking up with Lieutenant Colonel �Rados�aws� Home Army forces, they were seriously hampered by the absence of ammunition deliveries and by poor training in urban warfare. As a result, they suffered heavy losses which only served to prolong Czernik�w�s death struggle. The 9th Regiment was wiped out before September 23 by General Rohr�s units and soldiers from the II Panzergrenadier-Regiment 146 from the 25th Panzer-Division. Only some tens of survivors were successfully evacuated during the night to Praga.

The toll was even worse for the 3rd Infantry Division, 8th Regiment�s landing between the Central and the Poniatowski Bridges, both of which had been destroyed. The regiment�s 1st Battalion began crossing the Wis�a on September the 19, at 1600 hours. Thanks to smoke cover and artillery support, this unit successfully reached the built-up area of the city. But the landing operation was poorly coordinated with respect to planned artillery support, which led to the next battalion having to attempt a successful crossing on rubber floats without any protection. Seeing this, the German artillery opened up with a wall of fire on the river�� and at the 2nd Battalion�s proposed landing site, a transport carrier, equipped with a machinegun and a rapid-fire 20 mm gun, suddenly cropped up, along with other tracked-vehicles from Fallschirm-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2 �Hermann G�ring.� Soldiers from the Luftwaffe drove back the 1st Battalion and the cover it was attempting to provide from the river bank; and thereafter, proceeded to mow down a large part of the 2nd Battalion in the water. It was only the telling effect of a direct hit from a 7.62 cm gun firing from Praga which forced the German vehicles to retreat from the river bank, thereby saving the lives of around 150 swimming survivors who managed to take themselves up onto the river bank on the Praga side. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had been surrounded and after having fought throughout the night, it surrendered. All told, the two Polish battalions lost 370 soldiers and an additional 300 were taken prisoner.

A similar drama was played out in �oliborz. On the night of September 17, in the district of Potok, a company out of the 2nd Infantry Division, 6th Regiment, 2nd Battalion landed without taking casualties (serving in the cited regiment was, among others; Lieutenant Wojciech Jaruzelski�� the last President of the Peoples Polish Republic.) The following night the rest of the battalion joined the, as yet, undiscovered-by-the-enemy company (the soldiers had hidden in bushes by the bank and the Germans at this point had no troops in the immediate area). That same night another company from the 3rd Battalion crossed the river. These troops made a failed attempt to enter �oliborz which was defended by a Lt. Colonel �Family provider� contingent. On September 20, a messenger had just arrived from the battalion to the location of a resistance unit baring a radio transmitter, but by that time the Germans had already cut off the battalion at the Wis�a. General L�ttwitz gave the order that the enemy bridgehead should be eliminated as soon as possible. This resulted in units from the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 146 and the Panzer-Aufkl�rungs-Abteilung 87 from the 25th Panzer-Division attacking the Polish troops; who lacked heavy weapon support, on the morning of September 21. Despite initial hard-nosed resistance, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, General Jan Rotkiewicz, watching from the other side of the river observed: �At 11:00 AM, the sound of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment�s battle quieted and communication was broken.� The Germans took a total of 218 prisoners of war.

Thus ended the 1st Polish Army�s effort to support the Uprising. The final figures reflect a tragic outcome: 1,987 dead or missing, 627 evacuated, of which 289 were wounded (more than at the storming of all of Praga). Marshal Rokossovskij received news of the landing-operation�s failure stoically. Objectively, it should not have surprised him. General Berling�s army was clearly not capable of single-handedly, i.e. without the assistance of Soviet engineer units, overcoming the obstacles posed by large bodies of water under combat conditions This was also evident at D�blin and Pu�away where crossings of the Wis�a were organized in a clumsy fashion. In Warsaw, the disorganization, the useless coordination of the individual units, and the consequent excessive time it took for the troops enter into battle became ever more apparent. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front never hindered Berling�s amphibious operations. He even assisted him by providing a number of boats held in reserve but he did this fully aware that these resources would not be enough to make these operations successful. This was just what Stalin meant when he gave the order to: �Provide the insurgents complete support.� Rokossovskij was only surprised at how quickly Berling had begun the crossing operations�� in his view, it bordered on overzealousness. For this very reason, Berling was transferred on October 1 to the post of deputy to the commander of the Polish Army. Formally, the position of deputy commander was a promotion but in December 1944, the general nonetheless resigned his post and travelled back to Moscow.

On the German side, the end of September was characterised by mounting nervousness. The HQ staff of the 9th Army had grossly overestimated the actual Soviet troop strength and the possibilities they had outside Warsaw, plus their commitment to helping the insurgents. Therefore, following the loss of Praga, very well-equipped units from the Wehrmacht had been regularly sent to the capital city and the fighting taking place there. The Uprising was to be strangled as quickly as possible, for fear there would be further landings across the Wis�a in the very near future. Here, units from the 25th Panzer-Division and Fallschirm-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 2, plus an engineer battalion from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division �Hermann G�ring� were brought into action. For the sake of being more precise, it should also be noted that Panzer-Regiment 9 from the 25th Panzer-Division and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 147 had already been notified in the middle of the month, but had, in fact, never been dispatched from Pu�tusk. Thus, the division fought in Warsaw only with the earlier cited Panzergrenadier-Regiment 146, Panzer-Aufkl�rungs-Abteilung 25, Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 87, Flak-Artillerie-Abteilung (motorised) 87, along with artillery from Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 91. The presence of these units strongly contributed to the defeat of the enemy at Czerniak�w and the annihilation of the Polish Army�s landing attempts, as well as to the significant weakening of the Home Army, even though heavy losses were sustained. During the first 48 hours of fighting against the resistance soldiers, German losses from the so-called �Family providers� detachment with respect, for example, to the reconnaissance battalion and the engineer troops from the 25th Panzer-Division, were recorded as 110 killed and 220 wounded.

Between September 21 and 23, the new commander of the 9th Army carried out a number of changes in the grouping of his troop forces. He issued an order to SS-Gruppenf�hrer Gille to regroup the 19th Panzer-Division on the Wis�a�s west bank with the XXXXVI Panzer-Corps, and further ordered that the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division and the remnants of the 73rd Infantry-Division be drawn back to the rearguard. This evident weakening of the momentarily passive IV SS-Panzer-Corps was dictated by an order from Heeresgruppe �Mitte�s� command imparting the information that the 25th Panzer-Division was to return to Pu�tusk. The 2nd Army therefore resumed preparations for eliminating the bridgehead there. The Hungarian troops, on the other hand, would, before the month was out, leave all their positions to the disposal of the Germans and be despatched home to Hungary. As it actually happened, this didn�t take place until the last half of October. Prior to this, or more precisely, during the last few days of September, the rest of the 73rd Infantry-Division was attached to the 5th Ersatz-Division outside Warsaw. After two weeks, the Wehrmacht�s luckless division was reorganised and the Hungarians were replaced by the 337th Volksgrenadier-Division (this arrived successively: the first to arrive in Konstancin was the 688th Grenadier-Regiment on October 14th). The Germans were able to regroup their formations ��during a period where the enemy was relatively quiet and without combat activity over and above the usual,� just as Heeresgruppe �Mitte�s � command reported on September 23. These conditions were to prevail on the Warsaw front from that precise day (when the final liquidation of the 1st Polish Army�s bridgehead took place) until October 10.

At this same time, in the field outside of Praga, stood the commander of the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and worried over his chances of retaining control over the area around the bridgehead. The exhausted 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf� and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� had each, without question, occupied both suitable and reinforced positions, but the soldier morale-situation in the combat units was extremely poor. It was grim common knowledge that the Soviets were preparing for new attacks. Gille therefore arranged, together with L�ttwitz, the redeployment of Fallschirm-Panzer-Division �Herman G�ring��� with exception of its 2nd regiment�� to the IV SS-Panzer-Corps. Transport trains soon left Magnuszew and made haste towards Modlin and W�ochy (outside of Warsaw). Their arrival was delayed due to Soviet air attacks on the railway bridge near Warka. Despite this, in the beginning of October an elite Luftwaffe unit arrived in time to reinforce the exhausted Waffen-SS formations. In addition, at the end of September, the Germans had organized operation �Falling Star� aimed at the partisans who had taken over the Kampinos-reservation west of the capital, and in this way the Germans exploited the prevailing stagnation at the front. Among other units that participated in this action were the rapid-response battalion from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf,� the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� and the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division �Hermann G�ring.�

On the second day of October 1944 the Warsaw Uprising was over, but the written order to surrender didn�t reach the insurgents in Warsaw�s centre until the following day. And hence, the Polish combatants have always talked of �64� days of resistance, in contrast to the view held by many historians. On the German-Soviet front a relative calm reigned. Both sides, however, sensed that new hostilities were about to break out. Marshal Rokossovskij�s aim, before adopting a totally defensive posture, was to destroy the enemy�s positions in the area of the Narew and Wisla�s join and continue to extend his control of the line as far as possible towards Pultisk. The Germans were planning a counterattack against the 65th Army�s bridgehead and, due to the relative weakness of their combat strength, hold to a defensive posture with respect to Praga.

Two days prior to the 47th and 70th Armies� attack, sudden events took place on both sides of the Warsaw front that would come to weaken both armies. The first occurred on October 4: The 2nd Army�s XX Army-Corps carried out a massive attack against the bridgehead at Pu�tusk, with support from, among others: the 25th Panzer-Division, the3rd Panzer-Division, the 104th Panzer-Brigade, four assault-gun brigades, and �K�nig Tigers� (PzKpfw VI B tanks) from schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505. General Batov�s 65th Army was forced to endure a couple of difficult days, but then, together with the 1st Guards Tank Corps, they soon succeeded in bringing the situation under control, and by October 12, had driven the Germans back to their original positions. Both panzer divisions from the XX Army-Corps absorbed heavy equipment losses, particularly when several Soviet heavy tanks, model IS-2, suddenly turned up on the battlefield. The crisis in Batov�s troop sector made clear to Rokossovskij the necessity of expanding the Pu�tusk bridgehead. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front therefore gave the 65th Army a privileged position with regard to the current scarce delivery of supplies. This had a negative effect on Popov�s and Gusiev�s armies, which over this while had launched an attack against the IV SS-Panzer-Corps.

On the German side, on October 7, Gille was informed that he was immediately to lose the recently arrived �Hermann G�ring� division�� a bitter pill that he was, nonetheless, forced to swallow. This unit was to be drawn back to Instensburg (Wystru�). There, a panzer-corps was being assembled bearing the Reich Marshal�s name: Fallschirm-Panzer Korps �Hermann G�ring.� In its place, the commander of the 9th Army transferred the 19th Panzer-Division, which had become redundant in Warsaw after the Uprising�s collapse and the destruction of the 1st Polish Army�s landing attempts. However, this was a disproportionately much weaker unit. Only one day before the new Soviet offensive, the 19th Panzer-Division manned the frontline extending from �era� to Tomasz�w; the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division �Totenkopf,� the front from Tomasz�w to Aleksandr�w; and the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking,� the front from Aleksandr�w to the Narew in the vicinity of Niepor�t. On October 9, the commander of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division was replaced: SS-Standartenf�hrer M�hlenkamp was replaced by SS-Standartenf�hrer Karl Ullrich. M�hlenkamp, who was an experienced tank soldier, was transferred to the Inspectorate of Panzer Forces. Ullrich, meanwhile, began his new appointment by seeking temporary underground shelter as the Soviet artillery rained fire down on his divisional command headquarters.

At 0900 hours on October 10, following 100 minutes of artillery fire, a number of rifle divisions from both Soviet armies attacked along the entire IV SS-Panzer-Corps� front. A relatively small number of tanks provided support, primarily �Shermans��� and from the sky, the air-assault wing. The Soviet infantry pressed against the front with great courage, but the units carrying out the fighting were notably undermanned, which negatively affected their combat capabilities. It was only thanks to the massive artillery bombardment that the infantry was able to make even small inroads during the attack�s first hours. Near Annopol, the 234th Rifle Division (which had replaced the 175th Rifle Division) was provided support by the Polish 6th Infantry Regiment from the 2nd Infantry Division, reinforced with SU-85 assault guns from the 13th Artillery Regiment. Towards evening, the Poles had reached Wi�niewo�s urban area which was defended by grenadiers from Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 from the 19th Panzer-Division. Meanwhile, units of the 47th Army attacked at Tarchomin and Henryk�w, while the 70th Army succeeded in taking Rembelszczyzna, after having earlier halted troops from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� outside Aleksandr�w and Niepor�t.

Although the Germans numbered far fewer than the attacking forces, it became apparent that the troop strength thought sufficient to carryout he assault was far too weak to achieve the mission they had been given. Gille�s entirely motorised forces attacked with armoured weaponry. Rapid-fire 20 mm guns were also used in fighting for terrain, spreading panic through the enemy infantry. The fighting ground to a halt on October 11. The response of the Soviet Generals Popov and Gusiev was to set all their divisions into battle on October 12: The entire 70th Army attacked Niepor�t, while the 47th Army attacked on a broader front, supported by the 8th Guards Tank Corps. After an entire day of hard fighting General Popov�s troops forced back the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� from Niepor�t and advanced to the road and rail intersection south of Zagrobow; that is to say, today�s Zegrze Po�udniowe. There, they were checked for the present by fire from anti-tank artillery and 20mm guns. Significantly less successful was the 47th Army�s storming of R�opole. The heavy shelling by tanks from Panzer-Regiment 27, hidden in the woods, kept the attackers from advancing from their start-out position.

On October 13, some ten tanks from SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 �Wiking,� together with grenadiers from SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 �Westland,� carried out eighteen counterattacks at the intersection outside Zegrze. All were thrown back. On October 14, the 70th Army�s infantry and several tens of �Shermans� entered Niepor�t-Forest which lay between Niepor�t and the Micha�ow estate. After they had taken the forest, the Soviet tanks rolled onto the main Legionowo-to-Zegrze road by the estate and partially closed in the SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 �Westland� in the forested area near Wieliszew. In the middle of the road, the �Shermans� surprised and destroyed a medical unit from the SS-division. The regiment stubbornly defended their positions for two days until a counterattack, with tracked guns and infantry from Legionowo, returned the situation to its pre-battle status. Ullrich threw clerical staff, cooks and mechanics into the fighting. This was necessary because in one of the battalions belonging to SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 10 �Westland� there were only 40 soldiers left: Specifically, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 �Germania� had lost 40% of its complement.

On October 16, the exhausted 47th and 70th Armies halted their attacks on the Waffen-SS divisions, which had been fighting with the very last remnants of their combat strength. To replace their heavy losses, the Germans sent �part-time� soldiers from the Wehrmacht�s reserves, including soldiers from the Luftwaffe. Only the 19th Panzer-Division had managed to retain the majority of its forces and had effectively paralysed the 47th Army�s operations north of Praga. To Gille�s misfortune, on October 17 L�ttwitz ordered that Panzer-Regiment 27 was to return to Magnuszew. The reason for this decision was the 8th Guards Army�s misleading �information.� On orders from the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, these activities were intended to dupe the enemy into withdrawing its troops from the Narew-mouth area. As discussed here, General Tjujkov carried out this mission particular well.

Marshal Rokossovskij also weakened the Soviet troops outside Praga by sending the 8th Guards Tank Corps, provisions, and a couple of infantry divisions to the 65th Army outside of Pu�tusk. A direct result of this decision was that General Batov�s army, reinforced by two tank corps, took the initiative on October 19, and advanced towards Serock. The 47th Army also went on the offensive�� but, due to its weakness, the opening battles against the IV SS-Panzer-Corps did not result in notable success. On the other hand, on October 21, after successfully throwing back a counterattack mounted by the 25th Panzer-Division�� a unit from the Soviet 65th Army�s XX Army Corps seized Serock and, at the same time, made contact with the 70th Army outside Zegrze. The Germans made the decision to retake the lost terrain which led to the remainder of the 19th Panzer-Division, with the exception of the panzer-grenadier regiment, being incorporated into the XX Army-Corps commanded by Colonel Zugeh�r. This meant that IV SS-Panzer-Corps was reduced to the equivalent of a strong tank division.

The commander of the 9th Army, aware of the weakened state of Gille�s troop force, approved shortening the frontline in the event the attacks mounted by the two enemy armies let up. They continued without respite until October 19, but�� due to the weakness of the combat forces on both sides�� the fighting in this area was sluggish. On October 22, Rokossovskij narrowed the offensive front for the 47th Army by sending the Polish 1st Infantry Division towards the Wis�a. But despite the persistent attacks, barricades of shell-fire and air bombardment, it was not until October 27 that the 3rd SS-Panzer-Regiment �Totenkopf,� respective the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking� left their up-until-then established positions and under the protection of their rearguard withdrew to the other side of the Br�dnowski Canal (at its outflow in Narew, north of �ajsk). The Germans relinquished Wieliszew and �ajsk and took up new positions along the D�be�� Skrzeszew�� Ka�uszyn�� Szybalin-farm line, east of Stara Olszewnica-Chotom�w. Meanwhile, Colonel Zugeh�rs panzer-grenadier regiment (Polish reports show that this included the entire Panzer-grenadier-Regiment 73, along with parts of the 19th Panzer Division�s Panzergrenadier-Regiment 74) was marching away from Praga�s outskirts via the main road towards Nowy Dw�r Mazowiecki. Not long behind them came the 1st Infantry Division, after having thrown back a series of counterattacks, and on October 28, it captured Legionowo. Further Soviet and Polish troop movements were halted at the above mentioned defence line.

On October 31, the 47th Army�s infantry, supported by tanks, renewed its attack against the enemy. According to the order issued by the commander of the front, the infantry was to advance to Nowy Dw�r, with the final goal of forcing the IV SS-Panzer-Corps to cross over to the other side of the Wis�a. The hardest fighting flared up in the vicinity of the Szybalin-farm and in the nearby village of Derlacz. The Soviet tanks were greeted with well-aimed fire from anti-tank guns, and the infantry was halted by mortar and artillery shelling. In the evening, a counterattack was launched with tracked assault guns throwing the Soviet attackers back to their original positions. The next day, the Germans learned that this failed attack was the last strained gasp of the Soviet�s depleted combat strength. After November 1, the exhausted 47th Army shifted to a defensive stance. Now, after almost three months of continuous fighting outside Warsaw, a relative calm reigned, disturbed only by isolated shelling by both sides. The front along the Wis�a would remain dormant for over two months.

This marked the conclusion of one of the Second World War�s operationally most complicated battles. Warsaw had been transformed into a mass grave. According to official estimates, the 1st Belorussian Front between the days of August 1 and August 15 alone, suffered casualties of 166,808 dead and wounded. The 1st Polish Volunteer Army counted a further 13.272 dead, wounded, and missing. At the same time, troop losses in the 2nd and 9th Armies mounted to 91,595 killed, injured and captured. Of these, the 9th Army lost 36,373 soldiers: 27,422 in combat at the front, plus an additional 8,951 in Warsaw. One must keep in mind that these figures do not include combat losses incurred during the month of July, the second half of September, or in the battles fought during October in Praga�s northern suburbs.

Equally serious for both sides were their equipment losses. At the very least, a 9th Army report covering a period of only 5 days (August 18�22 ), claiming the destruction of 249 Soviet tanks between Wo�omin and Wyszk�w, should be cited here to further illustrate the incredible extent of these losses. Even if they are exaggerated such reports nonetheless provide a picture of how bitter the fighting was in this theatre of the war. The report was sent two weeks after the conclusion of the large armoured battle carried out by the 2nd Panzer-Army �Gruppe von Saucken� wherein the Germans had destroyed more than 200 tanks. Similar information can be found in a report from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division �Wiking�. In this report SS-Panzer-Regiment 5, alone, claims that between the 4th and 5th of September 1944, they had destroyed or captured 151 tanks, 32 tracked assault guns, 176 guns, 94 machineguns and 5 aircraft!

The battle for Warsaw was an extremely lengthy one. That it turned out to be so was not solely the fault of Stalin holding back the assault on Praga while awaiting the crushing of the Uprising. This order was only applicable to the 47th Army�s left flank�� the rest of the Soviet troops were to continue their attacks. Despite this, it took over a month for three infantry armies to advance the 45 kilometers from Mi�sk Mazowieacki to Serock with the added support of tank corps and an air fleet. The most significant factor was the persistant resistance offered by the German troops, who succeeded in concentrating relatively small but highly motorised elite troops along the stretch facing Warsaw. The commander of Heeresgruppe �Mitte� skilfully manoeuvred his combat resources, constantly redeploying individual divisions from one zone of the front to another. However there can be no doubt that east Warsaw�� had Stalin issued the order to storm the Praga district�� would have been freed sometime between August 10 and 14, 1944; which is not to say, this would have meant the end of fighting for the city. The battle for Poland�s capital would have continued but the chances of saving the city would have been enormously increased. The storming wasn�t to take place until a month later, under completely different operational circumstances. The September attack on Praga was merely a support-attack which was primarily conducted to straighten-out the frontline. And even in this objective, due to the resistance mounted by the German troops, was not wholly achieved.

Commander of the Army: General K.�K.�Rokossovsky

Chief of Staff: Commandant General M.�S.�Mailinin??

Political Commissar: Lieutenant General N.�A.�Bulganin

Commanding Officer: General Nikolaus von Vormann (June to August)

General der Panzertruppen. Freiherr Smilo von L�ttwitz

Staff Officer: Major General Johannes H�lz

Operations Officer: Lieutenant Schindler

Germany�s first self-propelled artillery piece based on the 15 cm field howitzer was actually designed to be only an interim solution in anticipation of vehicles based on the Panther and Tiger chassis models. These were never built as the German Army felt obliged to use the Hummel model throughout the war. It was based primarily on the Pzkpfw IV, but with a number of components from PzKpfw III, therefore the designation of model III/IV. The same layout used for the Wespe was applied to the Hummel. Considering its light armour and the little protection it afforded the crews, even from the elements, and its limited access to ammunition; the Hummel was very effective and popular. In total, 880 Hummels were built during WWII.

Production period: 1943�1945

Main manafacturer: Rheinmetall-Borsig, Alkett

Tonnage: 23 tonnes

Crew: 6

Length: 7.17 meters

Width: 2.97 meters

Height: 2.81

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Maybach HL120 TRM V-12 petroleum

Engine capacity: 265HP at 2600 rpm

Fuel capacity: 600 liters

Maximum speed: 25 km/h

Maximum range: 215 km

Armament: 1� 15 cm s.F.H. 18/1, 1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity: 15 cm�� 18 shells, 7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 30 mm

Hull sides: 20 mm

Hull rear, roof floor: 15 mm

Turret front: 15 mm

Turret sides: 15 mm

Built to give the German Army the kind of firepower which only railway borne artillery could heretofore deliver but in the field, hence motorised. Large and ungainly and barely able to move, it fired, despite all, mortar rounds which weighed close to two tons each. Only six examples were ever manufactured, Tor, Oden, Adam, Eva, Loki and Ziu. They were used only during the siege of Sebastopol 1941�1942, as well as in the fighting in Warsaw. It was also described as a self-propelled howitzer.

Production period: -

Manufacturer: Rheinmetall-Borsig

Tonnage: 125 tonnes

Crew: 18

Length: 11.22 meters

Width: 3.2 meters

Height: 4.47 meters

Track width: -

Ground clearance: -

Motor: Daimler Benz V-12 Diesel

Engine capacity: 580 HP at 2000 rpm

Fuel capacity: - liter

Maximum speed: 10km/h

Maximum range: -

Armament: 1 � 60cm howitzer

Ammunition quantity:

60 cm�� 2 shells

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: -

Hull sides: -

Hull rear, roof, floor: -

Turret front: -

Turret sides: -

Czechoslovakia�s most important tank at the time of the German invasion in 1938. The vehicle was even better than the current German equivalents. This was naturally appreciated by the Germans who continued to produce the panzer until 1942. From that point on, it was produced as the basic platform for a number of special vehicles, such as the Hetzer. In total 2,000 were built between 1938 and 1942. It was exported to Sweden as model m/41.

Production period: 1938-42

Manufacturer: Praga CKD

Tonnage: 10.5 tonnes.

Crew: 4

Length: 4.9 metres

Width: 2.06 metres

Height: 2.37 meters

Track width: 29 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Praga EPA V-6 petrol

Engine capacity: 125 Hp at 2200 rpm

Maximum fuel capacity: 218 liters

Maximum speed: 42 km/h

Maximum range: 240 km

Armanent:

1 � 3.7 cm KwK(t)L/45

2 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition Quantity:

3.7cm�� 90 shells

7.92 mm�� 2500 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 25mm

Hull sides: 10�15mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 10mm

Turret front: 25 mm

Turret sides: 10�15 mm

One of Germany�s most important tanks at the beginning of WWII. Designed in 1935, in 1940 the tank was regarded as being too weak for use in an ordinary tank capacity. Instead, it came to be used as a platform for different types of mobile weaponry that did not require a turret, or for reconnaissance vehicles. Poorly armoured and poorly armed, it was, at least, light and swift and easy to manufacture. Production ceased in 1944. Approximately 2,000 models, including all its variations, were built during WWII.

Production period: 1935�44

Manufacturer: MAN, Henschel, Famo, Daimler-Benz

Tonnage: 9.5 tonnes

Crew: 3

Length: 4.64 metres

Width: 2.30 metres

Height: 2.02 metres

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 34 cm

Motor: Maybach HL66 P 6-cylinders Petrol

Engine capacity: 180 HP at 3500rpm

Fuel capacity: 200 litres

Maximum speed: 55km/h

Maximum range: 160 km

Armament: 1 � 2 cm KwK 38 L/55 1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

2 cm�� approx. 180 shells

7.92 mm�� 3,525 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 15�30 mm

Hull sides: 10�20 mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 10�20 mm

Turret front: 20�35 mm

Turret sides: 15�30 mm

The most common medium-heavy tank in Germany between 1939 and 1942. Also used as the platform for the famous Sturmgeschutz III. Up until 1942, it was possible to upgrade the vehicle to specifications required for the battlefield. By 1942, it was no longer possible to continue furthering its development. All production was concentrated on the Sturmgeschutz. But those panzers which continued to function were still used though preferably not on the frontline where its relatively weak armour and armament were out of place. In total 1,549 model J�s were manufactured.

Production period: 1942�43

Manufacturer: Daimler-Benz, Alkett, MAN

Tonnage: 22.3 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 5.56 metres

Width: 2.95 metres

Height: 2.50 metres

Track width: 36 cm

Ground clearance: 38 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 108 TR V�� 12 Petrol

Engine capacity: 250 HP at 3,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 300 litres

Maximum speed: 32 km/h

Maximum range: 160 km

Armament:

1 � 5 cm Kwk L/60

2 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

5 cm�� approx. 99 shells

1 � 7.92 mm 2,700 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 50�80 mm

Hull sides: 20�40 mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 10�20 mm

Turret front: 50�80 mm

Turret sides: 20�40 mm

According to many, the War�s most acclaimed and renowned panzer. It was Germany�s first assembly line heavy tank. A monster, armed with the famous 88 and for its time, (1942) it had extremely dense armour protection. Hardly upgraded during the war, it was not as indomitable a foe in 1945 as it had been in 1942, albeit still a tough nut for allied forces to crack, nonetheless. In total, approximately 1,350 were built during the war.

Production period: 1942�1944

Manufacturer: Henschel

Tonnage: 56.9 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 8.24 meters

Width: 3.73 meters

Height: 2.88 meters

Track width: 72 cm

Ground clearance: 47 cm

Motor: Maybach HL210 P 45 V-12 Bensin (H), Maybach HL230 P 45 V-12 Bensin (E)

Engine capacity: 650 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 534 liters

Maximum speed: 38 km/h

Maximum range: 90 km

Armament:

1 � 8.8 cm Kwk 36 L/56,

2 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity: 8.8 cm�� 92 shells, 7.92 mm�� 3,600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 80�102 mm

Hull sides: 60�80 mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 15�25 mm

Turret front: 80�110 mm

Turret sides: 60�80 mm

Description: Regarded by many as the war�s best mediumheavy tank, the Russians chose to classify it as a heavy tank. Originally set into production in 1942 as a solution the Soviet T-34, it was the first German tank with effectively sloped armour. Its design was complicated and it was often taken out of action, beset with problems in its hydraulic, gear-change, and wheel mounting systems. In the hands of well-train tank personnel, it was a life-threatening weapon even to the crews manning the allies� heaviest tanks. Fortunately, �Panthers� were never produced in sufficient number to meet the Germans� needs. All told, 3,750 variation G tanks were produced. And the combined production total for all variations was 6,100 Panthers.

Production period: 1943�45

Manufacturer: MAN, MNH, Daimler- Benz

Tonnage: 45 tonnes.

Crew: 5

Length: 6.88 metres

Width: 3.40 metres

Track width: 66 cm

Clearance: 54 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 230 P 30 V-12

Engine capacity: 700 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 730 litres

Maximum speed: 46 km/h

Maximum range: 200 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm KwK 42L/70

2 � 7.92 mm MG 34

1 � 7.92 mm MG 42

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm 80 shells

7.92 mm�� 4,200�4,800 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 60�80 mm

Hull sides: 40�50 mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 16�40 mm

Turret front: 100�110 mm

Turret sides: 45 mm

Germany�s most important tank during the entire war, along with being the most produced. Blueprinted before the war, its more traditional square appearance was kept throughout the war. In terms of its weaponry and armour protection, they were upgraded constantly and while this caused the weight of the vehicle to increase, its engine performance did not and its overall manoeuvrability consequently suffered. By the end of the war, the development of most allied tanks had surpassed and outclassed the model in terms of both armaments and protection. However, there was no alternative available in sufficient number to replace the tank with the German army. In addition, the chassis was used as the basic platform for a flood of special vehicles and variations of weaponry, for example, the Brummb�r and the Jagdpanzer IV, etc. Altogether, 5,400 examples of both variations were ultimately manufactured.

Production period: 1942�45

Manufacturer: Steyr, Vomag, Krupp, Praga

Tonnage: 22.3�25 tonnes.

Crew: 5

Length: 5.93 metres

Width: 2.88 metres

Height: 2.68 metres

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 120 TR V-12 Petrol

Engine capacity: 300 HP at 3,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 453 litres

Maximum speed: 32 km/h

Maximum range: 250 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm Kwk L/48 (G, H),

2 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm�� approx. 90 shells

7.92 mm�� 3,600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 50�80 mm

Hull sides: 30�50 mm

Hull back, roof, floor: 15�25 mm

Turret front: 50�80 mm

Turret sides: 30�50 mm

Italy�s most vital tank and the model they produced the most examples of. Typically, the Germans seized all functioning models of the tank as well as all functioning Italian transportation, on their capitulation in 1943. The Germans gave the tank their own id-number and used them as German Police tanks in the occupied territories: As a combat threat, the vehicle was insufficiently armed and the armour plating was designed for conditions in 1938/39�� Mechanically, they were unreliable and, in addition, the Germans lacked spare parts for them for obvious reasons. The M13/40 was the 1940 model, and likewise, the M14/41, the 1941model. The 1942 version, the M15/42, had hardly any production time before Italian capitulation.

Production period: 1940�1943

Manufacturer: Ansaldo-Fossati

Tonnage: 14.3 tonne

Crew: 4

Length: 4.92 meter

Width: 2.23 meter

Height: 2.39 meter

Track width: 26 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: SPA TM40 8-cylinders Diesel

Engine capacity: 125 HP at 1800rpm

Fuel capacity: - liter

Maximum speed: 32 km/h

Maximum range: 200 km

Armament: 1 � 4.7 cm Model 37/32

Ansaldo: 3 � 8 mm Breda MG model 38

Ammunition quantity:

4.7 cm�� 108 shells,

8 mm�� 3048 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 25�45 mm

Hull sides: 25 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 15 mm

Turret, front: 25 mm

Turret sides: 25 mm

Germany�s most produced special purpose AT (All-terrain) vehicle, or self-propelled, so-called �Armoured hunter.� Ironically enough, they were built on a chassis from Czechslovakia, and stretching this irony even further is the fact that it was the Czechs who succeeded in producing them great quantity and not the Germans,

It had a very simple and robust design, which even came to be used by the Swiss Army after the war. A low silhouette, relatively good armour protection and a reliable main gun, but above all, it was the ease of its operation that made it popular amongst the troops. In total, some 2,700 Hetzers were built between the summer of 1944 and the cessation of the war.

Production period: 1944�1945

Manufacturer: Praga CKD, BMM, Skoda

Tonnage: 16 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 4.87 meters

Width: 2.63 meters

Height: 2.17 meters

Track width: 35 cm

Ground clearance: 42 cm

Motor: Praga AC/2800 V-6 Bensin

Engine capacity: 160 HP at 2800rpm

Fuel capacity: 320 liters

Maximum speed: 42 km/h

Maximum range: 260 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 cm

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm�� 42 shells

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull front: 60 mm

Hull sides: 25 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

Description: The predecessor of the Sturmtiger. Modelled on the Pz Kpfw IV and was armed with a 15 cm StuH L/12. Actually highly successful as it could also be used for indirect artillery support for infantry forces. Over 300 were manufactured.

Production period: 1943�1945

Manufacturer: Deutsche Eisenwerke

Tonnage: 28 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 5.93 meters

Width: 2.88 meters

Height: 2.52 meters

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 120 TRM V-12 Bensin

Engine capacity: 300 HP at 3000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 470 liters

Maximum speed: 40 km/h

Maximum range: 180 km

Armament:

1 � 15 cm StuH L/12

1 � 7.92mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

15 cm�� 38 shells

7.92mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 100 mm

Hull sides: 50 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

A variation on the renowned Tiger. Behind its reinforced armour was installed a massive 38 cm howitzer which fired 344 kg shells. Partly due to experience gained from the battle for Stalingrad, the Germans knew that offensive warfare in an urban environment required powerful weapons to obliterate buildings constructed of concrete and stone. The Sturmstiger could solve this problem thanks to its massive armament. The only problem was that, at that point in time, the Germans didn�t need massive offensive weapons for urban warfare, quite the opposite. As a result, only eighteen were ever manufactured.

Production period: 1943�1944

Manufacturer: Alkett

Tonnage: 66 tonne

Crew: 5

Length: 6.28 meters

Width: 3.57 meters

Height: 2.85 meters

Track width: 80 cm

Ground clearance: 48 cm

Motor: Maybach HL230 P 45 V�� 12 Bensin

Engine capacity: 700 HP 3000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 860 liters

Maximum speed: 40 km/h

Maximum range: 120 km

Armament:

1 � 38 cm Raketenwerfer 61

1 � 7.92 mm MG 1

Ammunition Quantity:

60 cm�� 14 shells

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 150 mm

Hull sides: 80 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 40 mm

Turret front: 150 mm

Turret sides: 80 mm

A variant constructed on PzKpfw II tanks. Custom built to accommodate 7.62 cm anti-tank guns captured from the Soviet army. Approximately 200 vehicles were converted in this way in 1942 and were designated as Marder I�s. Marder were a family of hybrid-vehicles created by �rebuilding� dated, unusable German, or captured, tanks�� specifically, a family of has-been tanks adapted to accommodate 7.5 cm anti-tank guns.

Production period: 1942

Manufacturer: Alkett

Tonnage: 11.5 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 5.65 meter

Width: 2.3 meter

Height: 2.6 meter

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 29 cm

Motor: Maybach HL62 TRM V-6 Bensin

Engine capacity: 140 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 170 liters

Maximum speed: 55 km/h

Maximum range: 200 km

Armament:

1 � 7.62 cm PaK (r) L/54.5

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.62 cm�� 30 shells

7.92 mm�� 600 shot

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 30 mm

Hull sides: 15 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 15 mm

Turret front: 15 mm

Turret sides: 15 mm

One of Germany�s most common armoured vehicles during WWII. It was built upon a lorry chassis (8�8) and was designed in 1937. It was steered by the four forward wheels and could be driven in both directions just as easily, as it had both rear and forward steering. It could even be driven on railway tracks of normal gauge. It was merely a matter of removing the rubber tyres from the wheel rims. Four different variations were produced; the 231, a standard wagon with a 20mm automatic gun in one turret; the 232, a communications vehicle with standard armament (its radio antenna in the form of a rectangular frame antenna above the entire vehicle); the 233 which was an assault gun, with a 7.5cm L/24, sans turret; and the model 263 which was an unarmed communications vehicle. All variations taken into account, 1,235 were produced.

Production period: 1937�1942

Manufacturer: Bussing-NAG

Tonnage: 8.8 tonnes

Length: 5.85 meter

Height: 2.34 meter

Width: 2.20 meter

Wheel base: 410 cm

Ground clearance: 27 cm

Motor: Bussing-NAG model L8V-GS V-8 Bensin

Engine capacity: 150 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 150 liters

Maximum speed: 85 km/h

Maximum range: 160 km

Armament:

1 � 2 cm KwK 38 L/55 (231, 232), 1 � 7.5 cm KwK L/24 (233)

1 � 7.92 mm�� (all models)

Ammunition quantity:

20 mm�� 130 rounds (231, 232),

7.5 cm�� 32 rounds (233),

7.92 mm�� 1500 rounds

Armour Strength:

Hull frontal: 10�30 mm (all models)

Hull sides: 10 mm (all models)

Hull rear, roof and floor: 10 mm (all models)

Turret front: 15 mm (231, 232)

Turret sides: 8 mm (231, 232)

One of Germany�s many attempts to create a mobile anti-aircraft system to its armoured forces. from its inception The Sd Kfz 7 was an artillery half-tracked vehicle with an 8 tonne drawing power, most known for being the tow-vehicle for the much respected 88mm gun. The German Army began to use the vehicle as a platform for either the Flak-Vierling 38, four-barrelled 20mm anti-aircraft (Sd Kfz 7/1) or the 3.7 cm Flak 36 (Sd Kfz 7/2). A relatively inexpensive and effective solution to a constantly occurring problem, its biggest drawback was the lack of armoured protection for the crew�� virtually none at all. In total, 12,000 vehicles came off the production line between 1937 and 1945.

Production period: 1937�1945

Manufacturer: Krauss-Maffei

Tonnage: 11.55 tonnes

Crew: 7

Height: 6.85 meters

Width: 2.35 meters

Height: 2.62 meters

Track width: 36 cm

Ground clearance: 41 cm

Motor: Maybach HL52 TU 6 cylinders petroleum

Engine capacity: 115 HP at 2,600 rpm

Fuel capacity: 205 liters

Maximum speed: 50 km per hour

Maximum range: 250 km

Armament:

1 � 20 mm Flak-Vierling 38 (7/1),

1 � 3.7 cm Flak 36 (7/2)

Ammunition quantity:

20mm�� approximately 3,200 rounds

2,7cm�� approximately 1,000 rounds

Armour thickness: -

Another example of one of Germany�s many attempts to produce a mobile anti-aircraft artillery for its panzer forces. From its inception the Sd Kfz 10 was a half-tracked tow-vehicle with a one-ton pulling capacity. The original model was designed in 1926 and stands as the most produced example of half-track vehicles in Germany up until 1945. Practically speaking, the vehicle was not a satisfactory tow-vehicle with only a one ton drawing capacity. On the other hand, it was excellent as mobile platform for lighter weapon systems, as for example, the 20mm Flak 30 or 38. It was also used as the base-model for a whole series of 250-half-tracked vehicles�� armoured troop carriers. In total, some 25,000 models were built between 1932 and 1944.

Production period: 1932�1944

Manufacturer: Demag, Ph�nomen, Bussing-Nag.

Tonnage: 4.9 tonnes

Crew: 6

Length: 4.75 meters

Width: 1.93 meters

Height: 1.62 meters

Track width: 24 cm

Ground clearance: 32 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 42 TRKM 6-cylinders Bensin

Net capacity: 100 HP at 3000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 115 liters

Maximum speed: 65 km/h

Maximum range: 230km

Armament:

1 � 2 cm Flak 30 (10/4),

1 � 2 cm Flak 38 (10/5)

Ammunition Quantity:

2 cm shells approx. 800 rounds

Armour: -

Germany�s first true assault-gun. Primarily intended as an infantry support vehicle, hence its classifications as an assault-gun, in contrast to the later Panzer-hunter which was developed to hunt down and destroy an enemy�s tanks, a task that the StuG increasingly came to be used for. The first versions saw field service as early as 1939, albeit equipped with the shorter 7.5cm gun. From 1942 onwards, the G version became the most common and was produced in greater number than the majority of turreted tanks! Traditionally, the crews of StuG�s were regarded as elite troops within armoured weapon contingents as they were manned by artillery personnel, rather than by tank troops. In total, 8,000 F/G versions were produced.

Production period: 1942�1945

Manufacturer: Alkett

Tonnage: 23.9 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 5.56 meters

Width: 2.95 meters

Height: 2.15 meters

Track width: 36 cm

Ground clearance: 38 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 120 TRM v-12 Bensin

Engine capacity: 300 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 320 liters

Maximum speed: 40 km/h

Maximum range: 130 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm KwK L/43 (F),

1 � 7.5 cm KwK L/48 (G),

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition Quantity:

7.5 cm�� 54 shells,

7.92 mm 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 50�80 mm

Hull sides: 30�50 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 15�25 mm

Turret front: - mm

Turret sides: - mm

The Goliath�s big brother. In contrast to the Goliath, which was a radio steered vehicle, the B IV was a �true� motor vehicle in the sense that it was controlled by a lone driver within the vehicle and could be used repeatedly. Around 500 were built during the war. In the Battle of Berlin, in 1945, they were used as improvised tank killers or �Jagdpanzers� with specially mounted Panzerschrecktuber (particularly large gun-barrels).

Production period: 1939�1945

Manufacturer: Hansa-Loyd, Borgward

Tonnage: 3.66 tonnes

Crew: 1

Length: 3.65 meters

Width: 1.80 meter

Height: 1.19 meter

Track width: - cm

Ground clearance: - cm

Motor: Borgward 6-cylinders Bensin

Engine capacity: 49 HP at 3500 rpm

Fuel capacity: - liter

Maximum speed: 38 km/h

Maximum range: 210 km

Armament:

1 � 500 kg high explosives

Hull armour strength: Maximum 10 mm

A so called �mini-tank� which carried high explosive charges weighing 100 kgs. Steered by a radio-control operator to a given target where the charge was then detonated: A so-called �disposable� weapon�� fire once and forget�� extremely effective if the enemy couldn�t stop it. Not surprisingly, the armour was so weak that it could be pierced by small arms fire. Approximately 4,500 were built in total.

Production period: 1941�1945

Manufacturer: Zundapp

Tonnage: 0.4 tonnes

Crew: 0

Length: 1.63 meters

Width: 0.91 meter

Height: 0.62 meter

Track width: - cm

Ground clearance: - cm

Motor: Zundapp 2-cylinder Bensin

Engine capacity: 12.5HP at 4500rpm

Fuel capacity: - liter

Maximum speed: 12 km/h

Maximum range: 12 km

Armament: 100kg high explosive charge

Armour strength: 0

Germany was the only warring nation during WWII which had two competing versions of half-track carriers tasked for troop transportation. Model 250 was the smaller version, 251 was the larger one. Both were produced in a large number of different versions used for specific purposes. The most common variations were the 250/1 infantry transport vehicle, the 250/3 radio carrier, the 250/4 artillery observation vehicle, the 250/7 8 cm mortar carrier. The 250�s troop transport capacity, however, was inadequate; other than the two-man crew, only four men could be carried in a 250, whereas the 251 could carry ten men (i.e. an entire squad) in addition to its two-man crew. The model-250 was, in other words, too small. In addition, both models had under-powered engines, lacked roof protection and, in general, were far too poorly protected for operations on the frontline. There was, however, no other alternative available for the German Army and, in any event, they were never produced in quantities sufficient to cover their need. All told, approximately 7,500 model 250�s of all variations were produced, and approximately 16,000 model 251�s including all variations.

The following variations were built:

250/1 Armoured light transport carrier. Crew: 2 + 4 men.

250/2 Armoured combat command vehicle equipped with field telephone. Crew: 2 + 2 men.

250/3 Armoured radio carrier. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

250/4 Armoured firing direction carrier for artillery. Crew: 2 + 3.

250/5 Armoured light reconnaissance carrier. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

250/6 Armoured ammunition transport carrier. Crew: 2

250/7 Armoured 8 cm mortar carrier. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

250/8 Armoured assault-gun carrier m 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

250/9 Armoured panzer reconnaissance carrier m 2 cm automatic gun Kwk 38/L55 in turret. Crew: 2 + 1 man.

250/10 Armoured light Pv-carrier m 3.7 cm PAK 35/36 L/45. Crew 2 + 2 men.

250/11 Armoured light Pv- vehicle, m 2.8 cm sPzB 41. Crew: 2 + 2 men.

250/12 Armoured firing direction carrier for range finding for artillery. Crew: 2 + 2 men.

252 Armoured light ammunition transport carrier with roof. Crew: 2 men.

253 Armoured light firing direction carrier for artillery with roof. Crew: 2 + 2 men.

Production period: 1939�� 1945

Manufacturer: Demag

Tonnage: 5.7 tonnes

Crew: 2 + 4

Length: 4.65 meters

Width: 1.95 meters

Height: 1.66 meters

Track width: 24 cm

Ground clearance: 28 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 42 TRKM V-6 Petrol

Motor capacity: 100 HP at 2000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 140 liters

Maximum speed: 65 km/h

Maximum range: 250 km

Armament:

1�2 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.92 mm�� 1000�2000 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 10�15 mm

Hull sides: 8 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 8 mm

Turret front: 10�15 mm (250/9)

Turret sides: 8 mm (250/9)

The following variations were built:

251/1 Armoured medium troop transport carrier. Crew: 2 + 10 men.

251/1 (Wuhrfrahmen) Armoured medium troop transport carrier with m 28/32 cm rocket launchers �Stuks zu Fuss�. Crew: 2 + 5 men.

251/2 Armoured 8 cm mortar carrier. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/3 Armoured radio carrier. Crew 2 + 5 men.

251/4 Armoured artillery tractor. Crew 2 + 5 men.

251/5 Armoured transport carrier for pioneers(engineering troops/sappers). Crew 2 + 7 men.

251/6 Armoured command carrier for divisional, corp and Arme� commanders. Crew: 2 + 4.

251/7 Armoured transport carrier for assault engineers. Crew: 2 + 5 men.

251/8 Armoured ambulance. Crew 2 + 1.

251/9 Armoured assault-gun carrier 7.5 cm �Stummel�. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

251/10 Armoured platoon weapon support carrier 3.7 cm PAK. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

251/11 Armoured Field Telephone carrier. Crew: 2 + 3 men.

251/12 Armoured battery command carrier. Crew: 2 + 4 men.

251/13 Armoured fire direction carrier for artillery. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/14 Armoured command carrier for artillery sound measurement. Crew: 2 + 6 men.

251/15 Armoured command carrier for observation of artillery firing. Crew 2 + 4.

251/16 Armoured flamethrower �Flamenwerfer 40�. Crew 2 + 3 men.

251/17 Armoured anti-aircraft gun carrier Flak 38 2 cm. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/18 Armoured battle command carrier. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/19 Armoured command carrier with telephone exchange. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/20 Armoured carrier for search light �Uhu�. Crew 2 + 2 men.

251/21 Armoured anti-aircraft gun carrier MG 151/15 �drilling�. Crew 2 + 4 men.

251/22 Armoured Pv�� carrier PAK 40 7.5 cm. Crew 2 + 2 men.

251/23 Armoured reconnaissance carrier 2 cm Kwk 38. Crew 2 + 2.

Production period: 1939�1945.

Manufacturer: Hanomag and Borgward

Tonnage: 8.5 tonnes

Crew: 2 + 10 (see above)

Length: 5.80 meters

Width: 2 meters

Height: 1.75 meter

Track width: 28 cm

Ground clearance: 32 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 42 TUKRM V-6 Bensin

Engine capacity: 100 HP at 3000rpm

Fuel capacity: 160 liters

Maximum speed: 53 km/h

Maximum range: 320 km

Armament:

1�2 � 7.92 mm MG, depending on model.

Ammunition quantity: 7.92 mm.

Between 1200 and 3600 rounds depending on model.

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 12 mm

Hull sides: 8 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 8 mm

Turret front: 12 mm

Turret sides: 8 mm

One of Germany�s most common armoured cars during WWII. Built on a chassis designed for armoured cars, it had 4-wheel drive and 4�4 steering. They were manufactured between 1935 and 1944. The 221 and the 222 were reconnaissance vehicles with standard features and roles. The 223, 260 and 261 models had higher capacity radio systems and functioned more as mobile communication centres in connection with reconnaissance missions. Approximately 2,200 were built, all told.

Production period: 1935�1944

Manufacturers: Krupp, Horch

Tonnage: 4�4.8 tonnes

Crew:

221, 222, 223: 3,

260, 261: 4

Length: 4.8 meters

Width: 1.95 meters

Height: 1.80 meters

Wheel base: 280 cm

Ground clearance: 24 cm

Motor: Horch 801 V-8 Petrol

Engine capacity: 75 HP at 3600 rpm

Fuel capacity: 100 liters

Maximum speed: 80 km/h

Maximum range: 280 km

Armament:

221: 1 � MG 7.92 mm or 1� 2.8 cm

Panzerbuche 222: 1 � 20 mm KwK or 2.8 cm

Panzerbuche 223: 1 � 20 mm KwK

260, 261: 1 � MG 7.92 mm

Ammunition quantity:

20 mm�� 250 shells (222, 223)

2.8 cm�� 200 shells (221, 222)

7.92 mm�� 2,500 rounds (221, 260, 261)

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 14.5 mm (all models)

Hull sides: 8 mm (all models)

Hull rear, roof, floor: 8 mm (all models)

Turret front: 14.5 mm (231, 232)

Turret sides: 14.4 mm (231, 232)

Based on the PzKpfw II and Germany�s most common self-propelled artillery gun during WWII, the Wespe was hardly advanced and a very simply built vehicle. As usual, Germanys� armaments industry make use of their overproduction of dated equipment to come up with a more solution to a given problem.This was the case with the �Wespe�. The PzKpfw II was simplified by moving the engine, making space to install the big 10.5 cm howitzer in even such a small vehicle as the Pzkpfw II. The result was an extremely popular self-propelled gun. All told, approximately 1,000 were built in different versions.

Production period: 1943�1944

Manufacturer: FAMO

Tonnage: 11 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 4.81 meters

Width: 2.28 meters

Height: 2.30 meters

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 34 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 62 TR V-6 petrol

Engine capacity: 140 HP at 2,600rpm

Fuel capacity: 200 liters

Maximum speed: 40 km/h

Maximum range: 140 km

Armament: 1 � 10.5 le. FH. 18/2, 1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity: 10.5 cm�� 32 shells, 7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 30 mm

Hull sides: 15 mm

Hull rear, roof floor: 15 mm

Turret front: 15 mm

Turret sides: 15 mm

Initially, the design of this vehicle was completed as early as 1942. From the very first, it was called the �Sturmgesch�tz neue art� reflecting its purpose of replacing the StuG III as a mobile anti-tank artillery gun. However, it wasn�t until January of 1944 that Hitler approved it and production began. To begin with, it was equipped with an L/48 gun but by the late-summer of 1944 several more L/70 guns became available so that by November 1944 only the panzer IV/70 variant was in production. There were two additional variations: the Alkett (A) and the Vomag (V) that shared in the vehicle�s production right up until May 1945. The total number produced breaks down as follows: 769 examples of the L/48, 930 of the Vomag L/70 variation, and 278 of the Alkett L/70. The vehicle was extremely effective and very popular. Note: During the 1950s and 60s West Germany built a series of mobile PV-guns which were directly reminiscent of the Jagdpanzer IV design! The lines could be clearly observed.

Production period: 1944

Manufacturer: Vomag

Tonnage: 24 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 4.87 meters

Width: 2.63 meters

Height: 2.17 meters

Track width: 35 cm

Ground clearance: 42 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 120 TRM V-12 petrol

Engine capacity: 265 HP at 2,600rpm

Fuel capacity: 470 liters

Maximum speed: 40 km/h

Maximum range: 210 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48cm,

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm�� 79 shells,

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 80 mm

Hull sides: 40 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 40 mm

Turret front: unavailable

Turret sides: unavailable

Production period: 1944�1945

Manufacturers: Vomag, Alkett

Tonnage: 27 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 8.87 meters

Width: 2.90 meters

Height: 2.20 meters

Track width: 40 cm

Clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Maybach HL 120 TRM V-12 Petrol

Engine capacity: 265 HP at 2,600rpm

Fuel capacity: 470 liters

Maximum speed: 38 km/h

Maximum range: 200 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm K.w.K 42 L/70,

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm�� 90 shells

7.92 mm�� 1,200 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 80 mm

Hull sides: 40 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 40 mm

Turret front: unavailable

Turret sides: unavailable

A principle of the so called Blitzkrieg doctrine was that the infantry must be mechanised, and also, their support weapons. For this reason, Germany sought ways to mechanise the heavy infantry guns (s.I.G 15cm). During 1940 and 1941, the PzKpfw I and II were used to mechanise the s.I.G�� however, satisfactory solutions were never forthcoming. The 38(t) proved a much better solution. The vehicle was clearly more suited than its predecessors to transporting such a heavy gun. True, it was lightly armoured, but it was never intended to be used on the frontline, but rather as indirect support to the infantry. In total, 400 were manufactured in two production runs between 1942 and 1944, all based upon two different versions of the 38(t).

Production period: 1942�1943

Manufacturers: Praga CKD, BMM, Skoda

Tonnage: 11.5 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 5.6 meters

Width: 2.15 meters

Height: 2.40 meters

Track width: 29 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Praga TNHPS/II V-6 petrol

Engine capacity: 150 HP at 2,600 rpm

Fuel capacity: 218 litres

Maximum speed: 42 km/h

Maximum range: 185 km

Armament:

1 � 15 cm s.I.G 33/1

1 � 7.92 mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

15 cm�� 15 shells

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 50 mm

Hull sides: 10 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 10 mm

Turret front: 10 mm

Turret sides: 10 mm

Production period: 1943�1944

Manufacturers: Praga, CKD, BMM, Skoda

Tonnage: 11.5 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 4.8 meters

Width: 2.15 meters

Height: 2.40 meters

Track width: 29 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: Praga AC/2,800 V-6 petrol

Engine capacity: 150 HP at 2,800rpm

Fuel capacity: 320 liters

Maximum speed: 42 km/h

Maximum range: 260 km

Armament:

1 � 15 cm s.I.G 33/1,

1 � 7.92mm MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm � 15 shells,

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 60 mm

Hull sides: 15 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 15 mm

Turret front: 15 mm

Turret sides: 15 mm

A more modern armoured-car which was not over-armed like the BA-10, but only had a two man crew and a machine-gun. It was a notably excellent scouting car. A total of 3,600 examples were built during WWII.

Production period: 1942�1945

Manufacturer: GAZ

Tonnage: 2.5 tonnes

Crew: 2

Length: 3.67 meters

Width: 1.52 meters

Height: 1.88 meters

Wheel base: unavailable

Ground clearance: 25 cm

Motor: GAZ-MM Diesel

Engine capacity: 54 HP at 2,800 rpm

Fuel capacity: 100 liters

Maximum speed: 80 km/h

Maximum range: 560 km

Armament: 1 � 7.62 mm MG DT

Ammunition quantity: 7.62 mm�� 1,300 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 12 mm

Hull sides: 12 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 12 mm

Turret front: 12 mm

Turret sides: 12 mm

The Soviets� most common heavy armoured car during WWII. It bore a 45 mm gun in the turret as well as a machinegun. Strong and swift but unfortunately built only with 6�4 steering capacity which made it difficult for cross country operations. 1,400 were manufactured during the war years.

Production period: 1938�1942

Manufacturer: GAZ

Tonnage: 5 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 4.66 meters

Width: 2.07 meters

Height: 2.21 meters

Track width: unavailable

Ground clearance: 22 cm

Motor: GAZ-M1 Diesel

Engine capacity: 52 HP at 2,800 rpm

Fuel capacity: 120 liters

Maximum speed: 53 km/h

Maximum range: 250 km

Armament:

1 � 4.5 cm M1938,

2 � 7.62 mm MG DT

Ammunition quantity:

4.5 cm�� 43 shells

7.62 mm�� 2,100 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 10 mm

Hull sides: 10 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 10 mm

Turret front: 10 mm

Turret sides: 10 mm

The world�s most famous and most manufactured tank. And apparently a number are still in use today in most of the trouble spots and conflicts around the world. The ground reason for its success was, and remains, the suspension utilized to mount the caterpillar tracks; the so called �Christie suspension� which, together with its powerful engine and broad caterpillar �feet,� turned all terrain, with the exception of deep heavy mud, into common roads. It was produced in two main versions, the /76 and /85. The /85, however, eventually became the standard version in 1944. The designation �85� refers to the gun calibre. At the start of the war, the standard tank designed and produced by the Soviets had a turret with space for a crew that fell one man short�� that is to say, the German tanks of comparable size had three-man turrets and the T-34/76 turrets could only accommodate two men: The T-34/85 had a three-man turret. In addition, T-34s were rarely equipped with radios in the period prior to 1943, which naturally hindered coordination and effectiveness on the battlefield. This aside, it was well armed and well protected; the T-34�s armour has also been a model for international tank design ever since 1941, and it was mechanically dependable despite the fact that overall Soviet engineering prowess generally left something to be desired. It was neither finely crafted nor finely painted but it was dependable�� and popular with all who used it, including the Germans. Soviet industry managed to build approximately 35,000 T-34/76s and 31,000 T-34 /85s during WWII.

Production period: 1940�� 1944

Manufacturer: Kirov, STZ

Tonnage: 26.5 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 6.68 meters

Width: 3 meters

Height: 2.45 meters

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: V2 Diesel

Engine capacity: 500 HP at 2,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 460 liters

Maximum speed: 54 km/h

Maximum range: 300 km

Armament:

1 � 7.6 cm F-34 L/41.5

2 � 7.62 mm DT MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.6 cm�� 77 shells

7.62 mm�� 2,900 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 52 mm

Hull sides: 52 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 13 mm

Turret front: 52 mm

Turret sides: 52 mm

Production period: 1944�1945

Manufacturer: Kirov, STZ

Tonnage: 32 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 8.15 meters

Width: 3 meters

Height: 2.60 meters

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: V2-34 Diesel

Engine capacity: 500 HP at 1,800rpm

Fuel capacity: unavailable

Maximum speed: 52 km/h

Maximum range: 230 km

Armament:

1 � 8.5 cm ZiS S-53

2 � 7.62 mm DT MG

Ammunition quantity:

8.5 cm�� 55 shells

7.92 mm�� 1900 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 90 mm

Hull sides: 75 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 20 mm

Turret frontal: 90 mm

Turret sides: 75 mm

The Soviet Union�s most common light tank by 1944; the T-70 had the classical Soviet design for light tanks; a one-man turret and one person in the tank. In other words, it had a two-man crew, operating a 45 mm gun and a machinegun. It had strong armour for being a light tank but with a one-man turret, limited effectiveness in battle. Approximately 8,400 were built during WWII.

Production period: 1942�1943

Manufacturer: Factory No. 43

Tonnage: 10 tonnes

Crew: 2

Length: 4.42 meters

Width: 2.47 meters

Height: 2.03 meters

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 30 cm

Motor: GAZ-202

Engine capacity: 140 HP at 3,400rpm

Fuel capacity: 300 litres

Maximum speed: 45 km/h

Maximum range: 360 km

Armament:

1 � 4.5 cm model 1938

1 � 7.62 mm DT MG

Ammunition Quantity:

4.5 cm�� 70 shells

7.62 mm�� 1,000 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 60 mm

Hull sides: 45 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 45 mm

Turret front: 60 mm

Turret sides: 45 mm

Production period: 1942�1945

Manufacturer: GAZ

Tonnage: 11 tonnes

Length: 5 meters

Width: 2.74 meters

Height: 2.20 meters

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 30 cm

Motor: GAZ-203/2,800 V-6 diesel

Engine capacity: 140 HP at 3,400 rpm

Fuel capacity: 44 km/h

Maximum range: 360 km

Armament:

1 � 7.62 cm ZiS-3

Ammunition quantity:

7.62 cm�� 60 shells

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 35 mm

Hull sides: 10 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 10 mm

Turret front: 35 mm

Turret sides: 10 mm

The Soviet�s most common self-propelled artillery gun during the war, it was mounted on the chassis of the light T-70. An extra wheel was added on each side and an open turret was added for the crew. This resulted in space being created for a variation of the gun mounted on the T-34�s 7.62cm gun, namely, the ZiS-3. The ZiS 3 was a good combination of the 7.62cm field gun and the famous anti-tank gun of the same calibre, the ZiS-S-53. Overall, an extremely successful vehicle despite its weak armour, which was not a drawback of particular concern to the leadership of the Red Army. In total, 12,000 Su-76s were built during WWII.

The Soviets first attempt at an effective track-propelled anti-tank gun was built on the chassis of a T-34 with an 8.5 cm gun which was effective, but almost as quickly as the T-34 was built in 1944 with a mounted 8.5 cm gun, production of the SU-85�s was halted and manufacture of the even more effective SU-100 took over, a model which was used, among others, by Egypt in the Sinai War. In total 2,500 Su-85�s were built during WWII.

Production period: 1943�1944

Manufacturer: STZ

Tonnage: 29 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 8 meters

Width: 3 meters

Height: 2.45 meters

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: W2-34 Diesel

Engine capacity: 500 HP at 1,800 rpm

Fuel capacity: 465 litres

Maximum speed: 55 km/h

Maximum range: 300 km

Armament:

1� 8.5 cm D-5-S-85

Ammunition quantity:

8.5 cm�� 48 shells

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 65 mm

Hull sides: 45 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

Turret front: 65 mm

Turret sides: 45 mm

The Soviet Army had already experimented with heavy tanks prior to WWII�� no model had been particularly satisfactory. The T-35 was a monster which could hardly move without breaking down. The SMK was even worse and the T-28 was too lightly armed. The KV-1 was also too lightly armed but, despite all else, with its excellent armour it performed well during 1941 and 1942. From 1943 onwards, a new heavy tank was required and it was only then that for the first time the Soviet leadership felt that they could afford to design and build a new heavy tank. The IS-1 was a new design but only had an 8.5 cm gun, the same gun as found on the new T-34/85, thus the IS-2 was developed. The vehicle in question was a further development on the KV�s chassis and its track-drive suspension, but with much stronger armoured protection and much heavier armament. The vehicle was larger and slower than the T-34 but had a powerful gun which used different types of ammunition and possessed a powerful blasting capacity. It was popular among crews and was used throughout the war and even as late as 1967 in the middle-east conflict. However, there it was outclassed by more modern enemy tanks. In total 3,300 IS-2s were produced between 1944 and 1945.

Production period: 1943�1945

Manufacturer: Chelyabinsk

Tonnage: 46 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 9.83 meters

Width: 3.07 meters

Height: 2.74 meters

Track width: 47 cm

Ground clearance: 50 cm

Motor: W2-IS Diesel

Engine capacity: 600 hp at 2,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 550 litres

Maximum speed: 37 km/h

Maximum range: 240 km

Armament:

1 � 12.2 cm D-25T model 1943

2 � 7.62 mm DT MG

1 � 12.7 mm DShK AA MG

Ammunition quantity:

12.2 cm�� 28 shells

7.62 mm�� 2,300 rounds

12.7 mm�� 300 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 160 mm

Hull sides: 110 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 20 mm

Turret front: 160 mm

Turret sides: 110 mm

Production period: 1942�1943

Manufacturer: STZ

Tonnage: 31 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 7 meter

Width: 3 meter

Height: 2.32 meter

Track width: 40 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: W2-34 Diesel

Engine capacity: 500 HP at 1,800 rpm

Fuel capacity: 465 litres

Maximum speed: 55 km/h

Maximum range: 300 km

Armament:

1� 12.2 Howitzer M-30

Ammunition quantity:

12.2 cm�� 40 shells

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 65 mm

Hull sides: 45 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

Turret frontal: 64 mm

Turret sides: 45 mm

The Soviet Union�s first track-driven howitzer. Just like the SU-85 it is based on the T-34 with the same chassis and engine. This howitzer transporter was effective in 1942 when it was developed. In 1943 came its successor, the SU-152, and production of the SU-122 was halted to accommodate production of the SU-85. Approximately 600 SU-122s were built in total.

The most effective track-driven howitzer in the Red Army. Built on the chassis of the old KV-1, its armament was the massive ML-20S howitzer with a calibre of 15.24 cm. These shells �ploughed streets in the forest� according to eye-witnesses and proved to have a singularly destructive effect on Tiger and Panther tanks�� thereby acquiring the nickname �Zveroboi��� �the cat killer.� 700 hundred of them were built before the chassis was changed to the IS vehicle in 1943, at which time the SU-152 changed its designation to the ISU-152.

Production period: 1943

Manufacturer: Chelyabinsk

Tonnage: 46 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 9 meters

Width: 3.25 meters

Height: 2.45 meters

Track width: 47 cm

Ground clearance: 50 cm

Motor: W2-IS Diesel

Engine capacity: 600 HP at 2,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 550 litres

Maximum speed: 42 km/h

Maximum range: 260 km

Armament:

1 � 15.24 cm ML-20S Howitzer

1 � 12.7 mm MG DShK

Ammunition quantity:

15.24 cm�� 20 shells

12.7 mm�� 250 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 60 mm

Hull sides: 60 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

Turret front: 60 mm

Turret sides: 60 mm

Production period: 1943�1945

Manufacturer: Chelyabinsk

Tonnage: 45/46 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 9.85/9.18 meters

Width: 3.07 meters

Height: 2.48 meters

Track width: 47 cm

Ground clearance: 50 cm

Motor: W2-IS diesel

Engine capacity: 600 HP at 2,000 rpm

Fuel capacity: 550 litres

Maximum speed: 37 km/h

Maximum range: 220 km

Armament:

1� 12.2 cm D25S Howitzer (122)

1� 15.24 cm ML20 Howitzer (152)

1� 12.7 mm MG DShK (on both)

Ammunition quantity:

12.2 cm�� 30 shells

15.24 cm�� 20 shells

12.7 mm�� 250 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 90 mm

Hull sides: 90 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 25 mm

Turret front: 90 mm

Turret sides: 90 mm

In large part, it was the same vehicle as the SU-152 although built on an IS-2 chassis. Two different versions were manufactured, the ISU-122 or ISU-152; both were equally effective as infantry support weapons, but the 122 proved to be the more effective anti-tank weapon. Note the differing specifications below. In total, 4,000 examples of both were built between 1943 and 1945.

Production period: 1941�1944

Manufacturer: White Motors

Tonnage: 6 tonnes

Crew: 4

Length: 5.61 meters

Width: 2.03 meters

Height: 1.98 meters

Track width: unavailable

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: unavailable

Engine capacity: 97 HP�� rpm unavailable

Fuel capacity: unavailable

Maximum speed: 92 km/h

Maximum range: 260 km

Armament:

1 � 0.50 cal MG

2�3 � 0.30 cal MG

Ammunition quantity:

0.50 cal?

0.30 cal?

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 12 mm

Hull sides: 8 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 8 mm

An armoured truck, without the properties characteristic to them, is the best way of describing the M3A1. Designed to be an armoured reconnaissance vehicle was built on the chassis of a four-wheel drive lorry. So far so good, however, it was actually too big and clumsy to be an effective reconnaissance vehicle, and too weakly armoured and armed to be used as proper armoured transport. Instead it was actively utilized in wide range of roles such as a military police or command vehicle or even as an ambulance. Despite its apparent drawbacks, the Red Army regarded it as a splendid reconnaissance vehicle and equipped their cavalry corps with them. In addition, when heavily armed with up to 4 to 5 machineguns, they were effective in fighting against enemy infantry. Approximately 3,500 were sent to the Soviet Union under the lend lease programme. The American industrial sector produced approximately 18,000 vehicles of this type during the course of the war.

Production period: 1941�1945

Manufacturer: White, Autocar

Tonnage: 9 to 9.3 tonnes

Crew: 3 + 10

Length: 6.32 meters

Width: 1.96 meters

Height: 2.31 meters

Track width: 30 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: unavailable

Engine capacity: 128 HP�� rpm unavailable

Fuel capacity: unavailable

Maximum speed: 72 km/h

Maximum range: 345 km

Armament:

1� 0.50 cal MG

2� 0.30 cal MG

Ammunition quantity:

0.50 cal � ?

0.30 cal � ?

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 12 mm

Hull sides: 8 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 8 mm

Turret fronl: unavailable

Turret sides: unavailable

The USA�s answer to the German 251: A traditionally built half-track with a front-mounted motor and combat space at the rear. Swift, robust and dependable, it was a weakly armoured but was nonetheless popular. Built in several special versions, a total of approximately 56,000 these half-tracks were produced during WWII. The Soviets received approximately 1,400 under the lend-lease programme.

The USA�s first true self-propelled anti-tank gun or �tank-killer�. The vehicle was built on the chassis of the M4A2 or M4A3 but with lighter armour and a new turret which had a better gun than the original, a 3-inch M7. Overall not a particularly successful construction; though it certainly had a better gun to penetrate the front hulls of German tanks, as opposed to the M4�s 75mm, but with weaker armour, manual turret rotation, and without a machinegun in the turret to protect against infantry attack. Nonetheless, it remained in service until the M18 and M36 came on line in 1944. In total, nearly 7,000 M10s were built, of which the Soviets received 52�� almost all of which saw service with the 1st Belorussian front.

The USA�s and the rest of the world�s most common tank during WWII. Approximately 50,000 vehicles were built during the war years. (!!!) The frontal hull was sloped but not the side hulls which didn�t add value to the vehicle�s protection. In addition, the Americans typically had a white star painted the tank�s sides, enabling the enemy to pinpoint their sights. Moreover, this vehicle caught fire so easily that it was nicknamed the �Ronson lighter� and, as cited earlier, in the beginning of the war it was too lightly armed. Nonetheless, it was a robust tank and the most produced. The Soviet�s received 4,000 M4�s through the Lend-Lease programme.

Production period: 1942�1945

Manufacturers: Lima Locomotive Works, Chrysler

Tonnage: 28.5 tonnes

Crew: 5

Length: 5.89 meters

Width: 2.62 meters

Height: 2.74 meters

Track width: 43 cm

Ground clearance: 40 cm

Motor: 9-cyl Continental R975C1

Engine capacity: 350 HP at 2,400rpm

Fuel capacity: 662 litres

Maximum speed: 35 km/h

Maximum range: 190 km

Armament:

1 � 7.5 cm M3,

1 � 0.50 cal MG,

1� 0.30 cal MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.5 cm�� 97 shells

0.50 cal�� 300 rounds

0.30 cal�� 4,750 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 51 mm

Hull sides: 38 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 19 mm

Turret front: 85 mm

Turret sides: 25�50 mm

Perhaps the most British of all of the military inventions during WWII; the Bren carrier. No other country used a track driven transport vehicle of its size and to such an extent as Britain did. Over 50,000 were built between 1939 and 1945. Their areas of application were widespread and it was very popular among the troops. The Russians used them primarily as reconnaissance vehicles.

Production period: 1939�1945

Manufacturer: Vickers

Tonnage: 3.6 tonnes

Crew: 2 + 4

Length: 3.76

Width: 2.11 meters

Elevation: 1.60 meters

Track width: 20 cm

Ground clearance: 25 cm

Motor: unavailable

Engine capacity: 85 HP

Fuel capacity: unavailable

Maximum speed: 53 km/h

Maximum range: unavailable

Armament: 1� 7.92 MG

Ammunition quantity:

7.92 mm�� 600 rounds

Armour strength:

Hull frontal: 12 mm

Hull sides: 6 mm

Hull rear, roof, floor: 6 mm

Britain�s most common infantry support tank during WWII. The vehicle was primarily designed for close infantry support. This meant that was not equipped with the strongest of motors. Hence, it wasn�t capable of moving at high speed and, at the beginning of the war, it was weakly armed. Despite this, it proved to be a popular tank, above all with the Red Army, as it didn�t require much maintenance.

The Swedish volunteer SS-Untersturmf�hrer G�sta Borg was one of the few Swedish volunteers present in Warsaw during the bloody Uprising of 1944. As war-correspondent for the SS-Standarte �Kurt Eggers� Borg reported on the fighting in Warsaw�s from its urban centre. He was also present in the city quarter of Praga where the IV.SS-Panzer-Korps clashed with the 1st Belorussian Front. The fighting in and around Praga was incredibly intensive and there were heavy losses on both sides. Officially, it is usually claimed that the Red Army halted outside of Warsaw for military reasons. It is well known that Stalin had no intention of assisting the Polish Home Army under General �B�r� against the Germans during the Uprising and, as this book shows, the Red Army was anything but inactive in areas just outside Warsaw. The IV.SS-Panzer-Korps under SS-Obergruppenf�hrer Herbert Otto Gille effectively halted the Soviet offensive, but at the cost of incredible losses in equipment and human lives.

After the war, G�sta Borg wrote a book titled �Det R�da Massanfallet� i.e. �The Red�s Massed Attack� in which he recounts some of his experiences from the Warsaw area during the months of July and August, 1944. On pages 20 and 23 of this book, Borg describes the situation at the front and his impressions from the bloody battlefield.

�The Red�s Massed Attack� by G�sta Borg:

At the war�s end, Poland and its population had by no means won their freedom�� the Nazi government�s terror apparatus was replaced by the Soviet�s. Not until a half century later did the Poles win their freedom�� a freedom that cost countless human lives.

Abteilung: Battalion

AK: �Armia Krajowa� The Polish Home Army

AT: Anti-tank

BA-FAI: A Soviet armoured car used by the Germans as a police armoured car.

BP 42: Armoured train, model 1942

BP 44: Armoured train, model 1944

Brummb�r: Assault tank IV, equipped with a heavy assault gun

Ersatz: Replacement/training

Ersatz-StuG. Abt.: Replacement assault battalion

Fallschirm-Panzer: Parachute armour (Herman G�ring)

Flak-Kaserne: Anti-aircraft garrison

Flak-Vierling: Four-barrelled anti-aircraft gun of calibre 20 mm

Funklenk (Fkl): Radio controlled

Gammongranat: British anti-tank grenade

Goliath: Radio controlled mini tracked vehicle for the delivery of demolition charges

Heeresgruppe: Arm� Group (Army Group)

Hetzer: Tank killer, a self-propelled AT-GUN mounted on a Czechslovakian T-38 tank, when in German service PzKpfw 38(t)

Jagdpanzer: The standard description for all designed self-propelled AT-guns.

Kampfgruppe: Battle-group

Karl Ger�t: Super heavy mortar of calibre 60 cm and was used for the destruction of the heaviest bunkers.

Kraftfahrpark: Vehicle depot

MG 34: Machinegun, model 34

MG 42: Machinegun, model 42

Molotovcocktail: Petrol bomb

Munitionsschleper: Ammunition transport

M�rser: Mortar, high calibre artillery gun similar technically to standard mortars firing shells in a high arc toward the target.

Nebelwerfer: German rocket artillery

PAK: anti-tank weapon

Pak 38: Panzer Abwehr Kanone AT-GUN, 5 cm calibre

Pak 40: AT-gun, 7.5 cm

Panzer-Abteilung: Panzer Battalion

Panzer-Aufkl�rungs.Abt.: Panzer reconnaisance battalion

Panzerbefehlswagen IV: PzKpfw IV-vehicle with extra radio equipment for use as a battle command vehicle for a panzer battalion.

Panzer-Division: Tank Division

Panzerfaust: German AT gun

Panzergrenadier: Tank grenadier

Panzer-J�ger-Abteilung: Anti-tank battalion

Panzer-Kompanie: Panzer Company

Panzer-Korps: Tank Corps

Panzer-Nachrichten: Tank communication/radio unit

Panzerschreck: German bazooka

PIAT: British RCL, a one-man, recoilless AT-gun

PzKpfw: PanZerKamPFWagen = Tank

PzKpfw II: A light tank, model 2, and reconnaissance vehicle

PzKpfw III: A tank model 3 and medium tank

PzKpfw IV: A tank model 4 and medium tank

PzKpfw V �Panther�: A tank model 5 and medium-heavy tank

PzKpfw VI �Tiger�: A tank model 6 and heavy tank

PzKpfw 38(t): A reconnaissance tank of Czech origin also used by the Swedish Army

PzKpfw 736(i): German codification for an Italian tank of model M13/40 and the M14/41

RONA: Russian National Liberation Army

SA: Sturm-Abteilung�� Assault Battalion

Sd Kfz: SonDerkraFtfahrZug = ID code for military vehicles in German service.

Sd Kfz 7/2: Anti-aircraft- halftrack baring a 3.7 cm Flak 36 AA gun

Sd Kfz 10/4: Anti-aircraft-halftrack baring a 20 mm Flak-Vierling 38 AA gun

Sd Kfz 132 �Marder�: Self-propelled 7.62 cm AT-gun converted from the obsolete PzKpfw II�� vehicle

Sd Kfz 232: Armoured Radio Car

Sd Kfz 233: Armoured car without turret, armed with a 7.5 cm short-barrelled gun

Sd Kfz 250: Light half track for infantry transport

Sd Kfz 251: Medium/heavy half-track for infantry transport

Sd Kfz 263: Armoured radio car (6�4)

Sd Kfz 301, (B VI): Borgward a so called �Sprengstoff-tr�ger� vehicle built especially for the demolition of bunkers and obstacles.

SS-Obergruppenf�hrer: SS-General

SS-Standartenf�hrer: SS-Colonel

SS-Staufernkasern: SS-Garrison

StuG Sturmgesch�tz: Assault gun

SS und Polizeif�hrer: Chief of SS- and Police units within a specified occupied area

Sturm-Kompanie: Assault Company

Sturmpanzer: Heavily armed, assault gun of model Brummb�r

Sturm-Pionier: Assault sappers/pioneers

Sturmstiger: One of the most heavily armed guns! A 38 cm rocket launcher also called �Sturmm�rser� or assault mortar.

z.b.V zum besonderer Verwendung: available�� at command disposal

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Bartoszewski W: Dni walcz�cej stolicy, Warszawa 1989.

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Malmassari P: Les Traines Blind�s 1826-1989, bmw 1989.

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Pami�tniki �o�nierzy batalionu,, Zo�ka�: Warszawa 1957.

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Podleweski S: Prezemarsz przez pieklo, Warszawa 1957.

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armia Krajowa: Londyn 1950.

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